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Volume 30 - November 2014

Contents

Page 2 of 2

Reviews

Replies

  • THE ROLE OF EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS: REPLY TO JONES

  • Francesco Guala
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 June 2014, pp. 503-511

  • Martin Jones has criticized my account of the methodology of experimental economics on three points: the impossibility of testing external validity claims in the laboratory, my reconstruction of external validity inferences as analogical arguments, and the distinction between laboratory and non-laboratory sciences. I defend my account here and try to eliminate some misunderstandings that may have prompted Jones’s criticism.

Reviews

Critical Notice

  • RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND REASONING

  • Herlinde Pauer-Studer
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 September 2014, pp. 513-528

  • This critical note concerns John Broome's book Rationality through Reasoning (2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.

Contributors

Reviews

Review

Contributors

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 30 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    02 June 2014, pp. f1-f3
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Contributors

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 30 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    04 March 2014, pp. f1-f3
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Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 30 issue 2 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    02 June 2014, pp. b1-b4
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Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 30 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 September 2014, pp. f1-f3
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Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 30 issue 1 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    04 March 2014, pp. b1-b10
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  • EAP volume 30 issue 3 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 September 2014, pp. b1-b2
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Page 2 of 2