This study suggests that the militaristic orientation of the Meiji government and the wars fought against China and Russia contributed significantly to technological development in Meiji Japan (1868–1911). The roles played by the arsenals and the government-owned shipyards and factories in adopting and disseminating foreign technology are described to demonstrate their importance in the rapid Meiji industrialization. The article suggests that it is necessary to reexamine the view, primarily based on macro-economic analysis, that Meiji militarism was basically detrimental to economic growth in Japan.

The date printed on the spine of the Journal's March issue this year is 1976, not 1977. We regret the error, and hope that readers will alter the date on the spine of their copies, as we did on ours.

This article examines the evolution of the Russian government's policies between 1861 and 1917 in the sphere of rural credit, especially the extent to which social and cultural factors and ministerial politics impinged on the choice of banks and their development. Discussions concerned measures for economic change that could take place within the traditional and legal framework of the village community. The Ministry of Interior supported a classbased estate bank. The Ministry of Finance opted for the cooperative credit association which was to foster rural pacification and agricultural development by mobilizing peasant collective habits and private initiative that favored cooperative organizations.

Tax systems in England, France, Spain, and Venice are regarded as providing payments from subjects to governments for protection against foreign and domestic threats. In each developing state, the supply and demand for protection at the time of the tax system's origin determined the long-term character of taxation. Only where taxes arose in an environment of exceptionally long wars did subjects forfeit their right to control levies. Groups having close substitutes available for central government paid non-extortionate taxes. Collusion in the supply of protection led to noble tax privileges. Once created, taxes survived as long as the government itself.