Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conclude by sketching a substantially different justification-based account of scientific progress that avoids these problems.

How do opinion diversity and belief polarisation affect epistemic group decision-making, particularly if decisions must be made without delay and on the basis of permissive evidence? In an agent-based model, we track the consistency of group opinions aggregated through sentence-wise majority voting. Simulations on the model reveal that high opinion diversity, but not polarisation, incurs a significant inconsistency risk. These results indicate that epistemic group decisions based on permissive evidence can be particularly difficult for diverse groups. The results also improve our understanding of what can reasonably be expected of expert groups, and where expert advice might have limits.

Effective field theory (EFT) is a computationally powerful theoretical framework, finding application in many areas of physics. The framework, applied to the Standard Model of particle physics, is even more empirically successful than our theoretical understanding would lead us to expect. I argue that this is a problem for our understanding of how the Standard Model relates to some successor theory. The problem manifests as two theoretical anomalies involving relevant parameters: the cosmological constant and the Higgs mass. The persistent failure to fix these anomalies from within suggests that the way forward is to go beyond the EFT framework.

Scientists have the epistemic responsibility of producing knowledge. They also have the social responsibility of aligning their research with the needs and values of various societal stakeholders. Individual scientists may be left with no guidance on how to prioritize and carry these different responsibilities. As I will argue, however, the responsibilities of science can be harmonized at the collective level. Drawing from debates in moral philosophy, I will propose a theory of the collective responsibilities of science that accounts for the internal diversity of research groups and for their different responsibilities.

The Black–Scholes (B-S) model is considered by the academic environment one of the greatest achievements of financial economics. Yet it brings with it some conundrums. The model is often used in a manner that contradicts one of its assumptions, and its predictions are not supported by market reality. Here we address, from the perspective of philosophy of science, an additional issue related to this model: the distinction between its explanatory and predictive capabilities.

This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.

When many statistical hypotheses are evaluated simultaneously, statisticians often recommend adjusting (or “correcting”) standard hypothesis tests. In this article, I (1) distinguish two senses of adjustment, (2) investigate the prudential and epistemic goals that adjustment might achieve, and (3) identify conditions under which a researcher should not adjust for multiplicity in the two senses I identify. I tentatively conclude that the goals of scientists and the public may be misaligned with the decision criteria used to evaluate multiple-testing regimes.

This paper proposes a novel view in the the philosophy of race & causation literature known as “causal agnosticism” about race. Causal agnosticism about race implies that it is reasonable to refrain from making judgments about whether race is a cause. The paper’s thesis asserts that certain conditions must be met to infer that something is a cause, according to the fundamental assumptions of causal inference. However, in the case of race, these conditions are often violated. By advocating for causal agnosticism, the paper suggests a more modest approach to understanding the role of race in causal relationships.

In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.

This article introduces the snap hook methodology, a method used notably in astrochemistry as a way to indirectly validate and assess the accuracy of computational calculations in the absence of experimental or observational data. We argue that this methodology has tremendous potential for all computationally intensive scientific fields as a substitute for traditional verification and validation standards when those are not accessible and estimating the reliability of numerical predictions becomes a real difficulty. The goal of this article is to give to this method, which seems to be implicitly relied upon in many areas, a proper formulation, in order for philosophers of science to enter the debate and to highlight its undeniable potential in terms of interdisciplinary facilitation and knowledge transmission.

Well-known debates among statistical inferential paradigms emerge from conflicting views on the notion of probability. One dominant view understands probability as a representation of sampling variability; another prominent view understands probability as a measure of belief. The former generally describes model parameters as fixed values, in contrast to the latter. We propose that there are actually two versions of a parameter within both paradigms: a fixed unknown value that generated the data and a random version to describe the uncertainty in estimating the unknown value. An inferential approach based on CDs deciphers seemingly conflicting perspectives on parameters and probabilities.

An influential heuristic for thinking about climate adaptation asserts that “natural” adaptation strategies are the best ones. This heuristic has been roundly criticized but is difficult to dislodge in the absence of an alternative. We introduce a new heuristic that assesses adaptation strategies by looking at their maturity, power, and commitment. Maturity is the extent to which we understand an adaptation strategy’s effects. Power is the size of the effect an adaptation strategy will have. Commitment is the degree to which an adaptation strategy is difficult to test or reverse.

This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that provide a unique type of causal explanation. This paper clarifies what it means for a factor to be a constraint, when such constraints are causal, and how they figure in scientific explanation.

We propose a novel account of evolutionary transitions in individuality as life cycle closure: that is, the emergence of a new embedding life cycle. To characterize this process, we show how the life trajectory of lower-level entities (e.g., cells) can be coarse-grained into classes of a higher-level entity. We argue that only higher-level entities displaying two necessary conditions for the existence of a life cycle (e.g., multicellular organisms) have achieved life cycle closure. Throughout, we illustrate our point with stage-structured demographic models that yield a rigorous characterization of the conditions for life cycle closure.

Fitness has taken center stage in debates concerning how best to identify evolutionary transitions in individuality (ETIs). An influential framework proposes that an ETI occurs only when fitness is exported from constituent particles to a collective. We reformulate the conceptual structure of this framework as involving three steps. The culminating step compares “counterfactual” fitnesses against a long-run measure of fitness. This comparison assumes that collective-level fitness mereologically supervenes on particle fitness. However, if this assumption is rigorously enforced, the proposed conditions for identifying ETIs prove to be too weak. We here suggest an alternative model of ETIs centered around traits.

There is a mysterious twofold change in Du Châtelet’s position on Newtonian attraction: from acceptance thereof as an explanatory principle in Essai sur l’optique (ca. 1738–39), to rejection in the 1740 Institutions, and returning to acceptance again in her Commentary (1756) to Newton’s Principia. In this article, I suggest that we turn to the 1742 Institutions for answers. There, Du Châtelet introduces physical explanation and maintains that we can appeal to certain physical qualities (such as attraction) for explanatory force. Using this case study, I argue that the scholarship will benefit greatly from turning to the 1742 edition going forward.

The problem of quantity is the problem of identifying what about the physical world explains why it can be so well represented with mathematical entities. I introduce “quantitative primitivism,” the dominant position in the literature, which offers only a partial solution to the problem of quantity. I argue that a reductive account of quantitativeness provides a full solution to the problem and describe two reductive accounts in the literature. I discuss some of the unique metaphysical consequences of reductive accounts of quantity, including a novel dissolution to the long-standing absolutist–comparativist debate.

Teleparallel gravity, an empirically equivalent counterpart to general relativity, represents the influence of gravity using torsional forces. It raises questions about theory interpretation and underdetermination. To better understand the torsional forces of teleparallel gravity, we consider a context in which forces are better understood: classical spacetimes. We propose a method of incorporating torsion into the classical spacetime context that yields a classical theory of gravity with a closed temporal metric and spacetime torsion. We then prove a result analogous to the Trautman degeometrization theorem: that every model of Newton–Cartan theory gives rise, non-uniquely, to a model of this theory.