After three or more decades of mainly positivistic readings of the economics of Adam Smith, there was a decided movement following the bicentennial of the publication of the Wealth of Nations to broaden the agenda of Smithian studies. The publication in 1978 of the Report of 1762–63 of Smith's lectures in jurisprudence added impetus to this movement. In particular, historians of ideas began to pay increased attention to Smith's concern with justice in economic life. That attention has evoked renewed interest in certain of Smith's intellectual antecedents who may have played a part in shaping his ideas, but whose influence has remained a matter of relative neglect in modern scholarship.

This paper reviews the way in which constructivist or anti-representationalist arguments have been used as an argument in favor of changing the way we write the history of economic thought. It is argued that though such arguments provide some important new perspectives on the subject, their use as a comprehensive methodological critique of “traditional” approaches to the subject rests on the theses that a non-foundationalist methodology is impossible, and that we can assume that contemporary economics is in a healthy state. If these theses are not accepted, the case against “traditional” histories collapses.

The last decade has seen an outburst of growth models designed to replace the conventional Solow growth model, with its exogenous trend of technical progress, by more realistic models that generate increasing returns (to labor, capital and/or scale) as a result of endogenous technical progress. In contrast to the Solow model, the new models suggest that policy interventions can affect the long-run rate of economic growth. Nicholas Kaldor's growth model, designed in the late 1950s and early 1960s to replace the Solow growth model, is a precursor of the new growth models.

When William Stanley Jevons first presented his theory of exchange, he used the example of two trading bodies (A and B) holding stocks of corn and beef (goods X and Y), but he was eager to show how the basic results could be applied to a variety of situations. After considering the relatively simple introduction of transport costs, Jevons added three subsections (Jevons 1957, pp. 111–19) which demonstrated his confident handling of his approach. There have been many critical comments on Jevons's handling of mathematics, including those of Alfred Marshall in his review of the Theory of Political Economy (Jevons 1872; see Black 1981). However, these examples show that Jevons produced a clear and succinct statement of the mathematical structure of the theory of exchange.

As is well-known, Karl Marx distinguished three types of rent. In addition to two categories of differential rent, closely related to the Ricardian extensive and intensive margins, he argued (against David Ricardo) that rent was paid on the least fertile land. For Marx this so-called “absolute rent” resulted from the barrier posed by landed property to the free movement of capital into agricultural production. Since the organic composition of capital was relatively low in agriculture, the prices of production of farm products were lower than their labor values. The existence of private property in land prevented the reduction of agricultural prices to these prices of production, and allowed the payment of rent even on what could be described, in Ricardian terms, as marginal land. There exists a sizeable literature on Marx's theory of absolute rent,1 but there is no systematic account of its gestation and development. In this paper we explain how Marx's critique of Ricardian rent theory evolved between his first doubts early in 1851 and the articulation of a distinctive alternative analysis in the manuscripts of 1862–63. We also assess the influence exerted on Marx by Richard Jones and Johann Karl Rodbertus, and briefly discuss the significance of Marx's theory of absolute rent for his political economy as a whole.

Robert Heilbroner (1990) challenges us to re-examine our preconceptions about the development of economic analysis in the twentieth century. John Maynard Keynes (1951, p. 141) once said, in a discussion concerning Alfred Marshall, that the “master economist…must study the present in light of the past for the purposes of the future,” and in this regard Heilbroner's essay is the work of a historian of economics who commands our attention and respect. The purpose of his essay “is to inquire into the successes and failures of economic thought in anticipating the march of actual events” (Heilbroner 1990, p. 1097). The failures, Heilbroner points out, considerably outweigh the successes. But, he conjectures, even in those cases of success, the success is not due to superior analysis. Rather, “the success of the farsighted seem accounted for more by their prescient ‘visions’ than by their superior analyses” (ibid., p. 1098).

The appointment of Arthur Cecil Pigou as Alfred Marshall's successor has generated some interest among historians of economic thought (Coase 1972; Coats 1971; and Jones 1978). All agree that the 1908 election was highly political, affected by Marshall's intense efforts to manipulate the process in favor of Pigou and against Herbert S. Foxwell. T. W. Jones sheds light on “the lengths to which Marshall felt able to go in his support of Pigou and, in particular, the manner in which this impinged on one of the electors in 1908, J. N. Keynes” (Jones 1978, p. 235). This is interesting in the wake of John Neville Keynes's many conflicting roles: he was an elector, a friend of Foxwell, and father of John Maynard Keynes, who had failed to secure a Fellowship at King's College earlier that year. Regardless of the motives behind Marshall's maneuvers or the manner in which he accomplished his objective, the outcome of the election left Foxwell extremely, but understandably, disappointed and embittered. Some of this disappointment and bitterness must have been felt toward Marshall's successor, Pigou, of whom Foxwell did not think very highly to begin with. On different occasions, Foxwell had thought Pigou to be “an extreme agitator on a side not popular either here [Cambridge] or among influential people in the country”; “the last Economist I wish to see in any position where he could influence economic study. He has ruined it at Cambridge where complaints are incessant”; and “worse than useless”.