The Eurozone crisis is sometimes interpreted as a confirmation that the monetary union was a doomed project. An alternative view is that a monetary union is a demanding construction, more demanding than the founding fathers thought, and less demanding than the critics assert. The founding fathers were focused on the essentials: central bank independence backed by fiscal discipline, clarity of objectives and payment systems. The skeptics correctly observed that a central bank must be ready to lend in last resort, which creates liabilities that fiscally independent countries may refuse to accept. The crisis has confirmed the skeptics’ fears but not the conclusion that the Eurozone is not viable. The monetary union has proved its usefulness – no contagion of currency crises – but has illustrated the need for enhancing the requirements: a central bank must be concerned with financial stability and accept the possibility of having to lend in last resort; collective oversight and backstops are needed for banks; central bank management must be shielded from political pressure; fiscal discipline must be constitutionally guaranteed at the proper level.