This article shows that judicial review has a democratic justification, although it is not necessary for democratic government and its virtues are controversial and often speculative. Against critics like Waldron and Bellamy, it shows that judges, no less than legislators, can embody democratic forms of representation, accountability and participation. Hence, judicial review is not undemocratic simply because it enables unelected judges to over-rule elected legislators when people disagree about rights. Against recent defenders of judicial review, such as Eisgruber and Brettschneider, it shows that democratic arguments for judicial review do not require judges to be better at protecting rights than legislators. Hence a democratic justification for judicial review does not depend on complex and inevitably controversial interpretations and evaluations of judicial as opposed to legislative judgments. Democratic government does not demand special virtue, competence or wisdom in its citizens or their leaders. From a democratic perspective, therefore, the case for judicial review is that it enables individuals to vindicate their rights against government in ways that parallel those they commonly use against each other. This makes judicial review normatively attractive whether or not it leads to better decisions than would be made by other means.

What are social science theorists' responsibilities for the effects of their theories in the real world? I maintain that politicians and ideologues place theories in their political agendas without necessarily heeding their actual content. Hence, the ramifications of theories in the real world are mostly the result of political uses and, at times, political abuses. Consequently, theorists cannot be held morally responsible for these. They do, however, bear the obligation to examine if there are some intrinsic features of theorization and theory that render these susceptible to public misinterpretation and vulnerable to political abuse. Pointing to the rhetorical capital inherent in theories, and supported by examples involving democratic-peace theory and its political destinies, I conclude that, to discharge this task, social science theorists should substitute the prevailing objective ethic with a normative one.

Presidents are rightly held responsible for managing the national economy—they exercise substantial discretion over fiscal policy and have the potential for informally influencing monetary policy. At the same time, presidential accomplishments are circumscribed by market forces and institutions at home and overseas, and the complexities of fragmented authority and external constraints make judging performance difficult. I draw on the literature on economic policymaking and on the presidency to explicate a set of criteria for comparing presidential economic policy leadership, construct quantitative indicators of each dimension, and display the results of comparative analyses covering the second half of the twentieth century. The four criteria view presidents from three different vantage points: the separation of powers, focusing on presidents' success at gaining congressional approval for an economic agenda; the public, based on an original compilation of survey data tracking the electorate's evaluation; and the economy, tracing how presidents' policies affect overall prosperity and the distribution of income. Combining information about how crucial audiences have perceived and responded to presidential initiatives, with outcomes in the economy, this approach emphasizes comparison, and thus complements the qualitative depth of narrative approaches.

The international intellectual property system provides an important illustration of how regime complexity shapes domestic and international strategies of states and non-state actors. This article describes and graphically illustrates the multifaceted nature of the international intellectual property system. It then analyzes the consequences of regime complexity for international and domestic politics, emphasizing the strategy of regime shifting and its consequences for chessboard politics and the domestic implementation of international rules.

John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration introduces an early form of John Rawls's “original position” in order to shift the rhetorical ground in seventeenth-century England in favor of religious toleration. His method, which I call “Lockean switching,” seeks to induce readers to switch perspectives on the question of coercion of religious belief. This method yields three insights. First, although liberals typically assume that group identification stimulates passions beyond our ability to reason, Lockean switching reveals that the emotive qualities of group interest can actually help reinforce our commitment to and understanding of liberal principles. Locke thus insists that imagination and emotional response can encourage reason and increase impartiality. Locke's carefully crafted scenarios force readers to consider hard political questions, something underscored by comparing Locke's rhetorical strategies with those of two other important liberals, Montesquieu and Rawls. Second, Locke's invocation of remote “outsiders” such as Jews and pagans humanizes the hated minorities of his time and place. But it also risks reifying the majority group and inflaming prejudice. Finally, Lockean switching reminds us that liberals must be alert to the dangers of pushing readers to accept principles that are reasonable but impossible to implement. By exploring Locke's method of shifting perspectives, and connecting it to a broader liberal tradition of “switching,” I argue that contemporary liberals can use imagination and group identification to help reinforce the commitment of individuals and groups to liberal principles with which they might not otherwise identify. I conclude by illustrating this with regard to controversies surrounding the toleration of gays, lesbians and transgendered individuals in the US.

The current economic crisis has once again bought debates about capitalism and globalization to the forefront of the political agenda. Until very recently almost everyone seemed to be convinced that the world was at the dawn of a new era. Yet, the issue at the heart of globalization debates—whether political forces can dominate economic ones or must bow before them—is not new at all. I show that many of the great ideological and political battles of the last century were fought over precisely this ground, and argue that because we have forgotten or misunderstood these earlier debates our current discourse is thin and impoverished. To understand where we are and where we are going, we have to first step back and look closely at where we have been.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union's (EU) European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) both occupy the policy space of crisis management. This overlap has two effects. First, overlap has generated “chessboard politics” shaping member state strategies. Second, institutional overlap has generated a number of feedback effects. The prior existence of NATO shaped the conceptualization and organization of ESDP at its creation, and the existence of two alternative security institutions continues to influence the ways that the institutions evolve—how each institution defines security interests and how member states adjust the mandate of each institution to address changes in the security environment. Because both institutions are intergovernmentally organized and consensus-based, the actions and decisions of both institutions reflect the agreements of members. Chessboard politics and feedback effects are consequently interrelated—states strategize to affect outcomes in one venue or another, and decisions in one institution can affect decisions and behaviors in the other institution.

Joseph Conrad offers some of the most notoriously contested writing on imperialism in nineteenth-century literature. In this article, I use two of his stories (“An Outpost of Progress” and Heart of Darkness) to argue that his critique of imperialism is as relevant today as it was in his own time.

Conrad's critique of imperialism is twofold. First and most simply, he condemns it as an economically exploitative endeavor. Second, and more importantly, he rejects the “idealistic” claim often invoked to justify imperialism as the bearer of progress, enlightenment, and other supposedly universal liberal values. This second critique causes Conrad the most difficulty, largely because his rejection of idealism is only partial. I argue that the most controversial aspects of his work are manifestations of a philosophical struggle between universalistic idealism on the one hand, and relativistic skepticism on the other. In this, Conrad contends with a problem that historically has challenged both liberalism and its conservative critics alike. Moreover, it continues to challenge both perspectives today, particularly in the debate over so-called American imperialism.

Within a span of fifteen years civic engagement has become a cottage industry in political science and political theory, but the term has now outlived its usefulness and exemplifies Giovanni Sartori's worry about conceptual “stretching.” This article traces civic engagement's ascension as a catch-all term for almost anything that citizens might happen to do together or alone, and illustrates the confusion that its popularity has occasioned. It proposes that civic engagement meet a well-deserved end, to be replaced with a more nuanced and descriptive set of engagements: political, social, and moral. It also examines the appeal of engagement itself, a term that entails both attention and energy. Attention and energy are the mainsprings of politics and most other challenging human endeavors. But they can be invested politically, or in associative pursuits, or in moral reasoning and follow-through, and those types of engagement can, but need not, coincide. We should be asking which kinds of engagement—which kinds of attention and energetic activity—make democracy work, and how they might be measured and promoted.

This article explores the impact of institutional proliferation on the politics of refugee protection. The refugee regime mainly comprises the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Recently, however, new parallel and overlapping institutions have emerged in relation to two previously unregulated areas: internally displaced persons (IDPs) and international migration. This institutional proliferation has affected both state strategy and IO strategy in relation to refugee protection. It has enabled Northern states to engage in regime shifting. They have used the new institutions to prevent refugees reaching their territory, thereby avoiding incurring UN rules on refugee protection, and transferring burdens to Southern states. The resulting reduction in international cooperation in the refugee regime has contributed to UNHCR fundamentally redefining its strategy in order to become more relevant to Northern states. In particular, it has pursued states into the migration and IDP regimes into which they have shifted through a combination of stretching its mandate, engaging in the politics of the emerging regimes, and issue-linkage. The article's analysis draws attention to the potentially significant relationship between institutional proliferation and IO adaptation and change.

The combined effects of an aging population, domestic migration, and the geographically heterogeneous effects of foreign immigration are producing politically significant changes in the distribution of the American population. Using statistical projections of state populations in the 2010 and 2020 US Censuses combined with statewide estimates of the normal vote based on the last five presidential elections (1992–2008), I show that by 2024 Republican presidential candidates will receive a net benefit of at least eight electoral votes due to the declining population of the Northeast and upper Midwest relative to the rapidly-growing Sun Belt. Democratic presidential candidates will find it increasingly difficult to win elections without having some success in the South and Southwest as Barack Obama did in 2008 but many previous candidates failed to do. While migration will also benefit some solid Democratic states such as California, on balance Republican presidential candidates are poised to benefit from the status of Sun Belt states as magnets for both foreign immigration and domestic migration from a retirement cohort of unprecedented size.

Many analyses of U.S. foreign policy after September 11 have rested upon readings of the U.S. as a traditional imperialist power. In so doing, the constructions of Al Qaeda as a decentralized corporation and a virtual network are often ignored. Corporate and network constructions place less stress on conventional threats to the nation-state and instead portray terrorism in distinctively post-Fordist terms. This in turn helps explain the short-lived and partial patriotic responses to the terrorist attacks, as well as the contradictory place of race in portrayals of the threat facing the U.S. Together these discourses point to new ways of thinking about U.S. nationalism and terrorism in the twenty-first century.

The Bolivian presidency is a precarious position, not only because so many presidents have left office under duress, but because former presidents are subject to legal jeopardy. The case of Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé illustrates the weakness of the rule of law in Bolivia and the political motivations that sustain it. Rodríguez was a respected Chief Justice of Bolivia's Supreme Court. He reluctantly assumed the presidency during a political crisis and shepherded the country through peaceful elections in 2005 that brought Evo Morales to the presidency. He was subsequently charged with treason in a case that involved the transfer from the Bolivian military to the United States of some obsolete surface-to-air missiles. The Rodríguez case was politically important enough to be useful for the Morales Government, but only briefly, and the moment passed. Now, the case's obscurity and the fecklessness of the Bolivian courts have left Rodríguez in legal and professional limbo. Full disclosure from the U.S. government regarding its involvement in the missiles case might clear Rodríguez's name.

Immediately after coming to power, the Clinton administration declared the consolidation of market and democratic institutions in Russia to be a vital American interest. The administration's central tactic for promoting this outcome was to help Boris Yeltsin remain in power. In a major assault on Clinton's historical legacy, much of the scholarly community maintains that U.S. policy was fundamentally flawed, both morally and strategically. In the view of these analysts, post-Soviet Russia's founding president was an autocratic leader who derailed the country's progress toward democracy. However, this body of research focuses exclusively on the Russian Federation and fails to utilize comparative referents. In contrast, we analyze the experiences of the full population of post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1991 to the present. Whether examined in cross-national or longitudinal perspective, we find that Russian democracy under Yeltsin was, relatively speaking, a success. We conclude that the Clinton administration's policy of support for Yeltsin both served various American foreign policy interests and strengthened the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia, thereby fulfilling the dictates of both real- and idealpolitik. In addition, the relative success of Russia's democratization in the 1990s, the reversal of that pattern in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate the pivotal role played by presidential leadership in Russia's transition.

As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argues that the availability of many different organizations facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked for political reasons. Furthermore, when different international election monitoring agencies agree, their consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and thus magnify their influence on domestic politics. Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests that complex regimes can engender damaging inter-organizational politics and that the different biases, capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work at cross-purposes.

The 2000 presidential election made various electoral institutions—from ballot format to voting mechanisms—suddenly prominent in public debate. One institution that garnered little attention, but nonetheless affected the outcome, was apportionment. A few commentators, looking ahead to 2004, noticed that Bush would have won more comfortably had the apportionment based on the 2000 census already been in place for the 2000 election. Little attention, however, was paid to the method by which 1990 census data were used to generate the 1992–2000 apportionment, even though there are many ways to perform that allocation, the United States has used different methods over its history, and the precise algorithm turned out, in this instance, to matter. More generally, previous discussions of apportionment methods have neglected the point that allocation to states of US House seats simultaneously determines Electoral College weights. Since the Electoral College has built-in biases favoring small states, an apportionment method that partially offsets this bias might be justifiable. We revisit some criteria by which one might prefer one apportionment rule to another, in light of this double duty.

We contribute to a greater understanding of political psychology by 1) collecting data in a more systematic way for the intellectual community, 2) sensitizing students to the extent to which any intellectual discipline is socially constructed and is a work in progress, 3) heightening awareness of the political aspects of intellectual life, 4) exposing readers to the wide variety of diverse approaches and methodologies utilized by political psychologists, and 5) suggesting the range of topics that political psychology can address successfully and the range of techniques it can utilize.

The proliferation of international rules, laws, and institutional forms raises important questions for regime theory. Looking at the theoretical and empirical arguments presented by all the contributors, however, it seems clear that that complexity's effects on actor strategies—particularly powerful actors—remain open to debate. Some of the posited effects of international regime complexity have contradictory or cross-cutting effects. Further effects of regime complexity—cross-institutional strategizing, the asymmetrical distribution of legal and technical expertise, and the fragmentation of reputation—can erode the significance of institutions in complex environments. This contribution considers the effect that regime complexity has on how powerful actors approach world politics—in part by connecting the current debate with past discussions about the significance of international regimes in world politics.

As I write this introduction, barely eight weeks have elapsed since the inauguration of President Barack Obama, and if there were a honeymoon period, it has most definitely passed. In Pakistan, a weak and divided regime is tottering. To its west, the U.S.-installed regime in Afghanistan is in retreat before the Taliban. In a globalized world, no country has been spared the stresses caused by the financial crisis. And here in the U.S., the severity of the downturn has reignited rancorous partisan debate. The topic of Robert Bates's When Things Fell Apart—the focus of our featured symposium—is the breakdown of political order in parts of Africa. But, apropos earlier discussions about area studies and its limits in which Bates was an important participant, the problem of ensuring effective and legitimate governance is hardly the provenance of the “less developed” world.

The study of local politics has been relegated to the periphery of political science and many explanations have been offered for the marginalization of the subfield. I offer three related arguments for why scholars should revisit the study of sub-state politics. First, the local level is the source of numerous political outcomes that matter because they represent a large proportion of political events in the United States. Secondly, there are methodological advantages to studying local politics. Finally, analyzing politics at the sub-state level can generate thoroughly different kinds of questions than a purely national-level focus and can offer different answers to questions that apply more generally. Research on local politics can and should contribute to broader debates in political science and ensure that we understand both how and why cities are unique.