Between 1976 and 1994 the UK Government’s Welsh Development Agency made 2,304 loan and equity investments totaling £117.8 million. The agency aimed to address difficulties faced by firms in obtaining finance, and such intervention was justified by the market failure and spillover hypotheses. This article assesses the agency’s investment activities against both justifications. It finds that while some investments succeeded, the portfolio’s financial performance was poor, and the agency did not address widespread market failure. Evidence of spillover returns existed, but cannot be quantified accurately across the portfolio. The article argues that the agency’s two venture capital objectives, to assemble a profitable portfolio and to grow employment levels through boosting commercial activity, were incompatible within a poorly performing regional economy. Although spillovers can justify public venture capital in such economies, expectations as to financial performance should be realistic in the absence of an ecosystem that facilitates demand for capital.

The postwar market for films in Italy resembles those found in other developed capitalist economies, in which supply adjusts to demand through a set of institutional arrangements designed to maximize revenue for the film distributor. The outcome is a statistical distribution of revenues that manifests extreme levels of inequality, indicating that the hits of the day were “giants” in relation to the median film and enjoyed throughout the territory. By drawing upon film industry–sourced box-office data for five cities, Milan and Turin in the north, Naples and Bari in the south, and Rome in the center, we can observe the market mechanism operating at the city level, allowing the exploration of differences in preferences between the cities. A relative popularity index (RelPOP) is introduced to measure variation in film popularity across the five cities, and clear evidence is found to support the coexistence of national and local taste. This phenomenon is examined with respect to those films that were exceptionally popular throughout, and those with particular geographically specific audiences. The example of the many films that starred Totò, appealing in particular to southern Italian audiences, is highlighted and contrasted with the Don Camillo series of films that were set in Emilia Romagna and appealed differentially to filmgoers in the north.

This article contributes to literature on the role of “firms” in the early modern English economy by exploring contracts for works between the Crown, the City of London, and large construction firms that built the Greenwich Hospital, City churches, and St. Paul’s Cathedral from 1670 to 1712. Primary sources show varying arrangements to pricing, mitigating risk, and securing finance occurred without the costs of intermediaries. Clients pushed financial and operating risks onto contractors through complex contracting systems that enabled and supported a number of coordination mechanisms in the market. The article argues that contracts rather than firms should be the unit of analysis for those wishing to examine productivity and changes in early modern business.

This study analyzes the variables that influence international competitiveness, both in industrialized and developing countries. Based on rich archival resources, the study explains the intense international competition between European and North American publishers in pursuing Latin American book markets throughout the course of the First Global Economy. The case of Spain provides an opportunity to study the patterns of the internationalization process of a nonleading country and compare them with the strategies developed by German, U.S., French, and British companies. This research sheds light on the importance of social networks and national cultural influences in the internationalization of this singular industry.

This article examines the Reynolds Metals Company’s political networking activities in Washington, D.C., and the state capitals of the U.S. South in the 1940s and 1950s. It argues that Reynolds’ astute recruitment of senior staff from federal and state governments, its adept building of elite networks in the legislative and executive branches, its judicious espousing of key political rhetoric (antitrust, regional development, national security), as well as its nurturing of Democratic circles in the South were crucial to their attainment of competitive advantage. This saw the company rise from being a new entrant in the U.S. primary aluminum production during World War II to the second-largest national producer by 1946 and a major global player by the mid-1950s. This same political networking was critical in maintaining that advantage after World War II in the face of competition from the Aluminum Company of America and the Canadian multinational Aluminium Company of Canada. Both “wartime” (covering the period from World War II and into the Cold War) and the legacy of government intervention (from the early twentieth century until the 1960s, including the New Deal) provided a fertile context for RMC’s business strategy. The company’s success owed much to founder Richard S. Reynolds Sr.’s acumen in hiring the right people, creating or joining the right networks, having the right social capital, as well as his experiences and connections accrued from working with his uncle, the noted tobacco magnate R. J. Reynolds. The article offers insights into the nature of U.S. business–government relations.