This commentary addresses three distinctions: the relationship of conscious to unconscious processes, whether these processes are single or multiple, and the distinction between vehicle and content. Also considered are questions of the relationship between multiple drafts to consciousness, the oneness of phenomenal perception as an illusion, the role of consciousness in the redrafting process, and finally the update frequency for attentional revision.

Glicksohn and Salter both raise good questions that force us to clarify our position. We agree with much of their commentary, with a few caveats. Glicksohn wrongly assumes that later drafts must be “more advanced” and Salter speaks of “recruitment into consciousness,” which invites (but does not require) a Cartesian interpretation. Their suggestions about the time course of “editorial” revision of the multiple drafts and the possibility of restoration of the information in abandoned drafts are possible extensions of the Multiple Drafts Model.

Searle's (1990) argument for the “Connection Principle” seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.