The mere exposure, or familiarity, effect is the tendency for people to feel more positive about stimuli to which they have previously been exposed. The Eurovision Song Contest is a two-stage event, in which some contestants in the final will be more familiar to viewers than others. Thus, viewers’ voting is likely to be influenced by this effect. Previous work attempting to demonstrate this effect in this context has been unable to control for contestant quality. The current study, which used a novel procedure to analyse the way in which contestant countries distributed their points (a function of how viewers voted in those countries) between 2008 and 2011, showed that contestants did better if they previously appeared in a semifinal that was seen by voters. This is evidence that the mere exposure effect, alongside previously studied factors such as cultural and geographical closeness, influences the way viewers vote in the Eurovision.

Mathematics is a fundamental tool of research. Although potentially applicable in every discipline, the amount of training in mathematics that students typically receive varies greatly between different disciplines. In those disciplines where most researchers do not master mathematics, the use of mathematics may be held in too much awe. To demonstrate this I conducted an online experiment with 200 participants, all of which had experience of reading research reports and a postgraduate degree (in any subject). Participants were presented with the abstracts from two published papers (one in evolutionary anthropology and one in sociology). Based on these abstracts, participants were asked to judge the quality of the research. Either one or the other of the two abstracts was manipulated through the inclusion of an extra sentence taken from a completely unrelated paper and presenting an equation that made no sense in the context. The abstract that included the meaningless mathematics tended to be judged of higher quality. However, this “nonsense math effect” was not found among participants with degrees in mathematics, science, technology or medicine.

The current study examines the construct validity of the Maximization Scale (MS; Schwartz et al., 2002) and the Maximization Tendency Scale (MTS; Diab et al., 2008) as well as the nomological net of the maximizing construct. We find that both scales of maximizing suffer psychometrically, especially in their proposed dimensionality. Using confirmatory factor analysis and item response theory (IRT) we identify and remove three problematic items from the MTS and six problematic items from the MS. Additionally, we find that the MS appears to be measuring difficulty and restlessness with the search for the best alternative, whereas the MTS is more focused on the search for the best option, regardless of choice difficulty. We then examined these revised scales in relation to other psychological constructs in the nomological net for maximizing and found that maximizers may not be unhappy but are generally distressed in the decision-making context. Finally, we suggest that future maximizng research use revised form of the MTS that seems to us to be most consistent with the original concept of maximizing/satisficing.

Affective forecasting skills have important implications for decision making. However, recent research suggests that immune neglect—the tendency to overlook coping strategies that reduce future distress—may lead to affective forecasting problems. Prior evidence for immune neglect has been indirect. More direct evidence and a deeper understanding of immune neglect are vital to informing the design of future decision-support interventions. In the current study, young adults (N = 325) supplied predicted, actual, and recollected reactions to an emotionally-evocative interpersonal event, Valentine’s Day. Based on participants’ qualitative descriptions of the holiday, a team of raters reliably coded the effectiveness of their coping strategies. Supporting the immune neglect hypothesis, participants overlooked the powerful role of coping strategies when predicting their emotional reactions. Immune neglect was present not only for those experiencing the holiday negatively (non-daters) but also for those experiencing it positively (daters), suggesting that the bias may be more robust than originally theorized. Immune neglect was greater for immediate emotional reactions than more enduring reactions. Further, immune neglect was conspicuously absent from recollected emotional reactions. Implications for decision-support interventions are discussed.

In three studies, we examined factors that may temporarily attenuate information search. People are generally curious and dislike uncertainty, which typically encourages them to look for relevant information. Despite these strong forces that promote information search, people sometimes deliberately delay obtaining valuable information. We find they may do so when they are concerned that the information might interfere with future pleasurable activities. Interestingly, the decision to search or to postpone searching for information is influenced not only by the value and importance of the information itself but also by well-being maintenance goals related to possible detrimental effects that negative knowledge may have on unrelated future plans.

Most research on the compromise effect focuses on how consumers make their decisions in a complete information scenario; however, consumers generally lack sufficient information when they make purchase decisions. This research aims to explore the compromise effect with incomplete information. Three studies were conducted to examine the research hypotheses. The main findings was that consumers are more likely to choose the middle option when they have incomplete information than when they have complete information. Further, the compromise effect decreases when consumers can choose to defer their decision in an incomplete information scenario. Finally, the compromise effect decreases when consumers are asked to infer missing attribute values from the incomplete information.

We analyze behavior in two basic classes of decision tasks: description-based and experience-based. In particular, we compare the prediction power of a number of decision learning models in both kinds of tasks. Unlike most previous studies, we focus on individual, rather than aggregate, behavioral characteristics. We carry out an experiment involving a battery of both description- and experience-based choices between two mixed binary prospects made by each of the participants, and employ a number of formal models for explaining and predicting participants’ choices: Prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); Expectancy-Valence model (EVL) (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002); and three combinations of these well-established models. We document that the PT and the EVL models are best for predicting people’s decisions in description- and experience-based tasks, respectively, which is not surprising as these two models are designed specially for these kinds of tasks. Furthermore, we find that models involving linear weighting of gains and losses perform better in both kinds of tasks, from the point of view of generalizability and individual parameter consistency. We therefore, conclude that, overall, when both prospects are mixed, the assumption of diminishing sensitivity does not improve models’ prediction power for individual decision-makers. Finally, for some of the models’ parameters, we document consistency at the individual level between description- and experience-based tasks.

Runs of gains and losses are particularly salient to decision makers because of their perceived departure from randomness, as well as their immediate impact on the financial status of the decision makers. Past research has focused on decision making biases that relate to faulty conceptions of chance and luck, such as the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand effect. Participants in the current study bet on the outcomes of a long sequence of simulated coin tosses. Risk preferences were found to change as a function of run valence (i.e., losses vs. gains), run length, and financial status. Individuals were found to differ in the effect of all of these factors, in their responses to runs of gains and losses in sequential risky choice.

Research has identified loss aversion as a strong and robust phenomenon, but has also revealed some moderators affecting the magnitude of its effect on decision making. In the current article, we draw attention to the fact that even the measurement of loss aversion itself may affect its magnitude by inducing a focus on either losses or gains. In three studies, we provide empirical evidence for such a measurement-induced focus. In all studies we used coin-toss gambles—in which there is a 50/50 chance to win or to lose—to assess gain/loss ratios as a measure of loss aversion. Participants either filled out the loss side or the gain side of this gain/loss ratio. The studies consistently showed that—using within- and between-subject designs and anticipated and real coin-toss gambles—the strength of loss aversion depended on the measurement format (fill-in-the-loss versus fill-in-the-gain); filling in the loss side increased loss aversion. Moreover, loss aversion was more affected by the stakes of the gamble in the fill-in-the-loss format than in the fill-in-the-gain format.

A wise decider D uses the contents of his mind fully, accurately and efficiently. D’s ideal decisions, i.e., those that best serve his interests, would be embedded in a comprehensive set of totally coherent judgments lodged in his mind. They would conform to the norms of statistical decision theory, which extracts quantitative judgments of fact and value from D’s mind contents and checks them for coherence. However, the most practical way for D to approximate his ideal may not be with models that embody those norms, i.e., with applied decision theory (ADT). In practice, ADT can represent only some of D’s judgments and those imperfectly. Quite different decision aid, including intuition, pattern recognition and cognitive vigilance (especially combined), typically outperform feasible ADT models—with some notable exceptions. However, decision theory training benefits D’s informal decisions. ADT, both formal and informal, should become increasingly useful and widespread, as technical, cultural and institutional impediments are overcome.

Combining meaning, memory, and development, the perennially popular topic of intuition can be approached in a new way. Fuzzy-trace theory integrates these topics by distinguishing between meaning-based gist representations, which support fuzzy (yet advanced) intuition, and superficial verbatim representations of information, which support precise analysis. Here, I review the counterintuitive findings that led to the development of the theory and its most recent extensions to the neuroscience of risky decision making. These findings include memory interference (worse verbatim memory is associated with better reasoning); nonnumerical framing (framing effects increase when numbers are deleted from decision problems); developmental decreases in gray matter and increases in brain connectivity; developmental reversals in memory, judgment, and decision making (heuristics and biases based on gist increase from childhood to adulthood, challenging conceptions of rationality); and selective attention effects that provide critical tests comparing fuzzy-trace theory, expected utility theory, and its variants (e.g., prospect theory). Surprising implications for judgment and decision making in real life are also discussed, notably, that adaptive decision making relies mainly on gist-based intuition in law, medicine, and public health.

Studying group decision-making is challenging for multiple reasons. An important logistic difficulty is studying a sufficiently large number of groups, each with multiple participants. Assembling groups online could make this process easier and also provide access to group members more representative of real-world work groups than the sample of college students that typically comprise lab Face-to-Face (FtF) groups. The main goal of this paper is to compare the decisions of online groups to those of FtF groups. We did so in a study that manipulated gain/loss framing of a risky decision between groups and examined the decisions of both individual group members and groups. All of these dependent measures are compared for an online and an FtF sample. Our results suggest that web-conferencing can be a substitute for FtF interaction in group decision-making research, as we found no moderation effects of communication medium on individual or group decision outcome variables. The effects of medium that were found suggest that the use of online groups may be the preferred method for group research. To wit, discussions among the online groups were shorter, but generated a greater number of thought units, i.e., they made more efficient use of time.

When judging their likelihood of success in competitive tasks, people tend to be overoptimistic for easy tasks and overpessimistic for hard tasks (the shared circumstance effect; SCE). Previous research has shown that feedback and experience from repeated-play competitions has a limited impact on SCEs. However, in this paper, we suggest that competitive situations, in which the shared difficulty or easiness of the task is more transparent, will be more amenable to debiasing via repeated play. Pairs of participants competed in, made predictions about, and received feedback on, multiple rounds of a throwing task involving both easy- and hard-to-aim objects. Participants initially showed robust SCEs, but they also showed a significant reduction in bias after only one round of feedback. These and other results support a more positive view (than suggested from past research) on the potential for SCEs to be debiased through outcome feedback.

This paper develops tests of independence and stationarity in choice data collected with small samples. The method builds on the approach of Smith and Batchelder (2008). The technique is intended to distinguish cases where a person is systematically changing “true” preferences (from one group of trials to another) from cases in which a person is following a random preference mixture model with independently and identically distributed sampling in each trial. Preference reversals are counted between all pairs of repetitions. The variance of these preference reversals between all pairs of repetitions is then calculated. The distribution of this statistic is simulated by a Monte Carlo procedure in which the data are randomly permuted and the statistic is recalculated in each simulated sample. A second test computes the correlation between the mean number of preference reversals and the difference between replicates, which is also simulated by Monte Carlo. Data of Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011) are reanalyzed by this method. Eight of 18 subjects showed significant deviations from the independence assumptions by one or both of these tests, which is significantly more than expected by chance.

We report a preliminary study that compared decisions made in an oxygen depleted environment with those made in a normoxic environment. Participants were presented with a series of choices that involved either losses or gains. For each choice they were forced to choose between a sure thing and a gamble of the same expected value. For choices involving losses, participants were more risk seeking in the oxygen depleted environment; for those involving gains, no difference was found.

The current field study uses data collected after the 2009 war between Israel and the Hamas militias in the Gaza Strip ended. The study compares recalled emotions and perceived risks among two groups of students, all of whom were exposed to rocket attacks. Individuals in the “left the war zone” group left the region under attack as a precautionary action, while the “stayed in the war zone” group remained in the region during war. The results indicate no significant differences in the levels of recalled fear and anger between the two groups, while the perceived self-risk from terror was higher among the “stayed in the war zone” group. Yet, a higher level of recalled fear was found among those who left the war zone and whose parents resided in the war zone, compared to those who left the war zone and whose parents resided outside the war zone. In addition, fearful people became more pessimistic about their level of personal risk from terror, but not about the routine risks. We conclude that civilians need attention even if they leave the war zone since leaving the attacked region as a precautionary action may mitigate perceived self-risk from terror but does not seem to eliminate the high level of negative emotions evoked by the terror attacks.

We examine how almost winning in roulette affects subsequent betting behavior. Our main finding is heterogeneity in gambler behavior with some gamblers less likely to bet on numbers that were near misses on the prior spin and other gamblers more likely to bet on near miss numbers. Using a unique data set from the game rapid roulette, we model the likelihood of a gambler betting on a near miss number while controlling for the favorite number bias and the likelihood of a number being a near miss. We also find no evidence that near misses in roulette leads to gamblers extending the time spent gambling or to the placing of more bets.

According to the deliberation without attention (DWA) hypothesis, people facing a difficult choice will make a better decision after a period of distraction than after an equally long period of conscious deliberation, an effect referred to as the unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The status of the DWA hypothesis is controversial, as many studies have tried but failed to replicate the UTA. Here, we report a series of experiments that sought to identify the conditions under which the UTA can be replicated. Our starting point was a recent meta-analysis that identified the conditions under which the UTA was strongest in previous studies. Using a within-subjects design and a task that met each of these conditions, we failed to replicate the UTA. Based on closer inspection of previous methods and findings, we then examined some additional factors that could be important for replicating the UTA, including mental fatigue and choice complexity. This was to no avail, as the results revealed only a significant conscious thought advantage, when choice complexity was increased relative to the first experiment. We subsequently conducted exploratory analyses on the data across experiments and found that male subjects showed a significant conscious thought advantage while female subjects showed a trend towards an UTA. Taken together, our results suggest that replication of the UTA may depend more on characteristics of the sample than on the characteristics of the task, and they suggest that gender could be a source of variance in the outcomes of previous studies using a between-subjects design.

Previous research has shown an association between emotions, particularly social emotions, and moral judgments. Some studies suggested an association between blunted emotion and the utilitarian moral judgments observed in patients with prefrontal lesions. In order to investigate how prefrontal brain damage affects moral judgment, we asked a sample of 29 TBI patients (12 females and 17 males) and 41 healthy participants (16 females and 25 males) to judge 22 hypothetical dilemmas split into three different categories (non-moral, impersonal and personal moral). The TBI group presented a higher proportion of affirmative (utilitarian) responses for personal moral dilemmas when compared to controls, suggesting an atypical pattern of utilitarian judgements. We also found a negative association between the performance on recognition of social emotions and the proportion of affirmative responses on personal moral dilemmas. These results suggested that the preference for utilitarian responses in this type of dilemmas is accompanied by difficulties in social emotion recognition. Overall, our findings suggest that deontological moral judgments are associated with normal social emotion processing and that frontal lobe plays an important role in both emotion and moral judgment.