Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-sh8wx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-17T03:54:06.576Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Corporate Governance and Regulation in Privatized Utilities: Telecommunications in Four European Countries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Andrea E. Goldstein
Andrea E. Goldstein*
Affiliation:
OECD Development Centre
*
Andrea E. Goldstein, OECD Development Centre.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper analyzes the evolution of corporate governance and regulation in privatized telecommunication companies in the four largest EU economies. A political-economy approach is used to test the validity of the convergence hypothesis, which posits that globalization should produce convergence in business practices, ownership patterns, and regulatory frameworks. While there are signs that the structure of ownership and monitoring in continental Europe is adopting some of the features of the Anglo-Saxon arms-length governance system, corporate decisions remain shaped by durable national institutions and distinctive political traditions regarding the role of the corporation in society, the “just” level of executive remuneration, the concept of universal service, and the involvement of the state in corporate restructuring.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , August 2000 , pp. 189 - 223
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2000 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

AGCM. 1999 Rapporto Google Scholar
Artus, Patrick. 1998. Pourquoi les entreprises françaises sont elles opa-bles?. CDC Marché Flash 98(21).Google Scholar
Balladur, Edouard. 1997. Y a-t-il encore un avenir français pour nos entreprises? Le Monde, 13 November.Google Scholar
Becht, Marco and Boehmer, Erik. 1999. Ownership and Voting Power in Germany. In The Control of Corporate Europe, edited by Becht, Marco and Barca, Fabrizio (www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/book/). Brussels: European Corporate Governance Network.Google Scholar
Becht, Marco and Mayer, Colin. 2000. The Control of Corporate Europe. Paper presented at the Conference on The World's New Financial Landscape, Kiel.Google Scholar
Bianchi, Marcello, Bianco, Magda and Enriques, Luca. 1999. Pyramidal Groups and the Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy. In The Control of Corporate Europe, edited by Becht, Marco and Barca, Fabrizio (www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/book/). Brussels: European Corporate Governance Network.Google Scholar
Bishop, Matthew and Kay, John. 1988. Does Privatisation Work? Lessons from the UK. London: London Business School.Google Scholar
Bloch, Laurence and Kremp, Elisabeth. 1999. Ownership and Voting Power in France. In The Control of Corporate Europe, edited by Becht, Marco and Barca, Fabrizio (www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/book/). Brussels: European Corporate Governance Network.Google Scholar
Cohen, Élie. 1996. La tentation hexagonale. Paris: Seuil.Google Scholar
Cohen, Élie and Henry, Claude. 1997. Service Public, Secteur Public. Rapport au Premier Ministre. Paris: La Documentation Française.Google Scholar
Conyon, Martin, Gregg, Peter and Machin, Stephen. 1995. Taking Care of Business: Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom. The Economic Journal 105(3): 704–714.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cragg, Michael and Dyck, Alexander. 1998. Privatization, Compensation and Management Incentives: Evidence from the United Kingdom. Division of Research Working Paper 99–075. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School.Google Scholar
Union, European. 1999. Accentuating the Agility of the Firm—A Key to European Competitiveness. Third Report of the Second Competitiveness Advisory Group to the President of the Commission and the Heads of State and Government. Brussels.Google Scholar
Fitoussi, Jean-Paul. 1999. La valeur et l'argent. Le Monde, 5 June.Google Scholar
Franks, Julian and Mayer, Colin. 1996. Ownership, Control and the Performance of German Corporations. Mimeo.Google Scholar
Giavazzi, Francesco. 1995. Privatizzare si deve, a partire dall'ENI. Il sole-24 Ore, 16 February.Google Scholar
Goergen, Mark. 1999. Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United Kingdom. In Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, edited by Gugler, Klaus (preliminary version). University of Vienna.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Andrea. 1996. Privatisations et contrôle des entreprises: l'expérience française. Revue Economique 47(6): 1309–1332.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Andrea and Nicoletti, Giuseppe. 1996. Italian Privatisations in International Perspective. Cuadernos de Economia 33(100): 425–452.Google Scholar
Grout, Paul. 1994. Popular Capitalism. In Privatization & Economic Performance, edited by Bishop, Matthew, Kay, John and Mayer, Colin, 299–312. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grout, Paul. 1996. Promoting the Superhighway: Telecommunications Regulation in Europe. Economic Policy 22: 109–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guillén, Mauro. 2000. Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social-Science Literature. Annual Review of Sociology forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henry, Claude. 1997. Concurrence et services publics dans l'Union européenne. Paris: PUF.Google Scholar
Treasury, H. M. 1995. Her Majesty's Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme. London.Google Scholar
Irti, Natalino. 1998. Diritti degli azionisti e compensi degli amministratori. Corriere della Sera, 2 July.Google Scholar
Jenkinson, Tim and Mayer, Colin. 1994. The Costs of Privatisation in the UK and France. In Privatization & Economic Performance, edited by Bishop, Matthew, Kay, John and Mayer, Colin, 290–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez de Silane, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. 1997. Legal Determinants of External Finance. Working Paper 5879. Cambridge, MA: NBER.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez de Silane, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. 1999. Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform. Working Paper 7428. Cambridge, MA: NBER.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Main, Brian, Bruce, Alistair and Buck, Trevor. 1996. Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance. The Economic Journal 106(5): 1627–1644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Modigliani, Franco and Perotti, Enrico. 1999. Security versus Bank Finance: the Importance of a Proper Enforcement of Legal Rules. Note di Lavoro 37(99). Milan: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.Google Scholar
OECD. 1999. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
Ogden, Stuart. 1997. Corporate Governance in the Privatized Utilities: The Case of the Water Industry. In Corporate Governance, edited by Keasey, Kevin, Thompson, Steven and Wright, Mike, 252–278. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pauly, Louis and Reich, Simon. 1997. National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization. International Organization 51(1): 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roe, Mark. 1999. Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Corporate Control. Stanford Law Review forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strauss-Kahn, Dominique. 1999. Secteur bancaire: l'Etat a fait sa part. Le Monde, 4 July.Google Scholar
Thatcher, Mark. 1999. Liberalisation in Britain: From Monopoly to Regulation of Competition. In European Telecommunications Liberalisation, edited by Eliassen, Kjell and Sjøvaag, Marit, 93–109. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Waverman, Leonard and Sirel, Esen. 1997. European Telecommunications Markets on the Verge of Full Liberalization. Journal of Economic Literature 11(4): 113–126.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver. 1984. Corporate Governance. Yale Law Journal 93(5): 1197–1220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar