We use short interest as an investor-based measure of over- or undervaluation that distinguishes between the misvaluation and Q-theories of mergers. Using this measure, we find that misvaluation is a strong determinant of merger decision-making. Firms in the top quintile of short interest are 54% more likely to engage in stock acquisitions and 22% less likely to engage in cash acquisitions. Stock (but not cash) acquirers have higher short interest than their targets. Overall, our results suggest that the previously documented underperformance of stock acquirers and the overperformance of cash acquirers can be explained by misvaluation, as captured by short interest.

There is a generalized conviction that variation in dividend yields is exclusively related to expected returns and not to expected dividend growth, for example, Cochrane’s (2011) presidential address. We show that this pattern, although valid for the aggregate stock market, is not true for portfolios of small and value stocks, where dividend yields are related mainly to future dividend changes. Thus, the variance decomposition associated with the aggregate dividend yield has important heterogeneity in the cross section of equities. Our results are robust to different forecasting horizons, econometric methodology (long-horizon regressions or first-order vector autoregression), and alternative decomposition based on excess returns.

We construct a mortality table for U.S. public companies during 1985–2006. We find that the age-specific mortality rates of firms initially increase, peaking at age three, and then decrease with age, implying that the first 3 years of public life are critical. Financial intermediaries involved around the “public birth” of a firm (e.g., venture capitalists (VCs) and high-quality underwriters) are associated with lower firm mortality rates, sometimes for up to 7 years after the initial public offering (IPO). VCs reduce mortality rates more through natal financial care than through selection, whereas high-quality underwriters affect firm mortality more through selection.

This paper documents pervasive evidence of intra-industry reversals in monthly returns. Unlike the conventional reversal strategy based on stock returns relative to the market portfolio, we document intra-industry return reversals that are larger in magnitude, consistently present over time, and prevalent across subgroups of stocks, including large and liquid stocks. These return reversals are driven by order imbalances and noninformational shocks. Consistent with reversals representing compensation for supplying liquidity, intra-industry reversals are stronger following aggregate market declines and volatile times, reflecting binding capital constraints and limited risk-bearing capacity of liquidity providers.

After Lehman’s collapse in 2008, investors ran from risky money market funds. In 27 funds, outflows overwhelmed cash inflows, thus forcing asset sales. These funds sold their safest and most liquid holdings. Funds were thus left with riskier and longer maturity assets. Over the subsequent quarter, however, the hard-hit funds reduced risk more than other funds. In contrast, money funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks before Lehman did not alter portfolio risk. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns with the Treasury Guarantee of investor claims did not increase risk taking. Funds that benefited most from the government bailout reduced risk.

Do happy people predict future risk and return differently from unhappy people, or do individuals rely only on economic facts? We survey investors on their subjective sentiment-creating factors, return and risk expectations, and investment plans. We find that noneconomic factors systematically affect return and risk expectations, where the return effect is more profound. Investment plans are also affected by noneconomic factors. Sports results and general feelings significantly affect predictions. Sufferers from seasonal affective disorder have lower return expectations in the autumn than in other seasons, supporting the winter blues hypothesis.

This study examines whether religiosity at the county level is associated with future stock price crash risk. We find robust evidence that firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower levels of future stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the view that religion, as a set of social norms, helps to curb bad-news-hoarding activities by managers. Our evidence further shows that the negative relation between religiosity and future crash risk is stronger for riskier firms and for firms with weaker governance mechanisms measured by shareholder takeover rights and dedicated institutional ownership.

Stock liquidity has improved over the recent 4 decades. This improvement was accompanied by a dramatic increase in trading activity. The net effect on the liquidity premium is ambiguous. We show that the characteristic liquidity premium of U.S. stocks has significantly declined over the past 4 decades. In recent years, characteristic liquidity is significantly priced only for the smallest common stocks. This decline stems from an improvement in liquidity and from a lower sensitivity of expected returns to liquidity. By contrast, systematic liquidity has not been trending down and is still significantly priced primarily among NASDAQ stocks.

We apply an empirical approximation of the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) to show that cross-sectional dispersion in currency returns can be rationalized by differences in currency excess returns’ sensitivities to the market return’s cash-flow news component. This finding echoes recent explanations of the value and growth stock market anomaly. The distinction between cash-flow news and discount-rate news is key to jointly explain average stock and currency returns. Our analysis reveals the presence of a common source of systematic risk in stock and foreign currency returns that is reflected in the market return’s cash-flow news component.

The risk of securities class action litigation alters corporate savings and investment policy. Firms with greater exposure to securities litigation hold significantly more cash in anticipation of future settlements and other related costs. The result is due to firms accumulating cash in anticipation of lawsuits and not a consequence of plaintiffs targeting firms with high cash levels. The market value of cash is lower for firms exposed to litigation risk. Corporate investment decisions are also affected by litigation risk, as firms reduce capital expenditures in response. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and possible spurious temporal effects.