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I congratulate the authors of this article for their beneficial and much-needed work. I consider this work to be a bright shining light in a dark tunnel and a brave move in the right direction. The true value of this work is far beyond the treatment of 71 patients; it implants hope where there is confusion, promotes love where there is hate, and initiates trust and confidence where mistrust is common. Today, humanitarian aid groups and relief organizations face unique, difficult conditions, and sometimes must answer obscure questions and respond to new problems. History tells us that the war ends when the cease fire starts, that humanitarian organizations are well-received and protected, and that victims and patients respect and trust those providing medical treatment, regardless of their nationality. However, current reality reveals that a cease fire sometimes marks the start of a different war with a different strategy. The number of victims after the cease fire may exceed the number of conventional war victims. Some politicians generalize, classify, and reclassify people, creating mistrust, a lack of confidence, and confusion. It is sad to see victims who need treatment, while nearby there are well-meaning people willing to treat them but who are unable to do so without great risk.
In recent years, the perceived threat of chemical terrorism has increased. It is hoped that teaching civilians how to behave during a chemical incident will decrease the number of “worried well” patients at hospitals, reduce secondary contamination, and increase compliance with the instructions of emergency services. The governments of the United Kingdom and Israel sent booklets to every household in their respective countries. In Israel, the civilian population was issued chemical personal protective equipment (chemical personal protective equipment).
Methods:
The effectiveness of these public education programs was assessed using a scenario-based questionnaire that was distributed to 100 respondents in Birmingham, UK and Jerusalem, Israel. Respondents were asked how they would behave in three deliberate chemical release scenarios and how they would seek information and help.
Results:
Only 33% of the UK respondents and 22% of the Israeli respondents recalled reading the government booklets. When asked what they would do after being contaminated in a deliberate release, approximately half of the respondents ranked seeking medical care at a hospital as the most appropriate action.
The preferred sources of information in the wake of a chemical strike were (in descending order): radio, television, and the Internet. Approximately half of the respondents would call emergency services for information. Forty-one percent of the UK respondents and 33% of Israeli respondents stated that they either would call or go to the nearest hospital to seek information.
Conclusions:
The public information campaigns in both countries have had a limited impact. Many citizens claimed they would self-present to the nearest hospital following a chemical attack rather than waiting for the emergency services. A similar response was witnessed in the Sarin attacks in Tokyo and the 1991 Scud missile attacks in Israel.
Current UK doctrine mandates that specialist decontamination teams be deployed to the scene of a chemical release. However, this takes >1 hour, and it requires at least 30 minutes to don hospital chemical personal protective equipment. Therefore, it is imperative that hospitals are equipped to cope with unannounced self-presenters after a chemical attack. This requires chemical personal protective equipment and protocols that are easier to use.
Trauma is a leading cause of death in most countries. Different patterns of trauma deaths are recorded in different countries. The purpose of this study was to evaluate retrospectively the pattern of trauma deaths in the emergency unit of a University Teaching Hospital in Nigeria.
Methods:
This is a descriptive, retrospective study. The data were obtained from patient case files and nurses'records. The data abstracted included age, sex, cause of trauma/death, parts of the body injured, time of death, andthe duration of stay in the Accident and Emergency Unit (AEU).
Results:
A total of 5,537 cases presented to the AEU of the University of Benin Teaching Hospital between 01 January 2001 and 31 December 2004. Of these, 5,446 were due to trauma (98.4%). A total of 127 patients died (case fatality rate: 2.3%). Of the deaths, 81.9% were males. Motor vehicle crashes were the most frequent cause (54.3%), and drowning was the least common cause of trauma (0.8%). The most frequently injured region of the body was the head and neck (53.4%). A total of 67.4% of the deaths occurred within six hours of presentation to the AEU.
Conclusions:
There is a great need for improved road safety, adequate pre-hospital medical care, and prompt transfer services for victims of trauma.
The current insurgency warfare in Iraq is of an unconventional or asymmetrical nature. The deteriorating security has resulted in problems recovering and maintaining essential health services. Before the 2003 war, Iraq was considered a developed country with the capacity to routinely perform baseline medical and surgical care. These procedures now are performed irregularly, if at all. Due to the unconventional warfare, traditional Military Medical Civilian Assistance Programs (MEDCAPs) and civilian humanitarian missions, which routinely are mobilized post-conflict, are unable to function. In December 2005, an international medical mission conducted by the Operation Smile International Chapter in neighboring Jordan employed civilian physicians and nurses to provide surgery and post-operative care for Iraqi children with newly diagnosed cleft lip and palates and the complications that had occurred from previous surgical repair. Seventy-one children, their families, and a team of Iraqi physicians were safely transported to Jordan and returned to Iraq across the Iraqi western province war zone. Although complications may occur during transport, treatment within a safe zone is a solution for providing services in an insecure environment.
The evaluations following the Tsunami that affected 12 countries (December 2004) and the earthquakes in Bam, Iran (2003), and in Pakistan (2005) offered valuable lessons for public health preparedness against all types of risks (natural, complex, or technological) in all countries (regardless their level of development).
The lessons learned, needs assessments, effectiveness of external life-saving assistance, disease surveillance and control, as well as donations management, were reviewed.
Although hundreds of surveys or studies were conducted, the needs assessments were partial and uncoordinated. The findings often were not shared by individual agencies.
The evaluations in each of the three disasters point to some additional issues:
1. Foreign mobile hospitals rarely arrived in time for immediate trauma care. Existing international guidelines for the use of field hospitals often were ignored and must be updated and promoted. Local and neighboring facilities are best at providing immediate, life-saving care;
2. Occassionally, the risk of epidemics was grossly overestimated by the agencies and the mass media. Surveillance and improved routine control programs work without resorting to costly, improvised immunization campaigns of doubtless value. Improving or re-establishing water and sanitation must be the first priority;
3. Health donations were not always appropriate, nor did they follow the World Health Organization guidelines. The costly destruction of inappropriate donations was a recurrent problem; and
4. Medical volunteers from within the affected country were abounding, but did not benefit from the external logistical and material support. The international community should provide logistical and material support before sending expatriate teams that are unfamiliar with the area and its health problems.
Investing in the preparedness of the national health services and communities should become a priority for disaster-prone countries and those assisting them in their development.
Severe flooding in August 2002 devastated villages, towns, large areas of arable land, streets, roads, and industrial areas in the Czech Republic and Southeastern Germany. In the Czech Republic, 48,000 people were evacuated from Prague.Due to electrical outages, communication and the care of hospital patients suffered. Sanitation services and refuse collection also were not available, which increased the potential for the spread of disease. In Germany, five hospitals required evacuation. Electrical outages were problematic here as well, and it is recommended that the procedures for the longdistance transportation of a large number of severely ill or injured people be clarified in national plans.
Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) are on the rise. The ability to locate, identify, and triage patients quickly and efficiently results in better patient outcomes. Poor lighting due to time of day, inclement weather, and power outages can make locating patients difficult. Efficient methods of locating patients allow for quicker transport to definitive care.
Objective:
The objective of this study was to evaluate the methods currently used in mass-casualty collection, and to determine whether the use of the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) triage tag system can be improved by using easily discernable tags (glow sticks) in conjunction with the standard triage tags.
Methods:
Numerous drills were performed utilizing the START triage method. In Trial A, patients were identified with the triage tags only. In Trial B, patients were identified using triage tags and glow sticks. Four rounds of triage drills were performed in low ambient light for each Trial, and the differences in casualty collection times were compared.
Results:
Casualty relocation and collection times were considerably shorter in the trials that utilized both the glow sticks and triage tags. An average of 2.58 minutes (31.75%) were saved during the casualty collections. In addition, fewer patient errors occurred during the trials in which the glow sticks were used. Between the four rounds, an average of four patient errors occurred during the trials that utilized the triage tags. However, there was an average of only one patient error for the drills when participants utilized both the triage tags and the glow sticks.
Conclusions:
The use of the highly visible glow sticks, in conjunction with the START triage tags, allowed for more rapid and accurate casualty collection in suboptimal lighting. The use of the glow sticks made it easier to relocate previously triaged patients and arrange for expeditious transport to definitive care. In addition, the glow sticks reduced the number of patient errors. Most importantly, there was a significant reduction in the number of patients that initially were triaged via the START method, but were overlooked during casualty collection and transport.
Emergency preparedness can be defined by the preparedness pyramid, which identifies planning, infrastructure, knowledge and capabilities, and training as the major components of maintaining a high level of preparedness.The aim of this article is to review the characteristics of contingency plans for mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) and models for assessing the emergency preparedness of hospitals.
Characteristics of Contingency Plans:
Emergency preparedness should focus on community preparedness, a personnel augmentation plan, and communications and public policies for funding the emergency preparedness. The capability to cope with a MCI serves as a basis for preparedness for non-conventional events. Coping with chemical casualties necessitates decontamination of casualties, treating victims with acute stress reactions, expanding surge capacities of hospitals, and integrating knowledge through drills. Risk communication also is important.
Assessment of Emergency Preparedness:
An annual assessment of the emergency plan is required in order to assure emergency preparedness. Preparedness assessments should include: (1) elements of disaster planning; (2) emergency coordination; (3) communication; (4) training; (5) expansion of hospital surge capacity; (6) personnel; (7) availability of equipment; (8) stockpiles of medical supplies; and (9) expansion of laboratory capacities. The assessment program must be based on valid criteria that are measurable, reliable, and enable conclusions to be drawn. There are several assessment tools that can be used, including surveys, parameters, capabilities evaluation, and self-assessment tools.
Summary:
Healthcare systems are required to prepare an effective response model to cope with MCIs. Planning should be envisioned as a process rather than a production of a tangible product. Assuring emergency preparedness requires a structured methodology that will enable an objective assessment of the level of readiness.
On 14 August 2003, New York City and a large portion of the northeastern United States experienced the largest blackout in the history of the country. An analysis of such a widespread disaster on emergency medical service (EMS) operations may assist in planning for and managing such disasters in the future.
Methods:
A retrospective review of all EMS activity within New York City's 9-1-1 emergency telephone system during the 29 hours during which all or parts of the city were without power (16:11 hours (h) on 14 August 2003 until 21:03 h on 15 August 2003) was performed. Control periods were established utilizing identical time periods during the five weeks preceding the blackout.
Results:
Significant increases were identified in the overall EMS demand (7,844 incidents vs. 3,860 incidents; p<0.001) as well as in 20 of the 62 calltypes of the system, including ca rd i ac arrests (119 vs.76, p= 0.043).Significant decreases were found only among calls related to psychological emergencies (114 vs. 221; p= 0.006) and drugor alcohol-related emergencies (78 vs. 146; p = 0.009). Though median response times increased by only 60 seconds, median call-processing times within the 9-1-1 emergency telephone system EMS dispatch center of the city increased from 1.1 to 5.5 minutes.
Conclusions:
The citywide blackout resulted in dramatic changes in the demands upon the EMS system of New York City, the types of patients for whom EMS providers were assigned to provide care, and the dispositions for those assignments. During this time of increased, system-wide demand, the use of cross-trained firefighter and first-responder engine companies resulted in improved response times to cardiac arrest patients. Finally, the ability of the EMS dispatch center to process the increased requests for EMS assistance proved to be the rate-limiting step in responding to these emergencies.These findings will prove useful in planning for future blackouts or any disaster that may broadly impact the infrastructure of a city.
A simplified, four-step approach was used to establish a medical management and response plan to mega-terrorism in Israel. The basic steps of this approach are: (1) analysis of a scenario based on past incidents; (2) description of relevant capabilities of the medical system; (3) analysis of gaps between the scenario and the expected response; and (4) development of anoperational framework.
Analyses of both the scenario and medical abilities led to the recommendation of an evidence-based contingency plan for mega-terrorism. An important lesson learned from the analyses is that a shortage in medical first responders would require the administration of advanced life support (ALS) by paramedics at the scene, along with simultaneous, rapid evacuation of urgent casualties to nearby hospitals by medics practicing basic life support (BLS). Ambulances and helicopters should triage casualties from inner to outer circle hospitals secondarily, preferentially Level-1 trauma centers.
In conclusion, this fourstep approach based on scenario analysis, mapping of medical capabilities, detection of bottlenecks, and establishment of a unique operational framework, can help other medical systems develop a response plan to megaterrorist attacks.
A mass toxicological event (MTE) caused by an act of terrorism or an industrial incident can create large numbers of ambulatory casualties suffering from mild intoxication, acute stress reaction (ASR), and exacerbation of chronic diseases or iatrogenic insult (such as atropine overdose). The logistical and medical management of this population may present a challenge insuch a scenario. The aim of this article is to describe the concept of the Israeli Home Front Command (HFC) of a “Mild Casualties Center” (MCC) for a chemical scenario, and to analyze the results of two large-scale drills that have been used to evaluate this concept.
Methods:
Two large-scale drills were conducted. One MCC drill was located in a school building and the second MCC drill was located in a basketball stadium. These medical centers were staffed by physicians, nurses, and medics, both military (reservists) and civilian (community, non-hospital teams). Two hundred simulated patients entered the MCC during each of the drills, and drill observers assessed how these patients were managed for two hours.
Results:
Of the casualties, 28 were treated in the “medical treatment site”, 10 of which were relocated to a nearby hospital. Only four casualties were treated in the large “mental care site”, planned for a much higher burden of “worried well” patients. Documentation of patient data and medical care was sub-optimal.
Conclusion:
A MCC is a logistically suitable solution for the challenge of managing thousands of ambulatory casualties. The knowledge of the medical team must be bolstered, as most are unfamiliar with both nerve gas poisoning and with ASR. Mild casualties centers should not be located within hospitals and must be staffed by non-hospital, medical personnel to achieve the main task of allowing hospital teams to focus on providing medical care to the moderate and severe nerve gas casualties, without the extra burden of caring for thousands of mild casualties.
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the amount of terrorism preparedness training has increased substantially. However, gaps continue to exist in training for the mental health casualties that result from such events. Responders must be aware of the mental health effects of terror-ism and how to prepare for and buffer these effects. However, the degree to which responders possess or value this knowledge has not been studied.
Methods:
Multi-disciplinary terrorism preparedness training for healthcare professionals was conducted in Kansas in 2003. In order to assess knowledge and attitudes related to mental health preparedness training, post-test surveys were provided to 314 respondents 10 months after completion of the training. Respondents returned 197 completed surveys for an analysis response rate of 63%.
Results:
In general, the results indicated that respondents have knowledge of and value the importance of mental health preparedness issues. The respon-dents who reported greater knowledge or value of mental health preparedness also indicated significantly higher ability levels in nationally recognized bioterrorism competencies (p <0.001).
Conclusions:
These results support the need for mental health components to be incorporated into terrorism preparedness training. Further studies to determine the most effective mental health preparedness training content and instruction modalities are needed.
An important issue in disaster medicine is the establishment of standards that can be used as a template for evaluation. With the establishment of standards, the ability to compare results will improve, both within and between different organizations involved in disaster management.
Objective:
Performance indicators were developed for testing in simulations exercises with the purpose of evaluating the skills of hospital management groups. The objective of this study is to demonstrate how these indicators can be used to create numerically expressed results that can be compared.
Methods:
Three different management groups were tested in standardized simulation exercises. The testing took place according to the organization's own disaster plan and within their own facilities. Trained observers used a predesigned protocol of performance indicators as a template for the evaluation.
Results:
The management group that scored lowest in management skills also scored lowest in staff skills.
Conclusion:
The use of performance indicators for evaluating the management skills of hospital groups can provide comparable results in testing situations and could provide a new tool for quality improvement of evaluations of real incidents and disasters.
On 04 September 2005, 1,589 Hurricane Katrina evacuees from the New Orleans area arrived in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma State Department of Health conducted a rapid needs assessment of the evacuees housed at a National Guard training facility to determine the medical and social needs of the population in order to allocate resources appropriately.
Methods:
A standardized questionnaire that focused on individual and household evacuee characteristics was developed. Households from each shel-ter building were targeted for surveying, and a convenience sample was used.
Results:
Data were collected on 197 households and 373 persons. When com-pared with the population of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, the evacuees sampled were more likely to be male, black, and 45–64 years of age. They also were less likely to report receiving a high school education and being employed pre-hurricane. Of those households of <1 persons, 63% had at least one missing household member. Fifty-six percent of adults and 21% of children reported having at least one chronic disease. Adult women and non-black persons were more likely to report a pre-existing mental health condition. Fourteen percent of adult evacuees reported a mental illness that required medication pre-hur-ricane, and eight adults indicated that they either had been physically or sex-ually assaulted after the hurricane. Approximately half of adults reported that they had witnessed someone being severely injured or dead, and 10% of per-sons reported that someone close to them (family or friend) had died since the hurricane. Of the adults answering questions related to acute stress disor-der, 50% indicated that they suffered at least one symptom of the disorder.
Conclusions:
The results from this needs assessment highlight that the evac-uees surveyed predominantly were black, of lower socio-economic status, and had substantial, pre-existing medical and mental health concerns. The evac-uees experienced multiple emotional traumas, including witnessing grotesque scenes and the disruption of social systems, and had pre-existing psy-chopathologies that predisposed this population to post-traumatic stress dis-order (Post-traumatic Stress Disorder).x When disaster populations are displaced, mental health and social service providers should be available immediately upon the arrival of the evacuees, and should be integrally coordinated with the relief response. Because the displaced population is at high risk for disaster-related mental health problems, it should be monitored closely for persons with PTSD. This displaced population will likely require a substantial re-establishment of financial, medical, and educational resources in new communities or upon their return to Louisiana.
The importance of accessing care within the first hour after injury has been a fundamental tenet of trauma system planning for 30 years. However, the scientific basis for this belief either has been missing or largely derived from case series from trauma centers. This study sought to determine the correlation between prehospital times and outcomes among severely injured elderly patients.
Methods:
This is a cross-sectional, observational study. All adults (<18 years of age) with acute trauma as defined by The International Classification of Diseases Ninth Edition, Clinical Modification diagnostic codes and E-codes were included. Poisonings, single system burns, and late effects of injury were excluded. Chi-square and Student's ttest were used for significance testing. To assess the predictive effects of prehospital time and outcomes, three inde-pendent logistic regression models were constructed for both young and elderly groups, with hospital length of stay, mortality, and complications as individual dependent variables. Statistical significance was set at the 0.05 level.
Results:
Of 41,041 cases, 37,276 were >_18 years of age. Of the 1,866 with an Injury Severity Score (ISS) >15, 1,205 were young and 661 elderly. Logistic regression results showed that prehospital time correlated significantly with hospital length of stay (p = 0.001) and complications (p = 0.016), but not with mortality (p = 0.264) among young patients, whereas in the elderly group prehospital time had no significant predictive effect for length of stay, complica- tions, or mortality (p = 0.512, p = 0.512, and p = 0.954 respectively).
Conclusion:
This population-based study has demonstrated that prehospital time correlates with length of stay and complications in young patients. In elderly patients, prehospital time failed to show correlation with any outcomes measured.
Lessons on question content and refinement of a 2003 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality-Health Resources Services Administration (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality-Health Resources Services) pilot hospital preparedness assessment tool designed to capture activities in more detail than previous studies are reported in this study.
Methods:
Responses from fixed-choice questions, including organizational and geographical differences, were analyzed using the chi-square test. Openended questions were evaluated qualitatively.
Results:
Of the respondents, 91% had developed plans and 97% designated a bio-event coordinator, but only 47% had allocated funds. Urban hospitals were more likely to participate in regional infectious disease monitoring. Hospitals that participated in a network were more likely to fund preparedness, share bio-event coordinators and medical directors, and provide advanced training.
Conclusions:
Several issues deserve further study: (1) hospital networks may provide the structure to promote preparedness; (2) specific procedures (e.g., expanding outpatient treatment capacity) have not been tested; and (3) special attention should be directed towards integrating non-urban hospitals into regional surveillance systems to ensure early identification of infectious disease outbreaks.