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Constituency-based Lobbying as Corporate Political Strategy: Testing an Agency Theory Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Michael D. Lord
Michael D. Lord*
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
*
Babcock Graduate School of Management, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7659, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA. Tel.: 336-758-5031; Fax: 336-758-4514; E-mail: michael.lord@mba.wfu.edu
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Abstract

This study explores sources of variation in the efficacy of constituency building as corporate political strategy. The theoretical focus is on the persistent agency problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between constituents and legislators. Analysis of data from key congressional respondents indicates that the nature of these agency problems significantly determines the relative effectiveness of corporate constituency building as a means to influence legislative decisionmaking. Corporate constituency building appears to be more effective for influencing legislators' voting behavior than for influencing the specific content of legislation; more effective in the House than the Senate; contingent on party affiliation; contingent on the types of feedback corporate stakeholders use to communicate with legislative offices; contingent on the types of corporate stakeholders involved. This paper discusses these findings in the context of the existing literature and makes suggestions for further inquiry into the use, efficacy, and evolution of constituency-based lobbying as corporate political strategy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , November 2000 , pp. 289 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2000 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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