Onipresente na obra de Gilberto Freyre, na qual recebe tratamento diversificado, o tema da culinária e da alimentação evidencia o projeto científico e o programa político do autor pernambucano, bem como seu pioneirismo e sua importância contemporânea. Buscando um esforço de síntese e a sondagem de alguns aspectos mais recônditos da obra freyreana, esse artigo pretende demonstrar que subjazem ao tratamento da culinária em Freyre os temas-chave de raça, identidade e modernidade. A relação e entre nutrição e raça sugere que argumentos baseados na alimentação foram fundamentais para sobrepor ao paradigma racista um culturalista. A relação entre alimentação e identidade evidencia que a culinária brasileira é epítome do caráter mestiço do brasileiro. A relação entre alimentação e modernidade implica que a culinária nacional há de ser defendida das forças descaracterizadoras da modernização.

A significant shortcoming in Latin American transitions to democracy has been the failure of some subnational units to follow suit, leading to the emergence of authoritarian enclaves. Recently, however, some of these nondemocratic regimes have moved toward a political opening. In this respect, the state of Bahia in Northeastern Brazil is intriguing. Antônio Carlos Magalhães and his associates, known as carlistas, were in office between 1970 and 2006, when Jaques Wagner, from the Worker's Party (PT), won the gubernatorial election. While the ascent of the PT was saluted as spearheading Bahia's democratization, numerous observers have signaled important elements of continuity, including personalism, clientelism, and top-down decision making. What changed and what didn't is thus a pertinent question. To answer it, I use Robert Dahl's procedural definition of democracy (completed and updated by more recent scholarship) as the guiding criterion to compare carlista and PT rule in Bahia. I conclude with a broad reflection on subnational democratization in Latin America.

Este ensayo propone un análisis deconstructivo del problema del habla y la escritura en Vidas secas (1938) de Graciliano Ramos. Al examinar la razón de la aparente discapacidad lingüístico-alfabética de los protagonistas de la obra, la crítica ha permanecido hasta el momento dentro de un esquema oposicional (habla/no-habla) que debería ser reevaluado por fuera de ese mismo esquema. Siguiendo las ideas de Jacques Derrida, el artículo considera a Fabiano y a su familia una suerte de filósofos que, en su divagar mental y físico, realizan una crítica onto-teológica y logocéntrica del sistema de diferencias metafísicas naturaleza/cultura y humanidad/animalidad. A la luz de las teorías de Giorgio Agamben, Fabiano representa igualmente al homo sacer, en tanto proscrito bajo estado de excepción en donde se anula la diferencia entre animalidad y humanidad. Como subalterno, el personaje se ubica en un espacio liminal, incluido por su misma exclusión.

In 1955, a monument to Inca warrior Rumiñahui was erected in Otavalo's central plaza. In this article, I study the ways in which competing imaginings of the Ecuadorian nation have shaped the material and symbolic trajectory of the monument. The monument was the outcome of a struggle for hegemony between nonindigenous elites. The current appropriation of the monument by the local indigenous population, however, is at odds with the ideological purpose for which it was built. The initiative to build the monument emerged from the public sphere—which at that time excluded indigenous peoples—in a context of national debates about the Indian problem. The widespread notion that the indigenous people of Otavalo were exceptional propelled the local nonindigenous elite to debate the Indian problem and shape, in the process, a public sphere. Elucidating the workings of the public sphere in the racialization of indigenous peoples, I aim to contribute to the academic literature about the relationship between Indian and nation in Ecuador. This literature has focused on the role that either the state or the private sphere has played in this racialization and has not paid enough explicit attention to the public sphere.

Drawing on the literature on the social construction of public policy, this article pinpoints the emergence of the trope of the “temporary Mexican,” that is, the migrant farm laborer, to the 1920 congressional hearings on the “admission of illiterate Mexican laborers.” I argue that this construction was the brainchild of southwestern agriculture and its congressional supporters who sought to conceive of the Mexican laborer in terms consistent with the eugenic, liberal, and socially conservative sensibilities of the time. What resulted from this strategic creative process was the temporary Mexican, a new breed of peon who had free will and was biologically destined to return to Mexico. This temporariness, which was what made this social construction most palatable in the 1920s, has stayed with Mexicans (and Latinos generally) to the modern day, turning them into an in-between group whose membership is always suspect.

El abandono del régimen de convertibilidad en 2002 implicó cambios sustantivos a nivel macroeconómico que tuvieron un fuerte impacto en el desempeño de los distintos sectores de la economía argentina. Sin embargo, durante la posconvertibilidad parece haberse registrado también cierta continuidad en determinados procesos económico-sociales: si bien desde los elencos gubernamentales se ha reivindicado sucesivamente la necesidad de recuperar un empresariado nacional fuerte, el peso del capital extranjero entre las empresas más grandes del país no ha disminuido. Esto es sumamente relevante teniendo en cuenta que la Argentina es una economía dependiente y, por lo tanto, el rol del capital transnacional en su proceso de acumulación es determinante. El objetivo del artículo es indagar sobre las continuidades y las rupturas en el proceso de extranjerización del gran capital en la Argentina a partir de un análisis de lo ocurrido con las quinientas empresas líderes de la economía durante el período 1993-2008.

This article looks at the Chocó Department, where black and indigenous ethnic movements demanded collective land rights and autonomy to safeguard local livelihoods from resource-intensive economies. However, after decentralization and state restructuring reforms granted constitutional protections of local ethnopolitical autonomy in the nineties, most indigenous and black communities failed to benefit from the new rights. This has been explained as the result of human rights violations, neoliberal development, and armed groups' appropriation of regional economies, which created stressful conditions for self-governance. In such a scenario, autonomy was maintained only by communities that could resist violence and hold regional or national governments accountable. I build on these claims and add that the difference between the intent and the actual outcome of the reforms is explained by the way new institutions were territorialized or adapted by specific actors to local dynamics. In the Chocó Department, reforms were territorialized in a context of weak institutions, government corruption, and resource-intensive land-use changes that worked against ethnopolitical autonomy by enabling local intermediaries, who frequently made decisions that went against community rights.

Most conditional cash transfer evaluations have focused on estimating program effects on schooling, consumption, and labor supply. Fewer studies have addressed these outcomes using a distributive lens. This article uses data from three programs in Latin America to obtain evidence of their impact on educational inequality of opportunity, measured using primary enrollment. The main results indicate that groups considered vulnerable gain more in terms of access to education and that these interventions help level the playing field. They do not eliminate inequality of opportunity but are certainly a useful complement to equity-enhancing policies.

As part of a long-standing debate about the extent to which official, government-linked unions in Mexico actively seek to win gains for their members, analysts of labor relations in Mexico have described the dominance of contratos de protección, collective bargaining contracts that offer little or nothing to workers while protecting employers from real union representation. In particular, a number of researchers have asserted that such contracts are universal in retail. Analyzing forty-one retail collective bargaining contracts from four Mexican cities, I find strong evidence that this is not the case. I find considerable variation in wages and fringe benefits, benefits in excess of the legal minimum in 27 to 68 percent of cases (depending on the benefit), and cases of sustained improvement in contractual benefits. Detailed consideration of the patterns suggests that these contracts are not uniformly protection contracts, indicating that there is strong as well as weak unionism in Mexican retail, including among official unions, but that competitive conditions in Mexican retail constrain the possibilities for strong unionism.

Mexican immigration figures have reached their lowest point since 2000. Yet, even if as a whole the United States is receiving fewer Mexican migrants, the opposite is true for cities at the border. In this article, I present evidence to show that this sui generis migration pattern cannot be understood using traditional explanations of migration dynamics. Instead, Mexicans are migrating because of security issues, in fear of drug-related violence and extortion that has spiked since 2008. I provide the first estimate of this migration pattern, showing that 264,692 Mexicans have migrated in fear of organized crime activities. In doing so, I combine the literature on migration dynamics with that on violence and crime, pointing toward ways in which nonstate actors shape actions of state members.

Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves (1989) analyzed data from 238 British neighborhoods to test the mediating effect of indicators of social disorganization. Basing their work on that of Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay (1942), these researchers created indicators such as friendship networks, organizational participation, and the control of street-corner teenaged peer groups, and developed a theory of community level. In this article, we apply the formal logic of Sampson and Groves using data from the first Belo Horizonte victimization survey. In addition, we use data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and the Military Police. The results support the social disorganization theory and demonstrate that crime-rate differences are an effect of community level.