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Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective

  • Jeffrey Milyo (a1), David Primo (a1) and Timothy Groseclose (a1)

Abstract

There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.

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Copyright

Corresponding author

Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA. E-mail: jmilyo@tufts.edu

References

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