It would not be surprising to find a philosopher deploying subjunctive conditionals in defence of a position or as part of an analysis of a concept. One might defend the view that events in the far past, or objects on the other side of the moon, are observable in principle by pointing out that if an observer had been present, or if an observer were on the other side of the moon, he would have made, or would make, certain observations. Similarly, someone might argue that a statement to the effect that there are mountains on the other side of the moon simply means “If there were an observer on the other side of the moon, he would have such and such experiences” (no doubt the claim would be that this subjunctive and many others gave the meaning of the original statement). In the same vein, one might argue that “x wants Φ” means “If such and such were the case, x would do A”.

A persistent and objectionable claim is that there are states of consciousness attainable wherein there is consciousness of consciousness per se through the absence or diminution of the ordinary objects of consciousness or awareness. The claim is made by phenomenologists, religious thinkers and mystics, and some psychologists.

Du chap, I, retenons deux points. Traitant des propositions (au sens abstrait), Quine montre pourquoi on ne peut pas parler du sens d'un énoncé isolé. En particulier les énoncés d'une théorie scientifique n'affrontent pas le tribunal des faits un par un (thèse dite de Quine-Duhem, cf. « Two Dogmas », 1953). Cela dispose de la notion d'énoncé analytique. Plus tard (dans Word and Object, 1960), Quine introduit une nuance : les énocnés observationnels sont vérifiables ou falsifiables en isolement. Dans la suite de ce chap. I, Quine traite des objets propositionnels, sujet qu'il approfondit dans l'essai 6 de Relativité Ontologique (en abrégé RO).

At the beginning of Process and Reality, as he engages in a preliminary discussion of the Category of the Ultimate, Whitehead makes a crucial statement: “The sole appeal is to intuition.” (P.R. 32). In like fashion he says in Adventures of Ideas: “All knowledge is derived from, and verified by, direct intuitive observation.” (A.I. 228) He makes laudatory reference to the “complete concreteness” of intuitive experience and the absence of “analytic divorce from the total environment.” (S.M.W. 94, 279)