The Massingire acquired an identity separate from that of the other Maganja peoples under the leadership of a family of Indian origin called Vas dos Anjos. During the 1870s they became involved in a series of wars with the Makololo chiefs of the Shire, and the raids carried out by the Makololo on Portuguese territory threatened to implicate the Scottish mission in the Shire Highlands. In 1882 the Portuguese annexed Massingire after the deposition of the Vas dos Anjos chief, and in 1884 the whole area rose in rebellion supported by dissident elements on the prazos of the lower Zambezi. The Portuguese thought that the Makololo were responsible for the rising and that they had been aided by the Church of Scotland mission. The Massingire had, in fact, made many attempts to obtain official or unofficial British protection, and it is possible that they may have thought that their connections with the British would grant them the same sort of immunity as that enjoyed by the Makololo. When the frontiers were finally drawn in 1891, Massingire was divided, the larger part falling to the Portuguese.

The Benin kingdom did not come into the British official reckoning until well into the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that various European nations had been engaged in commercial contact with Benin for four centuries. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, Benin City fell to British troops after a dramatic build-up of rapidly succeeding events culminating in the punitive expedition of February 1897. These events, as the evidence in this article reveals, were prompted by economic rather than humanitarian considerations.

The Benin kingdom fell mainly because, in an age when the traders and the British consular officials had reasons impelling them to penetrate into the hinterland, Oba Ovonramwen was clinging to traditional policies of economic exclusiveness and monopolistic practices which inflicted economic losses on the revenues of the individual traders, the Itsekiri middlemen and the Niger Coast Protectorate government.

The increasing fear of concerted European designs on his kingdom further strengthened the Oba's adherence to his closed-door policy, which in turn increased the consul' determination to bring him under their economic and political control. This situation precipitated the events which culminated in the capture of Benin City by British forces in February 1897.

As with other powerful African rulers in the Niger Delta and on the West African Coast, the British had to settle accounts with the Oba of Benin, who had to be reconciled with the developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The fall of Benin cannot therefore be rightly divorced from the general British economic imperialism on the Niger Coast during the second half of the nineteenth century.

This article describes the debilitating illness of Menilek and its effects upon the Ethiopian state. Prior to his incapacity, the old emperor established a European-style cabient, reformed the appelate judiciary, named Lij Eyyasu as his heir, and appointed Ras Bitwodded Tessema Nado as regent. The latter two actions were opposed by Empress Taitou, who hoped to become the real ruler of Ethiopia, operating behind the scenes. As the emperor weakened, she managed to concentrate many of his functions and much of his authority in her own hands. Given the confusion caused by Menilek's condition, she went unchallenged for a time, during which she attempted futilely to construct a viable power base in the north. Finally, in reaction, the Shoan, southern faction, which had much to lose if Menilek's settlement was upset, united and successfully deposed the empress in 1910. A regency government, composed of Menilek's council of ministers and the more important provincial governors, operated more or less functionally until April 1911, when the Ras-Regent died. At the time Lij Eyyasu became chairman of the regency council, and by 1913 he was exercising more or less full authority over the empire. Contrary to contemporary official European expectations and calculations, Menilek's empire did not crack apart upon his removal, nor from regional and personal rivalries. The diplomats showed complete ignorance about the effectiveness of the administrative and military occupation of the newly annexed parts of the empire; they grossly undervalued the strength of Amhara–Tigrean nationalism; they misunderstood the vitality of the mythology of the Solomonic dynasty; and they failed to consider the veneration which Menilek elicited from his people. More than any other point, this article demonstrates the transcendent vitality of the empire which Menilek constructed.

In 1964 the Bamenda Grassfields, then composed of the three West Cameroon prefectures of Bamenda, Wum and Nkambe, had a population of almost 575,000, which was densest in the Bamenda prefecture, adjoining the populous Bamileke prefectures. By 1967 these three prefectures had been increased to five–Bamenda, Gwofon, Nso, Wum and Nkambe– by division of the former Bamenda prefecture into three (Bamenda, Gwofon and Nso) and the addition to Gwofon of the Widekum-Menka area formerly administered as part of Mamfe Division. The distribution and age and occupational structure of the population are discussed in The Population of West Cameroon: Main Findings of the 1964 Sample Demographic Survey (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, 1966). A census was carried out by the British administering authorities in 1953, based on socalled ‘clan areas’—a misnomer. The general picture given in administrative reports and reproduced in the 1953 census ethnic categories was of the broad division of the region into Tikar, Chamba (Bali), Tiv (Munshi) and Widekum, with small refugee enclaves on the northern borders. The significance and doubtful validity of these categories will be discussed in our forthcoming contribution to the Histoire des peuples et civilisations du Cameroun (ed. Claude Tardits), and are dealt with in some detail in E. M. Chilver and P. M. Kaberry, Notes on the Precolonial History and Ethnography of the Bamenda Grassfields (cyclostyled, 1966, for the Ministry of Education, West Cameroon).

Discussions about ‘direct’ administration and ‘indirect’ administration, with regard to French and British colonial policies, are less important than the question of who—local leaders or colonial administrators—had power over the lives of Africans. Monthly reports written by heads of subdivisions, the smallest French administrative units in a colony like Oubangui-Chari, are the most important written source of information for the day-to-day events of an area. They are also a source for the point of view of the administrator, often quite different from the point of view of chiefs and villagers. The European often sees himself as the central figure and colonial administrative problems as the central issues for everyone. African memories of the same period indicate that the European may have been considered less important by African peasants than their chief, whether the chief had a legitimate traditional basis or not, and that administrative issues were considered less important than certain local problems unknown to the European. This study of Félix Eboué and Raymond Sokambi, an administrator and a chief in Oubangui-Chari, shows that an attempt to examine perceptions of power—one basis for power—is a way to understand relations between the colonial administration and African society.

The formation of Bono-Manso appears to date from the early fifteenth century, perhaps c. 1420. It is concluded that it was not until the late sixteenth century, during the reign of the ninth king, that the procedures still in use at Takyiman for recording reign-length were first introduced. Muslim influence is strongly to be suspected. Perhaps at the same time, perhaps later, factitious records of reign-length were supplied for earlier generations of the dynasty, on the assumption that three generations make 100 years. Fairly accurate dating is possible for the kings and queenmothers of Bono-Manso during the period 1577–1723, and of Takyiman since its formation in the 1740s. It is no part of this paper to explore the implications of the shortened chronology suggested here, but a date in the early fifteenth century for the establishment of Bono-Manso seems to square well with current thinking.

This article draws attention to the comparative lack of material on the origins of African nationalism in Zambia, and suggests a framework of analysis and possible future areas of research on the subject. In contrast with some other East and Central African territories, Zambia offered little or no primary resistance to the imposition of colonial rule, but in other respects the country resembled neighbouring territories in the first three decades of colonial rule. There is a need for further study of Watch Tower and the Welfare Associations, the former in the inter-war years, the latter in the 1940s. The Copperbelt from 1930 to 1950, with its problems of urbanization and the colour bar, is a vital factor setting Zambia apart from other tropical dependencies. Here, Africans were confronted with the determination of Europeans to retain political and economic power, whatever the policy declarations of the government. The politicization of the territory can be traced from here, and the role of the Bemba-speaking peoples as the spearhead of protest had its origin in their powerful position on the Copperbelt.

Pour comprendre les rapports de la politique avec l'économie au temps de la constitution de l'empire français d'Afrique noire, un coup d'çeil est indispensable sur les relations entre l'Occident et l'Afrique de 1815 è 1870. On s'aperçoit alors que les facteurs économiques en jeu étaient essentiellement Ie commerce d'exportation de quelques produits industriels ’de traite’ européens, les tissus, armes, perles, alcools, tabacs, etc.,

This paper attempts to study the contrasting responses of two Kenya tribes, the Masai and the Kikuyu, to the establishment of British administration. It suggests that neither reacted in the way expected of them by early British officials, who anticipated that the Masai would forcefully oppose the British entry, while little or no resistance was expected from the Kikuyu.

Instead, the Masai actively co-operated with the British, through the support of a laibon, Lenana, and the provision of levies who accompanied British punitive expeditions. Although twice removed from their lands, the Masai still did not fight, but appealed to the law courts. When this failed, they showed little or no interest in further opposition. Although apparently having some cause to resent treatment received at the hands of the British, they showed virtually no interest in the protest movements of the twenties.

By contrast the Kikuyu, far from standing aside as had been expected, opposed the British entry in a series of short engagements, in which they suffered considerable casualties. Soon, however, collaborators began to emerge and ‘chiefs’ such as Kinyanjui—created by the British and beholden to them–benefited considerably from the connexion. Despite this co-operation, the earlier resentments continued and were reinforced by losses of land to European settlers, and by the unsettling effects upon tribal life of the proximity of Nairobi and the teaching of the missions. When, after the acute sufferings of the war years, further demands were made by the government, the Kikuyu responded by active participation in organized political protest.

Possible reasons are put forward for these contrasting responses, and the suggestion is made that differing attitudes to the protest movements of the twenties can be more fully appreciated when the history of these earlier years is taken into account.

In May 1961 a small group of men formed the Kabaka Yekka movement in the Kingdom of Buganda. Their simple objective was to unite the Baganda behind the throne, the symbol and guarantee of Buganda's separate identity. The great fear was that the election of a national Democratic Party government in the previous March had marked a decisive stage in the destruction of Buganda's special position within Uganda. Kabaka Yekka's appeal to Ganda loyalty was instantly successful, but it was not until the Kabaka's ministers agreed to accept membership of independent Uganda, and to support Kabaka Yekka in Buganda, that Kabaka Yekka could win popular support and deal effectively with the Democratic Party. But when Kabaka Yekka became an ‘official’ movement, its whole nature and function was changed. There had been differences at the beginning, but now the simple objective barely disguised the contradictions within the movement, while Kabaka Yekka became a means to personal promotion as well as the guardian of the ‘national’ interest. Above all, Kabaka Yekka now included the chiefs, who wanted to preserve the existing political and social arrangements within Buganda. So by February 1962 Kabaka Yekka had become the party for the Baganda and for the status quo within Buganda. It was a party which, because it was identified with the Kabakaship, was able to destroy the Democratic Party in elections for the Buganda Lukiko, and a party which, although in alliance with Dr Obote's Uganda People's Congress in national politics, had aroused sentiments and interests pointing ultimately, if not irrevocably, to Ganda separation.