Nous partirons du thème cent fois rebattu de l'allégorie de la Caverne. Les interprétations classiques du célébre passage de la République sont connues de tous. Il ne s'agit pas pour nous de les répéter, mais de proposer une nouvelle lecture de l'allégorie qui nous sortirait des sentiers battus.

The so-called objects in Wittgenstein's Tractates are particulars: Irving Copi first argued this thesis in his paper “Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tractates.” His argument took the form of an exclusion. There are only three metaphysical possibilities for these objects: They must be either particulars, properties or relations. The last two can be ruled out on the basis of evidence internal to the Tractates; therefore only the first alternative remains. Consequently, the objects of the Tractates must be particulars.

Matière et Mémoire a pour sous-titre « Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit».

Bergson se place d'emblée ici à l'intérieur du dualisme matièreesprit. Des la première ligne de l'avant-propos, il écrit:

Ce livre affirme la réalité de l'esprit, la réalité de la matière, et essaie de déterminer le rapport de l'un à l'autre sur un exemple précis, celui de la mémoire. Il c'est done nettement dualiste. (G'est nous qui soulignons.).

Dans cet article, je me propose deux buts: 1) illustrer les difficultés éprouvèes par un philosophe — i.e. un profane en tout — au moment ou il tente de faire la synthése des points de vue des spécialistes; 2) tenter de clarifier la façon dont se pose le problème d'une théorie de la monnaie.

J.J.C. Smart once opined that if we were able to keep a human brain alive outside the skull, there would be no philosophical reason to believe that it could not think, and every physiological reason to believe that it could (“Materialism,” Journal of Philosophy, LX (1963), 651–662, pp. 659–660). Only a short time later, Wilfred Sellars asserted that if one were to deflesh and de-bone a human being, keeping the nervous system intact and discarding the rest, what one would have left would be, in all essentials, a person: a “core person,” Sellars says, thinking perhaps of apples (“The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” Review of Metaphysics, XVIII (1965), 430–451, pp. 441–442). Since then, Bernard Gert has provided this view with an argument, describing an example which proves, in his opinion, that it makes sense to speak of brains as thinking. (“Can a Brain Have a Pain?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVII (1967), 432–436).

In a recently published article, R. N. McLaughlin argues for what he calls an “open form” of bill of rights, in preference to the standard closed form. Such an open form would consist of a directive to the courts “to invalidate laws which offend fundamental morals by depriving citizens of basic rights, or by forcing them to deprive others of basic rights.” A standard form consists, of course, of a list of rights which are not to be violated. His reason for making this proposal is that he does not think the standard form is capable of keeping pace with the changing moral codes which such a bill is supposed to reflect, whereas the open form would by its very nature do so. I should like, in what follows, to argue that the open form presents a number of serious problems which the standard form does not, and that a standard form is in the end to be preferred, both because it does not present these new problems and because it need not be as inflexible in the face of changing moral standards as McLaughlin thinks.

In a recent article published in this journal, Charles Ripley argues that determinism cannot be true because it is self-defeating. According to Ripley, the determinist “holds determinism to be objectively true and supports his claim by appealing to justifying reasons” but unfortunately “it is a logical consequence of determinism that appeals to justifying reasons and also the very concept of objective truth must be abandoned.” On this view, if determinism is true, there can be neither true nor justified belief, or if there can be such things, we can never know when we have them.

Bernard Gert's The Moral Rules is an original and important book that radically alters our perspective in moral philosophy. Its impact, if it receives the attention it deserves, should be considerable, for it is unlikely that anyone, having given due consideration to Gert's arguments, could go on doing ethics in quite the same way as he had done before, whether or not he found the arguments all finally convincing.

Since Norman Kemp Smith's 1905 article on “The Naturalism of Hume,” there have been two competing theories on the general nature and import of Hume's philosophy. One is that which Kemp Smith attributes to a long line of English and Scottish philosophers, including his target there, Thomas Hill Green. That theory is that “Hume has no set of positive beliefs, and merely develops to a sceptical conclusion the principles which he inherits from Locke and Berkeley” (S149). The conclusion, to quote the first of the long line, Thomas Reid, is that

There is neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and ideas. What we call a body, is only a bundle of sensations; and what we call the mind, is only a bundle of thoughts, passions, and emotions, without any subject.

Bogen has written an excellent book, packed with sensible and suggestive things about Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and about the problems that exercised him. Bogen treads successfully a narrow ridge few others have been able to tread. He has a very clear grasp of what both the earlier and the later Wittgenstein were up to, but he can stand back from Wittgenstein's work and present a lucid and dispassionate account of its philosophical strengths and weaknesses. He is not the kind of unsympathetic and unilluminating critic who regards the Wittgensteinian corpus as aphoristic, obscure and disorganized trivia. Nor is he the kind of acolyte who regards it as sufficient simply to refer his colleagues to the appropriate section of the Investigationswithout further explanation. Whatever thesis Bogen wants to find in Wittgenstein he documents fairly and carefully. Whatever view held by Wittgenstein Bogen wants to regard as penetrating or (even) correct, he usually defends himself independently of its being Wittgenstein's view and also of Wittgenstein's own arguments. Bogen also, in true Wittgensteinian fashion, makes throughout the book masterly use of the happy example. The net result is a book which can be read most profitably both by those interested in Wittgenstein and by those interested in the philosophy of language.

Dans cet exposé nous nous proposons de traiter d'un livre récent de Herbert Fingarette intitulé Self-Deception (L'lllusion sur soimême), et d'essayer d'établir un rapport entre cette œuvre et certaines divergences philosophiques entre Jean-Paul Sartre et Gabriel Marcel; des divergences qui ont eu lieu pendant la période existentialiste de M. Sartre.

As a historian of logic, I am frequently puzzled by the things which people have to say about the relationship between mathematical logic and some other kind of logic which is variously described as ‘intentional’ and ‘traditional.’ Part of my puzzlement arises from my failure to understand precisely what kind of system is being offered under the guise of intentional logic. I have always taken it that logic is concerned with valid inferences, with showing us how we may legitimately derive a conclusion from a set of premisses; yet the validation of inferences seems to be the least of the concerns of the intentional logician. He says that it can be done, but he does not bother to show us how. My purpose in this paper is to list some of the sources of my puzzlement in the hope that an exponent of intentional logic will show me how they can be resolved, and how their resolution will contribute to the building of a system (however informal) in which different types of argument can be validated.

Il me semble qu'il faut de temps en temps défendre la thèse que la logique est une science dans l'horizon du monde objectif et que son développement est essentiellement liéaux interrogations sur l'être dans les tensions de son humanisation.

Le XVIIIe siècle avait mis à l'honneur l'histoire des systèmes; sans doute parce qu'en cette période, le philosophe voyait toute une partie du savoir échapper à l'ordre systématique. Si la raison prescrit encore une organisation discursive de la science dans le domaine de la géométrie et de la mécanique, elle entre en conflit avec sa propre rationalité dans le champ d'un savoir descriptif, qui se veut histoire de la Nature. L'empirisme des nouveaux théoriciens de la connaissance propose une conception de l'entendement qui le réduit à la passivité de l'intuition sur le donné de l'expérience. L'instinct, la Nature, la vie, la présence de Dieu, l'économie de la création: autant d'Idées de la raison, par lesquelles la raison se définit négativement quant à son propre pouvoir régulateur et constitutif. Quelle peut être dans ces conditions la visée de la critique philosophique? S'agit-il d'une réflexion en vue de dévoiler les fondements des concepts de l'entendement? Et alors, la métaphysique deviant cette invention de l'intelligible que Leibniz symbolisait par l'entr'expression monadique. Ou plutôt s'agit-il de déterminer au lieu de réfléchir, et ainsi de délimiter la raison par l'effectuation de son pouvoir? Pour citer la seconde préface de la Critique de la Raison Pure, alors qu'il s'agit de l'ordre copernicien du savoir certain, «la raison ne perçoit que ce qu'elle produit, elle-même, selon son plan». Et cette fois-ci, pour utiliser les propres termes de M. Courtès, « entre monde et raison, mais sans aucune distance, nous sommes le rapport qui s'autodétermine’ (p. 309).

Cet ensemble de textes choisis et présentés par Yvan Lamonde, jeune philosophe et historien rattaché au Centre d'Etudes canadiennes-francçaises de l'Université McGill, constitue le premier recueil de la section « Philosophic » des Cahiers du Québec, collection lancée récemment par la maison Hurtubise HMH de Montréal. On peut y voir aussi un instrument attendu qui sans doute devra être complété mais qui s'imposait manifestement chez un peuple qui à force de chercher dans l'avenir le point de départ de sa philosophie en était venu à oublier que celle-ci avait un passé. C'est pour-quoi cet ouvrage mérite de retenir l'attention tant des philosophes québécois à la recherche d'une identité un peu bousculée ces derniers temps que du philosophe anglo-canadien (ou étranger) qui s'interroge à son tour sur ce qu'ont voulu jadis et sur ce que veulent aujourd'hui les philosophes du Québec.