This article provides practical ethical guidance for clinicians making decisions after a nuclear detonation, in advance of the full establishment of a coordinated response. We argue that the utilitarian maxim of the greatest good for the greatest number, interpreted only as “the most lives saved,” needs refinement. We take the philosophical position that utilitarian efficiency should be tempered by the principle of fairness in making decisions about providing lifesaving interventions and palliation. The most practical way to achieve these goals is to mirror the ethical precepts of routine clinical practice, in which 3 factors govern resource allocation: order of presentation, patient's medical need, and effectiveness of an intervention. Although these basic ethical standards do not change, priority is given in a crisis to those at highest need in whom interventions are expected to be effective. If available resources will not be effective in meeting the need, then it is unfair to expend them and they should be allocated to another patient with high need and greater expectation for survival if treated. As shortage becomes critical, thresholds for intervention become more stringent. Although the focus of providers will be on the victims of the event, the needs of patients already receiving care before the detonation also must be considered. Those not allocated intervention must still be provided as much appropriate comfort, assistance, relief of symptoms, and explanations as possible, given the available resources. Reassessment of patients' clinical status and priority for intervention also should be conducted with regularity.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S46-S53)

Objectives: The World Health Organization convened a panel of experts to rank the evidence for medical countermeasures for management of acute radiation syndrome (ARS) in a hypothetical scenario involving the hospitalization of 100 to 200 victims. The goal of this panel was to achieve consensus on optimal management of ARS affecting nonhematopoietic organ systems based upon evidence in the published literature.

Methods: English-language articles were identified in MEDLINE and PubMed. Reference lists of retrieved articles were distributed to conferees in advance of and updated during the meeting. Published case series and case reports of ARS, publications of randomized controlled trials of relevant interventions used to treat nonirradiated individuals, reports of studies in irradiated animals, and prior recommendations of subject matter experts were selected. Studies were extracted using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment Development and Evaluation system. In cases in which data were limited or incomplete, a narrative review of the observations was made.

Results: No randomized controlled trials of medical countermeasures have been completed for individuals with ARS. Reports of countermeasures were often incompletely described, making it necessary to rely on data generated in nonirradiated humans and in experimental animals. A strong recommendation is made for the administration of a serotonin-receptor antagonist prophylactically when the suspected exposure is >2 Gy and topical steroids, antibiotics, and antihistamines for radiation burns, ulcers, or blisters; excision and grafting of radiation ulcers or necrosis with intractable pain; provision of supportive care to individuals with neurovascular syndrome; and administration of electrolyte replacement therapy and sedatives to individuals with significant burns, hypovolemia, and/or shock. A strong recommendation is made against the use of systemic steroids in the absence of a specific indication. A weak recommendation is made for the use of fluoroquinolones, bowel decontamination, loperamide, and enteral nutrition, and for selective oropharyngeal/digestive decontamination, blood glucose maintenance, and stress ulcer prophylaxis in critically ill patients.

Conclusions: High-quality studies of therapeutic interventions in humans exposed to nontherapeutic radiation are not available, and because of ethical concerns regarding the conduct of controlled studies in humans, such studies are unlikely to emerge in the near future.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:183–201)

Tens of thousands of workers participated in rescue, recovery, and cleanup activities at the World Trade Center (WTC) site in lower Manhattan after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11). The collapse of the WTC resulted in the release of a variety of airborne toxicants. To date, respiratory symptoms and diseases have been among the most examined health outcomes in studies of WTC disaster workers. A systematic review of the literature on respiratory health outcomes was undertaken to describe the available information on new onset of respiratory symptoms and diseases among WTC disaster workers after September 11, 2001. Independent risk factors for respiratory health outcomes included being caught in the dust and debris cloud, early arrival at the WTC site, longer duration of work, and delaying mask and respirator use. Methodological challenges in epidemiologic studies of WTC disaster workers involved study design, exposure misclassification, and limited information on potential confounders and effect modifiers. In the 10 years after 9/11, epidemiologic studies of WTC disaster workers have been essential in investigating the respiratory health consequences of WTC exposure. Longitudinal studies along with continued medical surveillance will be vital in understanding the long-term respiratory burden associated with occupational WTC exposure. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S189–S196)

Objectives: Hospital surge capacity in multiple casualty events (MCE) is the core of hospital medical response, and an integral part of the total medical capacity of the community affected. To date, however, there has been no consensus regarding the definition or quantification of hospital surge capacity. The first objective of this study was to quantitatively benchmark the various components of hospital surge capacity pertaining to the care of critically and moderately injured patients in trauma-related MCE. The second objective was to illustrate the applications of those quantitative parameters in local, regional, national, and international disaster planning; in the distribution of patients to various hospitals by prehospital medical services; and in the decision-making process for ambulance diversion.

Methods: A 2-step approach was adopted in the methodology of this study. First, an extensive literature search was performed, followed by mathematical modeling. Quantitative studies on hospital surge capacity for trauma injuries were used as the framework for our model. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization triage categories (T1-T4) were used in the modeling process for simplicity purposes.

Results: Hospital Acute Care Surge Capacity (HACSC) was defined as the maximum number of critical (T1) and moderate (T2) casualties a hospital can adequately care for per hour, after recruiting all possible additional medical assets. HACSC was modeled to be equal to the number of emergency department beds (#EDB), divided by the emergency department time (EDT); HACSC = #EDB/EDT. In trauma-related MCE, the EDT was quantitatively benchmarked to be 2.5 (hours). Because most of the critical and moderate casualties arrive at hospitals within a 6-hour period requiring admission (by definition), the hospital bed surge capacity must match the HACSC at 6 hours to ensure coordinated care, and it was mathematically benchmarked to be 18% of the staffed hospital bed capacity.

Conclusions: Defining and quantitatively benchmarking the different components of hospital surge capacity is vital to hospital preparedness in MCE. Prospective studies of our mathematical model are needed to verify its applicability, generalizability, and validity.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:117–124)

A nuclear detonation in a US city would have profound psychological, social, and behavioral effects. This article reviews the scientific literature on human responses to radiation incidents and disasters in general, and examines potential behavioral health care provider (BHCP) contributions in the hours and days after a nuclear detonation. In the area directly affected by the blast, the immediate overarching goal of BHCP interventions is the support of lifesaving activities and the prevention of additional casualties from fallout. These interventions include 6 broad categories: promoting appropriate protective actions, discouraging dangerous behaviors, managing patient/survivor flow to facilitate the best use of scarce resources, supporting first responders, assisting with triage, and delivering palliative care when appropriate. At more distant sites, BHCP should work with medical providers to support hospitalized survivors of the detonation. Recommendations are also made on BHCP interventions later in the response phase and during recovery.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S54-S64)

Objective: We evaluated emergency department (ED) data, emergency medical services (EMS) data, and public utilities data for describing an outbreak of carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning following a windstorm.

Methods: Syndromic ED data were matched against previously collected chart abstraction data. We ran detection algorithms on selected time series derived from all 3 data sources to identify health events associated with the CO poisoning outbreak. We used spatial and spatiotemporal scan statistics to identify geographic areas that were most heavily affected by the CO poisoning event.

Results: Of the 241 CO cases confirmed by chart review, 190 (78.8%) were identified in the syndromic surveillance data as exact matches. Records from the ED and EMS data detected an increase in CO-consistent syndromes after the storm. The ED data identified significant clusters of CO-consistent syndromes, including zip codes that had widespread power outages. Weak temporal gastrointestinal (GI) signals, possibly resulting from ingestion of food spoiled by lack of refrigeration, were detected in the ED data but not in the EMS data. Spatial clustering of GI-based groupings in the ED data was not detected.

Conclusions: Data from this evaluation support the value of ED data for surveillance after natural disasters. Enhanced EMS data may be useful for monitoring a CO poisoning event, if these data are available to the health department promptly.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:37-45)

Background: Mental health issues are a significant concern after disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. This study was designed to assess the mental health effects on residents of areas of southeastern Louisiana affected by the oil spill.

Methods: Telephone and face-to-face interviews were conducted with residents (N = 452) assessing concerns and direct impact.

Results: The results show that the greatest effect on mental health related to the extent of disruption to participants' lives, work, family, and social engagement, with increased symptoms of anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress. Given the location of the oil spill affecting communities that had been devastated by Hurricane Katrina, results also revealed that losses from Hurricane Katrina were highly associated with negative mental health outcomes. Conversely, the ability to rebound after adversity and place satisfaction were highly associated with better mental health outcomes.

Conclusions: Enhanced understanding of mental health effects after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill will help in determining directions for much-needed mental health services after the disaster and in contributing to the knowledge of complex traumatization and the ability to rebound after adversity.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:280–286)

Objective: We present the longest follow-up, to date, of probable posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City firefighters who participated in the rescue/recovery effort.

Methods: We examined data from 11 006 WTC-exposed firefighters who completed 40 672 questionnaires and reported estimates of probable PTSD by year from serial cross-sectional analyses. In longitudinal analyses, we used separate Cox models with data beginning from October 2, 2001, to identify variables associated with recovery from or delayed onset of probable PTSD.

Results: The prevalence of probable PTSD was 7.4% by September 11, 2010, and continued to be associated with early arrival at the WTC towers during every year of analysis. An increasing number of aerodigestive symptoms (hazard ratio [HR] 0.89 per symptom, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.86-.93) and reporting a decrease in exercise, whether the result of health (HR 0.56 vs no change in exercise, 95% CI 0.41-.78) or other reasons (HR 0.76 vs no change in exercise, 95% CI 0.63-.92), were associated with a lower likelihood of recovery from probable PTSD. Arriving early at the WTC (HR 1.38 vs later WTC arrival, 95% CI 1.12-1.70), an increasing number of aerodigestive symptoms (HR 1.45 per symptom, 95% CI 1.40–1.51), and reporting an increase in alcohol intake since September 11, 2001 (HR 3.43 vs no increase in alcohol intake, 95% CI 2.67-4.43) were associated with delayed onset of probable PTSD.

Conclusions: Probable PTSD continues to be associated with early WTC arrival even 9 years after the terrorist attacks. Concurrent conditions and behaviors, such as respiratory symptoms, exercise, and alcohol use also play important roles in contributing to PTSD symptoms.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S197-S203)

Background: On June 8 and 9, 2008, more than 4 inches of rain fell in the Iowa-Cedars River Basin causing widespread flooding along the Cedar River in Benton, Linn, Johnson, and Cedar Counties. As a result of the flooding, there were 18 deaths, 106 injuries, and over 38 000 people displaced from their homes; this made it necessary for the Iowa Department of Health to conduct a rapid needs assessment to quantify the scope and effect of the floods on human health.

Methods: In response, the Iowa Department of Public Health mobilized interview teams to conduct rapid needs assessments using Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based cluster sampling techniques. The information gathered was subsequently employed to estimate the public health impact and significant human needs that resulted from the flooding.

Results: While these assessments did not reveal significant levels of acute injuries resulting from the flood, they did show that many households had been temporarily displaced and that future health risks may emerge as the result of inadequate access to prescription medications or the presence of environmental health hazards.

Conclusions: This exercise highlights the need for improved risk communication measures and ongoing surveillance and relief measures. It also demonstrates the utility of rapid needs assessment survey tools and suggests that increasing use of such surveys can have significant public health benefits.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:287–292)

There is a need for model uniform core criteria for mass casualty triage because disasters frequently cross jurisdictional lines and involve responders from multiple agencies who may be using different triage tools. These criteria (Tables 1-4) reflect the available science, but it is acknowledged that there are significant research gaps. When no science was available, decisions were formed by expert consensus derived from the available triage systems. The intent is to ensure that providers at a mass-casualty incident use triage methodologies that incorporate these core principles in an effort to promote interoperability and standardization. At a minimum, each triage system must incorporate the criteria that are listed below. Mass casualty triage systems in use can be modified using these criteria to ensure interoperability. The criteria include general considerations, global sorting, lifesaving interventions, and assignment of triage categories. The criteria apply only to providers who are organizing multiple victims in a discrete geographic location or locations, regardless of the size of the incident. They are classified by whether they were derived through available direct scientific evidence, indirect scientific evidence, expert consensus, and/or are used in multiple existing triage systems. These criteria address only primary triage and do not consider secondary triage. For the purposes of this document the term triage refers to mass-casualty triage and provider refers to any person who assigns primary triage categories to victims of a mass-casualty incident.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:125–128)

Introduction: Paramedics play an integral role in the response to and management of disasters and mass casualty events. Providing a core component of the front line response to disasters, paramedics potentially expose themselves to a variety of health and safety risks, including physical injury, death, communicable disease, and psychological effects. The health and safety risks to emergency service personnel were highlighted by the deaths of firefighters, paramedics, and police during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the infection, illness, and deaths of paramedics and emergency health care staff during the severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak in 2003.

Objective: Given that a willing and able prehospital workforce is a vital component of any successful response to a disaster situation, the present study explored paramedics' perception of risk and willingness to work, with a specific focus on identifying which type of disasters that paramedics associate with greater levels of fear, familiarity, and risk.

Methods: A total of 175 paramedics completed a survey ranking 40 disaster scenarios for levels of fear and familiarity.

Results: The results indicate that paramedics ranked nuclear and radiological events and outbreaks of new and highly infectious disasters highest for fear and unfamiliarity. This has implications for preparedness, education, and training.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:46-53)

Objective: Hematopoietic syndrome (HS) is a clinical diagnosis assigned to people who present with ≥1 new-onset cytopenias in the setting of acute radiation exposure. The World Health Organization convened a panel of experts to evaluate the evidence and develop recommendations for medical countermeasures for the management of HS in a hypothetical scenario involving the hospitalization of 100 to 200 individuals exposed to radiation. The objective of this consultancy was to develop recommendations for treatment of the HS based upon the quality of evidence.

Methods: English-language articles were identified in MEDLINE and PubMed. Reference lists of retrieved articles were distributed to panel members before the meeting and updated during the meeting. Published case series and case reports of individuals with HS, published randomized controlled trials of relevant interventions used to treat nonirradiated individuals, reports of studies in irradiated animals, and prior recommendations of subject matter experts were selected. Studies were extracted using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system. In cases in which data were limited or incomplete, a narrative review of the observations was made. No randomized controlled trials of medical countermeasures have been completed for individuals with radiation-associated HS. The use of GRADE analysis of countermeasures for injury to hematopoietic tissue was restricted by the lack of comparator groups in humans. Reliance on data generated in nonirradiated humans and experimental animals was necessary.

Results: Based upon GRADE analysis and narrative review, a strong recommendation was made for the administration of granulocyte colony-stimulating factor or granulocyte macrophage colony-stimulating factor and a weak recommendation was made for the use of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents or hematopoietic stem cell transplantation.

Conclusions: Assessment of therapeutic interventions for HS in humans exposed to nontherapeutic radiation is difficult because of the limits of the evidence.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:202-212)

This article summarizes public health legal issues that need to be considered in preparing for and responding to nuclear detonation. Laws at the federal, state, territorial, local, tribal, and community levels can have a significant impact on the response to an emergency involving a nuclear detonation and the allocation of scarce resources for affected populations. An understanding of the breadth of these laws, the application of federal, state, and local law, and how each may change in an emergency, is critical to an effective response. Laws can vary from 1 geographic area to the next and may vary in an emergency, affording waivers or other extraordinary actions under federal, state, or local emergency powers. Public health legal requirements that are commonly of concern and should be examined for flexibility, reciprocity, and emergency exceptions include liability protections for providers; licensing and credentialing of providers; consent and privacy protections for patients; occupational safety and employment protections for providers; procedures for obtaining and distributing medical countermeasures and supplies; property use, condemnation, and protection; restrictions on movement of individuals in an emergency area; law enforcement; and reimbursement for care.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S65-S72)

Objective: To document the ability of public health laboratories to respond to radiological emergencies.

Methods: The Association of Public Health Laboratories developed, distributed, and analyzed two separate surveys of public health laboratories representing the 50 US states and major nonstate jurisdictions. The 2009 All-Hazards Laboratory Preparedness Survey examined overall laboratory capability and capacity, with a subset of questions on radiation preparedness. A 2011 survey focused exclusively on radiation readiness.

Results: The 50 state and District of Columbia public health laboratories responded to the 2009 All-Hazards Laboratory Preparedness Survey, representing a 98% response rate. In addition to the above laboratories, environmental and agricultural laboratories responded to the 2011 Radiation Capabilities Survey, representing a 76% response rate. Twenty-seven percent of the All-Hazards Survey respondents reported the ability to measure radionuclides in clinical specimens; 6% reported that another state agency or department accepted and analyzed these samples via a radioanalytical method. Of the Radiation Capabilities Survey respondents, 60% reported the ability to test environmental samples, such as air, soil, or surface water, for radiation; 48% reported the ability to test nonmilk food samples; 47% reported the ability to test milk; and 56% reported sending data for drinking water to the Environmental Protection Agency.

Conclusions: Survey data reveal serious gaps in US radiological preparedness. In 2007, federal experts estimated it would take more than 4 years to screen 100 000 individuals for radiation exposure and 6 years to test environmental samples from a large-scale radiological emergency, relying on existing laboratory assets. Although some progress has been made since 2007, public health laboratory radiological test capabilities and capacities remain insufficient to respond to a major event. Adequate preparation requires significant new investment to build and enhance laboratory emergency response networks, as well as investments in the broader public health system in which public health laboratories function.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:213-217)

Mass casualty triage is the process of prioritizing multiple victims when resources are not sufficient to treat everyone immediately. No national guideline for mass casualty triage exists in the United States. The lack of a national guideline has resulted in variability in triage processes, tags, and nomenclature. This variability has the potential to inject confusion and miscommunication into the disaster incident, particularly when multiple jurisdictions are involved. The Model Uniform Core Criteria for Mass Casualty Triage were developed to be a national guideline for mass casualty triage to ensure interoperability and standardization when responding to a mass casualty incident. The Core Criteria consist of 4 categories: general considerations, global sorting, lifesaving interventions, and individual assessment of triage category. The criteria within each of these categories were developed by a workgroup of experts representing national stakeholder organizations who used the best available science and, when necessary, consensus opinion. This article describes how the Model Uniform Core Criteria for Mass Casualty Triage were developed.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:129-137)

Objectives: To assess and compare the prevalence of psychological morbidity among survivors of the 2005 northern Pakistan earthquake from Azad Kashmir and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).

Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional study among randomly sampled survivors (N = 361) of the earthquake living in camps at the time of the interview, approximately 6 months after the earthquake.

Results: The prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in the total sample was 51.5% and the prevalence of individuals who received positive scores on the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL) was 75%. The prevalence rates for anxiety and depression symptoms were 77.3% and 70.9%, respectively. The prevalence in Azad Kashmir was 57.9% for PTSD and 79.8% for positive HSCL, and NWFP had 41.3% PTSD and 67.4% positive HSCL. Study subjects from Azad Kashmir were approximately 2 times as likely to have PTSD or a positive HSCL when compared to subjects from NWFP (odds ratio 1.95, confidence interval 1.27-3.0; P = .0024) and (odds ratio 1.91, confidence interval 1.18-3.1; P = .0085), respectively.

Conclusions: Nearly half of the northern Pakistan earthquake survivors had symptoms of PTSD. Six months after the incident, more than three-fourths exhibited symptoms of an anxiety disorder.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:293–299)

Effective emergency response among hospitals and other health care providers stems from multiple factors depending on the nature of the emergency. While local emergencies can test hospital acute care facilities, prolonged national emergencies, such as the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, raise significant challenges. These events involve sustained surges of patients over longer periods and spanning entire regions. They require significant and sustained coordination of personnel, services, and supplies among hospitals and other providers to ensure adequate patient care across regions. Some hospitals, however, may lack structural principles to help coordinate care and guide critical allocation decisions. This article discusses a model Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that sets forth essential principles on how to allocate scarce resources among providers across regions. The model seeks to align regional hospitals through advance agreements on procedures of mutual aid that reflect modern principles of emergency preparedness and changing legal norms in declared emergencies.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:54-61)

Objective: Several studies have provided prevalence estimates of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in broadly affected populations, although without sufficiently addressing qualifying exposures required for assessing PTSD and estimating its prevalence. A premise that people throughout the New York City area were exposed to the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) towers and are thus at risk for developing PTSD has important implications for both prevalence estimates and service provision. This premise has not, however, been tested with respect to DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD. This study examined associations between geographic distance from the 9/11 attacks on the WTC and reported 9/11 trauma exposures, and the role of specific trauma exposures in the development of PTSD.

Methods: Approximately 3 years after the attacks, 379 surviving employees (102 with direct exposures, including 65 in the towers, and 277 with varied exposures) recruited from 8 affected organizations were interviewed using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule/Disaster Supplement and reassessed at 6 years. The estimated closest geographic distance from the WTC towers during the attacks and specific disaster exposures were compared with the development of 9/11–related PTSD as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision.

Results: The direct exposure zone was largely concentrated within a radius of 0.1 mi and completely contained within 0.75 mi of the towers. PTSD symptom criteria at any time after the disaster were met by 35% of people directly exposed to danger, 20% of those exposed only through witnessed experiences, and 35% of those exposed only through a close associate’s direct exposure. Outside these exposure groups, few possible sources of exposure were evident among the few who were symptomatic, most of whom had preexisting psychiatric illness.

Conclusions: Exposures deserve careful consideration among widely affected populations after large terrorist attacks when conducting clinical assessments, estimating the magnitude of population PTSD burdens, and projecting needs for specific mental health interventions.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S205-S213)

The hallmark of a successful response to a nuclear detonation will be the resilience of the community, region, and nation. An incident of this magnitude will rapidly become a national incident; however, the initial critical steps to reduce lives lost, save the lives that can be saved with the resources available, and understand and apply resources available to a complex and dynamic situation will be the responsibility of the local and regional responders and planners. Expectations of the public health and health care systems will be met to the extent possible by coordination, cooperation, and an effort to produce as consistent a response as possible for the victims. Responders will face extraordinarily stressful situations, and their own physical and psychological health is of great importance to optimizing the response. This article illustrates through vignettes and supporting text how the incident may unfold for the various components of the health and medical systems and provides additional context for the discipline-related actions outlined in the state and local planners’ playbook.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S73-S88)