Since the late 1980s, the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) has been a prominent vehicle used to support collaboration between US federal laboratories and private firms. This paper examines the structure and goals of one of the most ambitious CRADAs conducted to date, the EUV CRADA, which involves three Department of Energy laboratories and leading US firms in the semiconductor industry and is aimed at the development of next-generation lithographic technologies. This large project is an important case study in ‘post-Cold-War’ technology policy and government-industry collaboration. Although the EUV project represents significant improvements in the design and management of CRADAs, it also illustrates the inherent difficulties of balancing political and economic goals in complex technology development programs.

Most current theoretical treatments view business associations as rent-seeking, special interest groups. Yet, empirical research in a wide range of developing countries reveals a broad range of functions and activities undertaken by business associations, many of which promote efficiency. These positive functions address crucial development issues (emphasized in the New Institutional Economics) such as strengthening property rights, facilitating vertical and horizontal coordination, reducing information costs, and upgrading worker training. The associations that engage in these developmental activities tend to be well organized and staffed. This institutional strength depends in turn on high member density, valuable selective benefits (often delegated by governments), and effective internal mediation of member interests. In addition external factors, especially competitive markets and government pressure, encourage associations to use their institutional strength for productive ends.

Campaign finance reform is the subject of ongoing public policy debates in many modern democratic societies. In the United States, individuals and interest groups from across the ideological spectrum have proposed or embraced a variety of campaign finance reforms in attempts to alter the electoral landscape. At least one recent presidential candidate highlighted the issue of campaign finance reform which appear to resonate with voters, as part of a broader strategy to secure his party's nomination. Many of these reforms propose to alter the sources and uses of financial resources in Congressional elections.

This study explores sources of variation in the efficacy of constituency building as corporate political strategy. The theoretical focus is on the persistent agency problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between constituents and legislators. Analysis of data from key congressional respondents indicates that the nature of these agency problems significantly determines the relative effectiveness of corporate constituency building as a means to influence legislative decisionmaking. Corporate constituency building appears to be more effective for influencing legislators' voting behavior than for influencing the specific content of legislation; more effective in the House than the Senate; contingent on party affiliation; contingent on the types of feedback corporate stakeholders use to communicate with legislative offices; contingent on the types of corporate stakeholders involved. This paper discusses these findings in the context of the existing literature and makes suggestions for further inquiry into the use, efficacy, and evolution of constituency-based lobbying as corporate political strategy.

The recent zero-priced award of $11–70 billion in digital TV (DTV) licenses by the federal government occurred when auctions had been initiated for non-broadcast licenses and when the seven decade-old regime of ‘public trusteeship’ in broadcasting had become famous for licensee reneging on promised obligations. Policymakers nonetheless declined to auction DTV licenses when enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, rejecting a plea from the Senate Majority Leader. This paper provides an overview of the episode and investigates three basic questions. (1) Why does Congress continue a regulatory system that routinely fails to provide the benefits it is supposed to generate? (2) Why did the National Association of Broadcasters propose high definition television as a way of keeping land mobile operators off an unused spectrum? (3) Why did Congress delegate to the FCC the decision to award licenses for digital television broadcasting?

This paper examines several hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the existence and growth of legislators' campaign “warchests”. We examine the sources and political consequences of warchests in US House elections over the period of 1978–1998. Briefly, our findings are as follows. First, we find little evidence in support of the deterrence hypotheses. Second, short-term electoral forces-scandals, partisan tides, challenger quality-accounts for a large fraction of the explained variation in savings. Third, incumbents act as if they have finite, “target” levels of total savings. Fourth, some of the accumulated savings before 1992 appear to be for retirement. Finally, we find considerable evidence that many of the largest warchests are accumulated to help members run for higher office.

Interest groups cannot enforce contracts with legislators to work in their favor since fee-for-service agreements would be considered bribery. When such contracts are not available, a system of specialized, standing committees can provide a second-best way to maximize contributions, since such a system facilitates repeated interactions and reputational development between PACs and members of the relevant committees. Using data on PAC contributions by competing financial services interests to members of the House Banking Committee, we find evidence consistent with key implications of our model of committees as reputational-development devises. We then interpret important episodes in the evolution and development of the committee system during the twentieth century from the perspective of our theory. We focus on the revolt against House Speaker Cannon, which resulted in the birth of the modern committee system, and the post-Watergate reforms. We also consider broader implications of this approach for analyzing term limits, corruption, and party strength. JEL classifications: D72, D78, G28.

Taxation reform has dominated Australian politics over the past twenty-five years. Despite this prominence on the political agenda, until recently Australian governments have lacked the capacity to consolidate key elements of this tax reform agenda. While the problematic nature of Australian tax reform can be explained in part by macro-level variables, this protracted policy deadlock has also influenced historical patterns of business-government intermediation. The article argues that the evolution of the Australian tax policy network over the study period was prompted by both associational and state actors reassessing their strategies in the context of the political failure of tax reform proposals. These developments provide empirical insights into the ongoing debate relating to the factors which lead to the formation and evolution of sectoral level policy networks. The article concludes that while the increasing levels of business mobilization experienced over the study period enhanced the electoral viability of reform proposals, these new patterns of sectoral business politics should be regarded as a consequence of the policy deadlock relating to tax reform rather than primary cause of policy change.

Business plays a critical yet poorly understood role in trade policymaking. This paper develops an analytical framework that focuses on the distribution of business trade preferences, the forces that cause those preferences to change, and the ability of different groups to exert political influence over policy. It then applies this framework to Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. Large, exporting firms increased their weight due to shifts in the international context, the condition of the domestic economy, and previous government policies. Policymakers granted political access to actors whose economic and political leverage had risen, typically those who controlled numerous investment resources and sought out a direct role in policymaking. Many of these actors also favored free trade. Business participation in trade policy reflects these patterns. Large, outward-oriented firms played an increasingly important role in Mexico's adoption of free trade policies over the 1980s and early 1990s.

This paper analyzes the evolution of corporate governance and regulation in privatized telecommunication companies in the four largest EU economies. A political-economy approach is used to test the validity of the convergence hypothesis, which posits that globalization should produce convergence in business practices, ownership patterns, and regulatory frameworks. While there are signs that the structure of ownership and monitoring in continental Europe is adopting some of the features of the Anglo-Saxon arms-length governance system, corporate decisions remain shaped by durable national institutions and distinctive political traditions regarding the role of the corporation in society, the “just” level of executive remuneration, the concept of universal service, and the involvement of the state in corporate restructuring.

In recent decades, both South Korea and Taiwan have made remarkable leaps in the development and production of semiconductors-the core element in burgeoning global telecommunications, computer, and computer equipment industries. Although many aspects of their sectoral industrial strategies have differed, both countries are now moving aggressively to adapt their semiconductor industries to turbulent global markets. In the wake of the severe regional financial crisis that began in 1997, this case study compares and contrasts continuing processes of adaptation among primary semiconductor manufacturers in the two countries. The crisis had observable effects, especially in Korea, but it was not deep enough to force fundamental adjustments in either country. In the early days of the industry in both places, a sense of vulnerability-the need to come from behind-gave rise to quite different corporate structures and attendant strategies. Remarkable differences persist in the ways in which the South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms are seeking new advantages in rapidly changing regional and global markets. Strategic change and structural continuity mark the attempt of two relatively small countries to stay competitive in a key industry.

This paper examines the political activity of US defense contractors over the years 1980–1994. Using econometric techniques to account for both fixed-effects and selection, I examine the industry determinants and distribution patterns of political action committee (PAC) contributions to the US House of Representatives. The analysis finds that the size of the defense budget is a primary factor explaining political activity across the industry as well as within individual firms; firm size, dependency on defense, and defense contract awards explain much less. I also find that firms appeared to change their political strategies in the face of large exogenous shifts in the US defense budget. While defense expenditures were on the rise, defense firms spread their contributions relatively broadly over the defense committee system; when the budget fell, however, the firms switched strategies and targeted committee leaders. An incidental contribution of the paper is an empirical application of the trimmed least absolute deviations estimator for fixed-effects models with selection.

The examination of the U.S.—Japan conflicts from the mid-1980s to early 1990s over the space industry sheds light on our understanding of the Japanese political economy. The Japanese response to U.S. pressure was not so strategic as conventional wisdom suggests. Under U.S. pressure, Japan shifted to international cooperation, abandoning the autonomous development policy it had sought for four decades. This unexpected policy change primarily resulted from the lack of clear jurisdictional authority among the government actors over the rapidly changing space industry. This study's findings will apply to other high technology industries such as telecommunications and information technology, where bureaucratic boundaries are ambiguous and technological change is rapid.

There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.