Recent years have witnessed the rise of a multiracial church (MRC) movement in American evangelicalism. Leaders of this movement articulate a “biblical mandate”-based mission for breaking patterns of racial homogeneity in pursuit of more diverse, egalitarian, and vibrant churches. While participants are passionate about what they see as a powerful racial change effort in their religious communities, they express a variety of orientations about the potential political implications of faith-based MRC-building. Drawing from interview-based research inside MRC settings, I find that most participants are nervously interested in applying their framework to political contexts, while a minority articulates a more politicized justice orientation, and others are confused or actively resistant. The movement's political reluctance is instructive of the understudied dynamics between race and religion, especially in theologically conservative churches. In social capital terms, the “bonding” incentives of MRC settings by definition require difficult kinds of “bridging,” or reaching across deep historical and identity-based differences, in order to create trust-based networks where they have not existed. When successful, however, such networks can open new paths to race-related political engagement.

This article offers a normative evaluation of the Christian Right's impact on American democracy. It argues that our response to the question of whether this movement enhances or diminishes democracy turns on our understanding of the ideal of democracy. When viewed as a participatory ideal, the Christian Right's mobilizing practices enhance democracy. When viewed as a deliberative ideal, the Christian Right's practices diminish the deliberative virtues of toleration and free and open debate. These conflicting assessments point to an important democratic paradox. They show that the very same practices that inspire the participatory virtues of active political engagement also incite the deliberative vices of intolerance and polarization. To address this paradox, I argue that we ought to strive for a balance between pure participation and pure deliberation. The primary problem with Christian Right organizations like Focus on the Family, I will argue, is that they tend to disrupt this balance. They inspire active participation at the expense of deliberation.

This article examines the determinants of trust in religious institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia — three countries with low levels of religiosity as measured by attendance, prayer and fasting, yet high levels of trust in religious institutions. The analysis employs individual-level survey data and uses ordinary least squares regression to show that while religious practices do not determine trust in religious institutions, the importance of religion in one's daily life is a strong indicator of trust in religious institutions in each country. The results also show some differences among these countries with regard to two types of control variables — trust in secular institutions and socioeconomic factors. In Georgia, interpersonal trust is a significant indicator of trust in religious institutions. Residence in the capital is only significant in Azerbaijan. Finally, both education and age are significant in Armenia. Additionally, two theories of trust in institutions are tested. First, a cultural theory of interpersonal trust proves ambiguous in the region. Second, the presence of both low religious practice and high trust in religious institutions in these countries challenges reformulated secularization theories that consider declining religious authority — measured by trust in religious institutions — as a form of secularization.

The political practice of consociational democracies to take religion off the political agenda has led to the idea that religious issues only play a marginal role in the left-right ideological framework. This study demonstrates that religion has more than a marginal effect on the left-right placement of parties and thus on the space of competition. The analysis shows that voters for secular parties and voters for religious parties have different motives and beliefs on which they base the orderings of parties on the left-right scale. In other words, each group of voters defines its own left-right scale. These different left-right scales are individually single-peaked but there is no collective transitivity of orderings of parties. The intransitivity is a clear violation of Downs' condition for placing all parties on a single line in a manner agreed upon by all voters. Instead of having one left-right dimension as some sort of “super issue,” there are at least two left-right scales, one for voters for secular parties and one for voters for religious parties.

The study of political religion has focused on how religious structure and substance came to permeate grand political ideologies such as fascism and communism. The relevance of various relatively veiled forms of religion in modern day-to-day democratic politics has been undervalued and we therefore fail to appreciate to what extent, and how religious structure and substance have also penetrated conventional democratic politics. As a result, we do not comprehend that it is the progressive abolition of “quasi-messianism” in politics that is currently causing the existential problem of democracy, namely massive political disaffection. Quasi-messianism concerned the visionary anticipation of a better world that is attainable, here and in the distant, yet foreseeable future. This promise accorded politics an enchanting quality. Quite down-to-earth political ventures got charged with an inspiring and imaginative sense of purpose, direction, and meaning, but equally with this-worldly catalysts, which, in contrast to the political-religious grand utopias, were operational and practical. In this quality, some mass political projects or elite missions developed a capacity to enchant the political elite and the public alike. Hence the thesis that it is the disenchantment of politics, which lies at the heart of the contemporary phenomenon of waning political allegiance.

It is widely recognized that religious institutions and values play a prominent political role in various countries around the world. What is less clear is the degree to which other prominent ideologies perform an analogous role in regions where they predominate. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between Confucianism and liberal democracy in Taiwan. As the most important belief system in Taiwan and, indeed, in much of East Asia, Confucianism has provided a model of civic behavior for centuries, performing a largely priestly role. What is less apparent is whether Confucianism inhibited or promoted the development of liberal democracies in the region. While an extensive theoretical debate exists on this question, virtually no work analyzes how Confucianism has been understood by political actors on the ground. The data for this study consist of interviews with 27 politicians, democracy activists, Confucianism scholars, and journalists in Taiwan. The article tests whether or not, in the minds of these key political and cultural leaders, Confucian values are an aid or a hindrance to their efforts to promote liberal democracy. The concluding section discusses the implications of the empirical results for East Asian countries and addresses the parallels between Confucianism as an ideology in East Asia and the religious institutions and values in Western countries.

One of the essential characteristics of a democratic regime is the separation of Church and state. The elected governors of a democratic regime's institutions require sufficient autonomy in order to make policy that is within the bounds of the constitution and which cannot be contested or overruled by non-elected religious leaders or institutions. However, this requirement is often confused by scholars and politicians to mean that a democracy must also be secular. Therefore, the idea of an “Islamic democracy” for example, is often derided as a contradiction in terms. Using quantitative data from Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox (2006) on cross-national Church and state relationships, this article argues that once the core autonomy prerequisite has been fulfilled, further separation of Church and state is not necessarily associated with higher levels of democracy. In fact, the data indicate that there is a wide range of Church-state arrangements which gives religion the possibility of a central role in political life while maintaining a high quality of democratic rights and freedoms. Drawing on the statistical results of this analysis, the article concludes by rethinking about the possibilities and limits for “public” religion to strengthen democratization processes.

Attitudes about religion in Polish society have scarcely changed since 1989, in spite of radical political and economic transformation over the past 20 years, as survey data show. The question is why? In the following article, the author develops five alternative hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. Each of the hypotheses relates to some function of religion that is relevant in contemporary times. Among other things, historical circumstances, the role of Catholicism as a civil religion, security, and hidden privatization form the context in which one may explain the continuing vitality of religion in Poland.

Positing a “clash of cultures,” many European politicians oppose Muslim headscarves as well as Islamic instruction in public schools; the real source of “failed integration” lies not with the religiosity of young Muslims but rather with an arcane definition of “state neutrality” that sustains the dominance of some religions at the expense of others. Focusing on Germany, this study reviews educational statistics pertaining to youth of migrant origin, showing that conflicts over Islamic instruction mirror deeper patterns of minority discrimination. It outlines the legal hurdles new faith communities must overcome to secure recognition as “corporate entities under public law” (Körperschaftsstatus), entitling them to accredited teacher training, tax-funded salaries, construction subsidies, and other institutional privileges. It describes divergent curricular models utilized by the Länder, followed by a closer look at Islamic instruction in Berlin, where a court ruling compelled authorities to take a pro-active approach. It concludes with a review of dilemmas inherent in Germany's approach to “value education” against the backdrop of the new European Union anti-discrimination directives.

This article explores the social origins and consequences of Orthodox-Muslim tensions surrounding the attempts to find a place for religion in Russia's state schools. It demonstrates that the Orthodox-Muslim tensions are an inevitable outcome of what we define as Russia's pattern of “desecularization from above.” The attempts to restore religious education are carried out by alliances of top religious and political elites, which almost by default focus on the state-run schools. These attempts run into serious social and institutional constraints, and generate considerable Orthodox-Muslim tensions and controversies spilling over to public opinion. On the surface, the Orthodox-Muslim tensions often appear in the form ironically resembling “culture wars” between religious traditionalists and secularists in the West. Our survey data indicate that public support for religious instruction in state-run schools has reached high levels and is infused with a noticeable element of religious intolerance. We predict that further attempts to desecularize Russia's state schools “from above” may have destabilizing effects in society and fuel ethno-religious tensions.

This article explores the complex reality of religious freedom in post-war Iraq. It examines the constitutional parameters of religious freedom in a democratizing Iraq, while also demonstrating how the muddy realities of sectarian intolerance and violence continue to impede the realization of this essential liberty in “the land between two rivers.”

This article explores the current and probable future challenges faced by the Hungarian-speaking religious communities in northern Serbia as they try to navigate two worlds: the past and the present; cultural identification with Hungary and with Serbia. The mostly Roman Catholic and in smaller number Protestant Hungarians living in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina differ in both language and religious affiliation from the majority Serbian (by and large Orthodox Christian) population. The use of the Hungarian language and the strengthening of a sense of Hungarian identity is an important aspect of the activities their churches perform. By analyzing the socio-political and demographic situation of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, I will explore whether there is a middle road between complete assimilation and hermetical isolation in the religious-cultural-linguistic sense, which is of critical importance regarding the survival of these religious communities.

This article explores the conditions under which religious organizations push for democratization by addressing variation in support for democracy among Catholic Church authorities in South America. It argues that this can be best explained by leveraging key concepts used in the study of social movements: cultural frames, mobilizing resources, and political opportunity structures. This approach yields counter-intuitive insights about the role played by the Second Vatican Council, the size of national churches, and the crucial role of political parties. The empirical argument is formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and tested using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

We address a pressing substantive issue as well as evaluate several methodologies in this article. Substantively, we ask whether the U.S. State Department has a clear understanding of the level of cross-national religious intolerance that triggers daily headlines around the globe. Methodologically, we ask whether data on social attitudes coded from systematic qualitative reports can reliably represent cross-national public opinion. We empirically address these questions by comparing cross-national levels of religious intolerance coded from the State Department's annual international religious freedom reports with relevant population survey data from the World Values Survey and the Pew Research Center, as well as with data from written interviews of country experts conducted by the Hudson Institute. The results indicate that the understanding of social religious intolerance embodied in the State Department reports is comparable with the results of population surveys and individual expert opinion. Methodologically, this suggests that cross-national public opinion survey data can be cross-validated with coded data from systematic qualitative analysis as well as with expert opinion.

Many countries today face the challenges posed by their ethnic and religious diversity. This article comparatively analyzes how defining nation in Russia and Turkey affects what groups constitute religious minorities and what their prospects of integration into the Russian and Turkish societies are. It conceptualizes religious minorities as those religious groups that are excluded from the prevailing and institutionalized definitions of nation. This article studies what role religion, comprising Orthodox Christianity, and Sunni Islam, respectively, has played historically and until nowadays in Russia and Turkey in the definitions of their national identities and what kind of religious minorities each of these definitions created. It argues that a position of religious minorities depends not only on the informal association of national identity of the majority with certain religion, but also on the institutionalized support for the dominant religion by the ruling political forces.

Evangelicals form the core of Republican constituencies in many states. This has been particularly true in Iowa, where the Christian Right has held significant influence in the Republican party for almost 20 years. However, recent scholarship has suggested that evangelicals, particularly younger ones, may be changing their candidate choices and partisanship due to dissatisfaction with Republican policies. Based on a unique study surveying caucus-goers' opinions after the January 2008 caucuses, I examine respondents' candidate preferences in light of their religious beliefs, issues preferences, and demographic identities. The results indicate that while evangelicals remain more conservative on social issues than their co-partisans in both parties, issues seem to make little difference in candidate choice. This conclusion suggests that Republican evangelicals remain committed to the importance of social issues – or at least to their evangelical identity – in their voting choices.

Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality toward religion(s), along with other comprehensive systems of belief. Multiculturalism is premised on the view that the political policies of internally diverse nations should respect the beliefs and practices of the various cultural, ethnic, and religious groups of which those nations are composed. Sometimes synthesized, sometimes standing in tension, these two political frameworks share a common goal of minimizing conflict while respecting diversity. Although this goal is, in principle, laudable, I argue in this article that the operation of liberal and multiculturalist forms of public reasoning inadvertently diminishes critical reflection and revision in the area of religion, with potentially dangerous consequences both for the health of religion and for social stability. Measures to counter these dangers, I propose, include a relaxation of the restrictive rules that define liberal public reason, and education about religion in schools.

Studies of interest groups typically sample from organizations or lobbyists registered with a government – those already engaged in political action. Because of this design choice, the questions asked of organizational systems are constrained. We take a different tack, pursuing investigation of one organizational form, ministerial organizations (MOs), in a wide variety of systems to ask about whether and how they engage in public affairs across ecologies. Specifically, we ask: What pressures affect whether MOs engage a public versus private purpose? How do MOs forage in public affairs, with what size and diversity of coalition? The data result from a hyper-network survey of MO contacts, identified by a national sample of United Methodist Church clergy. We find, contrary to assertions in previous work that religious interest groups respond to ecological pressures in a similar manner as other interest groups.

The Khrushchev era brought a policy of religious repression in response to a resurgence of religious adherence after WWII. But a close evaluation of archival sources reveals distinctive features to its implementation in the Baltics, compared with other parts of the USSR and with the Orthodox Church. The study richly describes the erosion of church institutional interests, such as maintenance of registered churches and clergy, legal and financial autonomy, publications and theological education. But having adapted to their national context, republic-level state officials often pursued the campaign disproportionately against non-national churches, such as Catholics and so-called sects, thereby provoking bureaucratic tensions with party hardliners, both in Moscow and at the republic level. Motivated by its heightened anti-Vatican stance, Moscow's foreign policy opening—to the World Council of Churches, Lutheran World Federation, and the German churches—brought the Lutheran churches limited leverage against reluctant local and republic officials.