According to the 1993 Constitution, the Republic of Kazakstan was proclaimed as a democratic, secular, and unitary state. Human beings, their life, freedom, and inherent rights were granted the status of supreme value. A presidential republic as a form of government arose from the functions of the head of state and executive. The supreme legislative body, a one-chamber parliament (Supreme Soviet), preserved remnants of the old Soviet state system in name and function, denying the principle of the division of power. The Supreme Soviet was the only legislative and higher representative body that did not correspond to its legislative function, since that implied a hierarchical power structure. As the only legislative body, parliament could not have subordinate structures. According to the Constitution, the Supreme Soviet issued laws, controlled the observance of laws, and made formal interpretations of laws. This contradicted the power-division principle, according to which it should be the legislative body only. Judicial power in the republic in accordance with the 1993 Constitution belonged to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Arbitration, which was to be elected by the Supreme Soviet. But this also contradicted the power-division principle.

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has opened up a Pandora's box of communal conflicts. In most Western analyses the majority of these conflicts are subsumed under the heading “ethnic.” This is often the case also with the conflict in Moldova between the national regime in Chišinàu and the insurgent regime in Tiraspol that controls the left bank of the Dnestr river. To be sure, there is an ethnic component to this conflict, but ethnicity clearly is not the main driving force behind it. While ethnic Moldovans make up approximately 70% of the inhabitants on the right bank, there is no ethnic majority on the left bank: 40% of the population are Moldovans, 25% Ukrainians, and 23% Russians. In fact, the Chišinàu leadership downplays the ethnic component in its standoff with Tiraspol. The values at stake, they insist, are basically political in nature.

Rarely does an ethnic conflict remain wholly confined to its country of origin. Because ethnic groups often have members across international borders, their civil wars can have a strong influence on neighboring countries’ politics, impelling kindred communities to push for their state to intervene in support of imperilled relatives across the border. At the same time, strategic thinkers often find it tempting to destabilize neighboring countries, or to oppose groups acting as proxies for regional rivals. Because of such considerations, intervention in ethnic civil war becomes a political issue for the neighbors, with the emotional stakes often strengthening the hands of nationalists in the neighboring countries.

In Kazakstan, there are currently over sixty known oil and natural gas fields, including five sedimentary basins with a potentially large amount of proven and expected gas and oil bearing seams. The largest and best known are the Caspian (Prikaspiiski), South Mangishlak (Uzhno-Mangishlakski), Ustiurt-Buzachi (Ustiurtsko-Buzachinski), Torgai (Torgaiski), and Chu-Sarisu (Chu-Sarisuiski). Kazakstan is ranked twenty-fourth among the world's 55 oil-producing countries by many analysts. It has about 60 billion barrels of oil reserves. Indeed, it has been estimated by many of the same analysts that the offshore fields in the Caspian Sea, which borders Kazakstan's western territory, contain at least 26.6 billion barrels of extractable oil reserves. Yet in 1994, according to an article in Oil and Gas Journal, the government of the United States stated that it “does not consider Kazakstan as the most important source of oil supplies for the United States; however, Kazakstan might play [an] important role in reduction of the [sic] oil price.” Oil is a vital resource for Kazakstan and its extraction will play a major role in fostering the country's future development and relations with major oil consumers. Accurately estimating Kazakstan's reserves, and its ability to sell it on the world market, remains a major concern for Almaty.

During the late 1980s the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia, like many other regions within the former USSR, entered into a period of political turmoil. As the grip of the Communist Party weakened, increasingly serious conflict broke out between the Romanian-speaking majority and minority activists. Separatist forces quickly established themselves in two of the republic's regions, Transnistria on the east bank of the Dnestr river and the Gagauz districts in the south. Both claimed sovereignty and forcibly resisted the authority of the central government. By 1992 severe fighting was underway, especially in Transnistria, and Moldova appeared to be on the verge of a spiral into unrestrained civil conflict. Yet, by 1995, nationalist forces in Moldova had declined, and one of the two separatist conflicts, that in the Gagauz region, had been resolved by the peaceful reintegration of the Gagauz into Moldova. The second conflict, in Transnistria, was at least partially defused, and escalation was avoided.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the large international companies of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) began to emphasize collaboration with the former Soviet republics because of opportunities for new markets and raw materials. There are several basic problems, however, demanding serious research into such trade prospects:

(1) The definition of economic and technological variants in the division of labor among Russia, Central Asia, and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), including the roles of Kazakstan and Xinjiang.

(2) Defining needs and prioritizing units of production, labor, transportation, etc.

(3) Macropolitical and macroeconomical forecasts of the situations in Russia, Central Asia, and China.

(4) Research on the optimum forms of cooperation.

Kazakstan is both part of former Soviet Central Asia and yet stands apart in many respects. Its geographic position, past history and present development are unique for the area. It is significant that Soviet-era writings treated Kazakstan distinctly from the other four Central Asian republics. This essay is devoted to these differences.

On 10 December 1997, accompanied by much pomp and fanfare, President Nursultan Nazarbaev triumphantly declared Aqmola to be the new capital of Kazakstan in accordance with a 1995 decree he had signed in Almaty. Henceforth, he ordered, all official state business would be transferred from Almaty to Aqmola as expeditiously as possible. Even more dramatic was the context in which President Nazarbaev chose to make the announcement, namely, in the company of the then Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydrin. Clearly, the intention was, once again, to impress on Moscow Nazarbaev's determination to demonstrate specifically to Russia his personal commitment to transform Kazakstan into a genuine, independent post-Soviet state, or so one could interpret the timing of the event. But, before subjecting the long move from Almaty to Aqmola to further analysis, it might help to bring some perspective to the phenomenon of capital shifting, a practice that dates back at least to classical times.