I Physicalism, and the weak identity theory deny, while physicalism2 and the radical identity theory assert, that raw feels can be accomodated in a purely physicalistic framework.

II A way of interpreting the claim of physicalism1 is that raw feels are emergents.

III The doctrine of emergence asserts that: (i) there are different levels of existence, (ii) these levels of existence are distinguishable on the basis of the behaviour of entities of that level, and (iii) an adequate scientific explanation of a lower level is inadequate for a higher level.

IV The criteria of emergence are novelty and a priori unpredictability.

V Either qualities or laws or both may be regarded as emergents.

VI If the alleged impossibility of explaining higher level phenomena on the basis of explanation adequate for lower level phenomena is logical, then the impossibility is either trivial or it implies indeterminism.

Consideration of theories of emergence:

• VII Semantic emergence. On this view emergence is theory-bound, analogous to indefinability or indemonstrability.

• VIII Methodological emergence. On this view what we regard as emergents depends on the theory we construct.

• IX Nomological emergence. On this view emergence is an empirical problem.

Conclusion: if there are emergents, physicalism2 and the radical identity theory probably have to be abandoned. However, unless actual examples of emergents are produced both theories hold. The logical possibility of falsification is not an objection against physicalism2 and the radical identity theory; it is one of their merits.

An empirical law or evidence which supports a theory tends to have the greatest scientific value when it seemed improbable before it was investigated. Evidence which falsifies a theory tends to have the greatest value when it seemed probable that the investigation would confirm the theory. A scientist who wishes to optimize his contribution to knowledge probably will investigate most frequently hypotheses which seem neither very probable nor very improbable of being confirmed. This strategy leads neither to a maximum number of confirmations of a theory, nor to a set of tests which are maximally severe.

In Reason and Analysis, Prof. Brand Blanshard criticises the logical empiricist view regarding necessary statements, including the laws of logic. He distinguishes four component theses of this view: (I) Necessary statements—here, the laws of logic—are resolutions or reports of linguistic usage. (II) They are conventions. (III) They are analytic (tautologies). (IV) They say nothing about the world. In this paper I first show that Prof. Blanshard is essentially right in his criticisms of (I), (II), and (IV); but that he has done nothing to show that (III) is incorrect with regard to the laws of logic. Then, second, I attempt to show that even though (I), (II), and (more importantly) (IV) are false, (III) is true. That is, the laws of logic are tautologies, and yet, in a sense to be distinguished, they say something about the world.

A working theory can involve a compromise between pragmatic application and pure theory. This is illustrated by the development of Coombs's theory of data. The original version of the theory purported to guide investigators in the use of scaling techniques, but subsequent revisions including a logico-mathematical statement of the theory do not show whether the practical recommendations made earlier still apply. These practical recommendations, some of which Coombs has discarded to obtain a comprehensive theory, are important in spite of shortcomings as they reveal differences between attitude and mental test data. The different forms of Coombs's theory point to the existence of a general problem, how to find a compromise between practice and pure theory.

A number of authors recently have pointed out what they think are enlightening similarities between psychoanalysis and history. In stressing such similarities they are usually trying to justify their own particular characterization of psychoanalysis. I show wherein I think these characterizations go wrong and at the same time try my own hand at clarifying the nature of psychoanalytic propositions.

Central to Paul K. Feyerabend's philosophy of science are two theses: (1) there is no standard observation language available to science; instead, observability is to be viewed as a pragmatic matter; and (2) when considering questions of empirical significance and experimental test, the methodological unit of science is a set of inconsistent theories. I argue that the pragmatic theory of observation by itself decides neither for nor against any particular specification of meaning for an observation language; and that Feyerabend's position provides no decision procedure when two contending theories share no terms having the same meaning, and thus cannot be said to be logically incompatible. Also, Feyerabend's insistence upon falsification will force him to admit that there are relatively permanent facts available to all theories, or to abandon the idea of test as falsification and to conclude that scientific theories can only be accepted or rejected on the basis of non-evidential considerations.