Cet article porte sur les effets et les contraintes posés par la pandémie de COVID-19 sur les mécanismes de la gouvernance dans le système fédéral canadien. Pour ce faire, nous empruntons un cadre analytique bien spécifique, que nous faisons découler expressément des réflexions de la Cour suprême du Canada dans son Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec. Nous nous intéressons ainsi aux quatre principes sous-jacents à la Constitution canadienne identifiés par la Cour – soit le fédéralisme, la démocratie, le constitutionnalisme et la primauté du droit, de même que la protection des minorités – et à leur respect (ou non-respect) en temps de crise. Nous posons la question suivante : dans quelle mesure l’esprit de ces quatre principes constitutionnels fondamentaux a-t-il été respecté par les acteurs clés du système de gouvernance au Canada alors qu’ils étaient confrontés à la pandémie de COVID-19?

Is the COVID-19 pandemic a critical juncture? An emerging social scientific scholarship on the COVID-19 pandemic has set out to study its effects on a range of social, political, and economic phenomena. Some of this scholarship theorizes that the COVID-19 pandemic is one of those rarest and most impactful moments in time, what historical institutionalists would call a “critical juncture”. This article tests a COVID-19 critical juncture hypothesis by conducting a theory-infirming case study of recent multilingual developments in the United States. Process tracing of federal and state multilingual trajectories reveal that two of the hypothesis’ observable implications are absent: there is no evidence of radical institutional change and ostensibly “new” multilingual pathways were in fact established prior to the pandemic. In light of this evidence, the article concludes by discussing alternative understandings of COVID-19’s effects and this might mean for the study of the pandemic moving forward.

Questions concerning border closures during pandemics often focus on international borders or rights-based considerations. Closures of internal borders in federal countries, such as Canada, raise independent concerns regarding who can close internal borders when. Those questions are not exhausted by rights-based considerations and cannot be resolved using brute empirical measures. They instead implicate the nature and ends of federalism. This text uses the case of internal border restrictions in Canada during COVID-19 to explore whether the kinds of closures that took place there can be justified on federalism grounds. It argues that the case for provinces being able to unilaterally enact interprovincial border closures in federal countries, as observed in Canada during COVID-19, do not withstand scrutiny. It attends to possible justifications for federalism to demonstrate that the best arguments for federalism do not support provincial control over borders that justify provinces possessing, let alone exercising, unilateral authority to close interprovincial borders to persons residing in other provinces.