Sociologists have noted that the ideological inclusiveness of nationalism varies. By comparing the Bolshevik and Chinese communist revolutionary elites, this article explains that such variation depends on the social strength of nationalism. A strong nationalism is (a) undergirded by a widely diffused national culture that can socialize most radical elites into the nation; (b) kept institutionally open to broad social strata so that lower classes can form a nationalist identity through participation; and (c) universally believed to be a geopolitically feasible anti-colonial revolution so that radical elites can think of engagement as worthwhile and necessary. Using a comparative biographical method probing both nationalists and communists, this article demonstrates that nationalism in Tsarist Russia was far weaker than in post-imperial China. In the former, the nationalist movement excluded communists while, in the latter, communists were incorporated. Therefore, the two communist parties had different understandings of Marxism.

The 1988 constitution has led to the introduction of ethno-legal categories grounded on the dual premises of exceptionality and territorial administration. This article offers an explanation of why mobilizations based on ethnicity have not petered out despite the evident disengagement of the state, suggesting that it is important to distinguish between two ways of envisioning the articulation of singularity with territory: while the state considers that differences between populations pre-exist prior to territorial delimitation, local populations are convinced that the intention to proceed with demarcation suffices in itself to demonstrate their specificity. Moreover, from their perspective, a territorial claim is important as a way of accessing other rights that they consider equally essential. Our second section examines not only recent declarations of identity but also the observed switching between ethno-legal categories, building on a comparison with religious conversion as a meandering, complex, sometimes paradoxical process. Ethnicity, like religious affiliation, can thus be seen as a language developed at the national level but reappropriated by various populations in the service of local issues and usages. A final section examines particularism, whether quilombola, traditional or Indian, as the currently dominant norm and form of expression for social protest, while reflecting on the role of outside actors as “institutional hosts” [Houtzager 2004]. It should be noted, moreover, that such standardization of the forms of political involvement no more precludes the replication of the social hierarchies between outsiders and natives, than it prevents social protest from being co-opted by the authorities.

This article compares the collective commemoration of martyrs to ascertain changes in cultural understandings of the relationship between the ultimate sacrifice offered by an individual and monarchal violence. This historical comparison is used to argue that changes in the nature of Christianity transformed the popular interpretation of sovereign violence from a desecrative to a redemptive force. While cultural individualism and political statism appear in secularized modernity as contradictory impulses, their birth in early modernity was induced by coherent and entirely consistent religious worldview.

In March 1974, trade union leader and Chairman of the Socialist Party of India, George Fernandes, formed a new independent trade union of railway workers and then led a massive nation-wide strike lasting about a month. Two years later—March 1976—Fernandes was arrested as the principal accused in the Baroda Dynamite Conspiracy Case, a plot to bomb strategic targets in New Delhi in resistance to Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian rule. How did George Fernandes’ political work change over these two years—from engaging in traditional trade union movement tactics during the Railway Workers’ Strike in 1974 to being the ringleader of a plan to bomb strategic targets in resistance to the postcolonial state? Why would an activist who advocated non-violent social movement tactics change strategies and end up leading a movement that primarily uses violent tactics? I argue that in its violent repression of the Railway Workers’ Strike and its illegal imprisonment of the strike’s leaders, Indira Gandhi’s administration demonstrated to Fernandes and other opposition party leaders that there was no room for a peaceful solution to the ever increasing social conflict of early 1970s India. Therefore, when Gandhi instated herself as dictator, longstanding advocates of satyagraha believed that symbolic violence against the state was the tactic most likely to lead to the restoration of democracy in India.

In this project, I use the LGBT movement in Italy as a case study to investigate how social movements in culturally diverse social environments strategically employ contentious language to develop discourses that maximize cultural and policy outcomes without encountering discursive fragmentation. My research shows that supporters of LGBT civil rights in different Italian regions relied on a tactical use of particular words in order to respond to regionally specific norms of cultural expression regulating the boundaries drawn around the concept of family. Taking a cultural and linguistic approach to the study of social movements, I present the mechanism of asymmetrical metonymy as an example of the strategic use of polysemic language to achieve discursive convergence through culturally specific tactics, and I argue that discourse and rhetorical analysis offer a way to understand how movements make sense of different cultural limitations in a fragmented social environment.

Nationalism in the modern world began in European metropoles but spread throughout the world system in the form of anticolonial nationalism. While many studies have explored the former, this essay systematically examines the latter. Based upon an original database of 124 cases, we test multiple theories that might account for the origins and spread of anticolonial nationalism. We adjudicate between cultural-cognitive approaches emphasizing the discursive bases for national imaginings on the one hand and, on the other, theories that emphasize political-economic dynamics and elite conflict. Our time-series regression analysis suggests that while cultural-cognitive approaches best account for the initial wave of anticolonial nationalism, from 1700 to 1878, theories stressing political-economic dynamics and elite conflict explain anticolonial nationalism in the later wave, from 1879 to 1990. The analysis suggests that theories of nationalism need to be attentive to the historical specificity of their claims.

How do regulators regulate with metrics? This article offers a rhetorical approach to this question, using early U.S. securities regulation as a case in point, and reliance on credit ratings as empirical illustration. A rhetorical approach challenges economists’ claim that metrics are limited to providing technical guidance to policy formation: the fact is that the role of metrics in regulation can be appreciated only if technical and social aspects are considered together. A rhetorical perspective also fills an important gap in sociological studies of “co-production” that claim that procedural deliberation enhances the legitimacy of regulation but underemphasize the role of quantification when procedural rules are lacking. This article suggests that rhetoric is not suboptimal or irrational but a vital form of deliberation in contexts of uncertainty, when decision-making requires some amount of persuasion outside a procedural context. I observe that metrics can be a powerful vehicle of rhetorical change. Two components of rhetorical metrics are highlighted. First are cognitive clutches, or the capacity to shift prevailing models of attention. Second are actionable arguments, the capacity to embed cognitive deviance into a compelling argument for change. I conclude with reflections on the legacy of rhetorical decisions on current policy debates.

This article posits that institutionalized mythologies can create comparative production advantages. Myths shape collective identity, mobilize actors, and fundamentally reshape production dynamics. Myths are institutionalized in market rules, regulations and structures, leading to the reification of the myth. The myth functions as if it is true, not because it is true, but because it shapes the rules of production. Yet without the initial myth, specific production incentives—and even their institutional comparative advantages—would not exist. My theory integrates approaches from modernist historians (“imagined communities”) and economic sociologists (“imagined futures”) to explain how myths (“imagined histories”) shape contemporary market outcomes, using the example of the French wine market. This argument contributes to the historical institutionalist approach, which focuses on the historical power dynamics between competing groups and the present-day social and market consequence of their institutionalized solutions.

The present paper aims to unearth the rudiments of an alternative theory of action in Weber. Centring on salient descriptions of scientific practice found in Weber, I argue that one finds so-called “relational” impulses in these instances, which are at odds with the Kantian, subject-centred and dualist perspectives pervading much of Weber’s thought.

The paper consists of two parts. In the first—critical—part, after a short sketch of my relational approach, I cite some well-known “Kantian” passages in Weber’s work and demonstrate their undesirable theoretical and empirical consequences. I investigate Weber’s “official” theory of action and understanding, his concepts of rationality and psychology, and his understanding of technological mediation. In the second—positive—part, I delve into Weber’s understanding of creativity, investigating relational traits in Weber’s descriptions of scientific practice and experience. I then demonstrate how Weber’s late concept of personality is based on relational and object-oriented attitudes. Further, I investigate how the two dimensions of creativity and personality merge in his concept of Sachlichkeit. Finally, I provide certain biographical observations and discuss the conflict between existentialist and relational interpretations of Weber. At the very end of the paper, I discuss some general implications of the relational perspective.

Though anomie is one of sociology’s most unique conceptual contributions, its progenitor, Emile Durkheim, was notably ambiguous about its meaning. Consequently, its use in contemporary sociology has varied wildly. In part, the confusion surrounding anomie stems from Durkheim’s insistence that it is caused by deregulation, which has resisted operationalization. Nevertheless, careful consideration of the “four faces” of anomie most prominent in the sociological canon—that is, (1) the anomic division of labor, (2) anomic suicide, (3) Mertonian strain, and (4) the micro-level symbolic-cultural versions—reveals that disruption and disintegration, rather than deregulation, are the common threads woven through each. Drawing from this insight, a new theoretical conceptualization for anomie is offered that defines it as (a) a social psychological force operating at both the (b) individual- or “meso”/corporate unit-level of social reality that results from (c) chronic or acute disruptions that, in turn, generate (d) real or imagined disintegrative pressures. Furthermore, disruptions are not only predicated on the real or imagined loss of social ties (dissolution), but also on the real or imagined loss of attachment to a coherent social reality (disjunction) and/or physical space (dislocation). This recalibration allows anomie to enter into deeper dialogue with a wide range of other phenomena that may in fact share some overlapping elements with anomie related to the pain of potentially losing cherished social relationships and the motivation toward self-harm, anti-social and even pro-social behaviors to escape this social pain.

Even though Elias himself does not focus on an explicit theory on violence in The Civilizing Process, due to his research question on pacific social processes, violence is not generally theoretically excluded. Against this backdrop, and contrary to criticisms regarding a general loss as well as a biological rather than a sociological explanation of violence, and besides theories that explain meso and macro-level violence within Elias’s framework, this article considers interpersonal micro-level violence as an intrinsic part of the civilizing process. Especially by supplementing Elias’s assumptions of drive control and self-constraint with recent neuroscientific findings, it is possible to conceptualize interpersonal micro-level violence as situational exceedance of a subjective threshold of pain. Here, despite a normative civilized frame of behavior, aggression, as a (neuro)biologically-based reactive drive, is no longer controlled by socially learned self-constraint, leading to violence as a subjectively perceived rewarding behavior and socially performed action.