The authors of the target paper provide an interesting answer to the important question of why so many societies develop puritanical values. They suggest the answer lies in resolving two puzzles. I'm particularly interested in the second puzzle of puritanical morality as it relates to cooperation. The authors correctly point out that most evolutionary theories of morality suggest that “moral cognition is an adaptation to the challenges of cooperation recurrent in human social life” (target article, sect. 1.2, para. 1). This, they say, explains the cross-cultural condemnations of murder, violence, and theft but leaves unexplained why humans moralize victimless lifestyle choices that pertain to food prohibitions, alcohol consumption, clothing attire, and sexual relations. They go on to argue that puritanical morality develops from “folk-psychological beliefs that restraining indulgence in victimless pleasures would improve people's self-control, thus facilitating cooperative behaviors” (target article, sect. 1.3, para. 1). Although their argument for this is weak, what I find particularly problematic is their explanation as to why some societies no longer enforce “puritanical norms.”
To account for why puritanism declined in so-called western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, the authors maintain that puritanical norms are endorsed by the people to ensure the self-control necessary for cooperative behaviour. They reason that these norms have the cost of stifling people's enjoyment of highly gratifying pleasures. Therefore, “puritanical norms are only necessary when they are worth the cost” (target article, sect. 5, para. 2). Moreover, the authors argue that these norms are especially important when people's spontaneous self-control is seen as so inadequate to ensure a stable cooperative social order (my italics). They conclude that the collective demand for “temperance likely become useless when people are more moderate anyway, and less likely to develop hard-to-control addictions to bodily pleasures” (target article, sect. 5, para. 5). A consideration of events unfolding in the world today questions the narrative offered by the authors.
On September 16, 2022, Mahsa Amini died in custody after being arrested by the “morality” police for violating Iran's strict purity laws. Media reports suggest that many Iranians are willingly putting their lives in danger to challenge the “purity laws” of the ruling elite. According to Human Rights activists in Iran, over 300 people have been killed and thousands have been arrested. What is the explanation for this situation?
Is this an illustration of thousands of Iranians observing the behaviour of others and “extrapolating from their own psychology,” that surrounding individuals' are now capable of resisting temptations so puritanical restrictions are no longer worth the cost, as the moral disciplining theory (MDT) would suggest (target article, sect. 5, para 6)? Or, are we witnessing the actions of brave women and men challenging the “puritanical values” of a corrupt, coercive elite intent on controlling how women dress, think, or what they may do with their bodies?
The problem with the MDT is that there is no differentiation between morality and social conventions or between cooperation and coercion. Although space limits me to focus on the latter, I will make a brief comment about the former. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin defines morality as the study of how to treat others (Dworkin, Reference Dworkin2011) and researchers have demonstrated a clear distinction between violations of conventional norms and violations of moral principles (Turiel, Reference Turiel1983). Prohibitions against “inappropriate attire” are an example of a conventional norm, while concerns about how to treat others such as rights, justice, and autonomy involve morality. Failing to differentiate conventional norms with morality leads to confusion about coercion and cooperation. I will offer an analogy to emphasize the coercion/cooperation distinction.
In many democratic countries, criminal law includes several defences, including the defence of duress. Duress can be raised where an accused person has committed a criminal offence under threat of death or serious bodily harm by another individual or group of individuals. The accused person is excused from criminal responsibility because the person had no choice but to break the law.
Similarly, when we speak about cooperation, we must consider the choice or lack of choice of the individuals involved. MDT takes a “subjective selection” approach that claims, “people use their intuitions and folk-theories to craft cultural traits” (target article, sect. 3.4, para. 3). When making claims about what is considered a value in a particular culture, we must ensure that we identify what group of people are crafting the value. Certainly, cultures have assumptions about how people ought to behave, and purity language is often used to reference behaviours; however, one must be cognizant of what group of people are controlling the assumptions. We must not confuse cooperation with cooperation under duress.
In present-day Iran, are the puritanical “values” subjectively viewed as, “improving people's inner self-control” that is aimed at “lowering the demand for self-control by preventing temptations to arise in the first place” (target article, sect. 4.4, para. 1)? I doubt it. I argue that the current situation in Iran is the result of an increasing number of people, from diverse segments of society, challenging a theocratic regime who use “puritanical values” to impose a warped ideology.
Failing to consider how people live their lives in both WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies and ignoring how puritanical values have been challenged and eventually changed, leads to misconceptions about “cooperative” cultural practices. Not very long ago, a man kissing a man or a Black man holding the hand of a white woman offended the puritanical values of all WEIRD societies. Historically, “puritanical values” change, not because they are no longer needed, but because brave people have challenged discriminatory conventional norms. Often “puritanical values” have nothing to do with morality.
Although the MDT is unconvincing, encouragingly the authors conclude on a positive note. They say that perhaps the focus on the WEIRD/non-WEIRD dichotomy has limited our understanding of cross-cultural variation that psychological theories must account for. I agree. I suspect that a lack of respect for human autonomy by those enforcing “puritanical values” plays a significant role in both WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies, and a subjective uneasiness about the inadequate self-control of others has little to do with the “puritanical values” of any culture.
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The authors of the target paper provide an interesting answer to the important question of why so many societies develop puritanical values. They suggest the answer lies in resolving two puzzles. I'm particularly interested in the second puzzle of puritanical morality as it relates to cooperation. The authors correctly point out that most evolutionary theories of morality suggest that “moral cognition is an adaptation to the challenges of cooperation recurrent in human social life” (target article, sect. 1.2, para. 1). This, they say, explains the cross-cultural condemnations of murder, violence, and theft but leaves unexplained why humans moralize victimless lifestyle choices that pertain to food prohibitions, alcohol consumption, clothing attire, and sexual relations. They go on to argue that puritanical morality develops from “folk-psychological beliefs that restraining indulgence in victimless pleasures would improve people's self-control, thus facilitating cooperative behaviors” (target article, sect. 1.3, para. 1). Although their argument for this is weak, what I find particularly problematic is their explanation as to why some societies no longer enforce “puritanical norms.”
To account for why puritanism declined in so-called western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, the authors maintain that puritanical norms are endorsed by the people to ensure the self-control necessary for cooperative behaviour. They reason that these norms have the cost of stifling people's enjoyment of highly gratifying pleasures. Therefore, “puritanical norms are only necessary when they are worth the cost” (target article, sect. 5, para. 2). Moreover, the authors argue that these norms are especially important when people's spontaneous self-control is seen as so inadequate to ensure a stable cooperative social order (my italics). They conclude that the collective demand for “temperance likely become useless when people are more moderate anyway, and less likely to develop hard-to-control addictions to bodily pleasures” (target article, sect. 5, para. 5). A consideration of events unfolding in the world today questions the narrative offered by the authors.
On September 16, 2022, Mahsa Amini died in custody after being arrested by the “morality” police for violating Iran's strict purity laws. Media reports suggest that many Iranians are willingly putting their lives in danger to challenge the “purity laws” of the ruling elite. According to Human Rights activists in Iran, over 300 people have been killed and thousands have been arrested. What is the explanation for this situation?
Is this an illustration of thousands of Iranians observing the behaviour of others and “extrapolating from their own psychology,” that surrounding individuals' are now capable of resisting temptations so puritanical restrictions are no longer worth the cost, as the moral disciplining theory (MDT) would suggest (target article, sect. 5, para 6)? Or, are we witnessing the actions of brave women and men challenging the “puritanical values” of a corrupt, coercive elite intent on controlling how women dress, think, or what they may do with their bodies?
The problem with the MDT is that there is no differentiation between morality and social conventions or between cooperation and coercion. Although space limits me to focus on the latter, I will make a brief comment about the former. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin defines morality as the study of how to treat others (Dworkin, Reference Dworkin2011) and researchers have demonstrated a clear distinction between violations of conventional norms and violations of moral principles (Turiel, Reference Turiel1983). Prohibitions against “inappropriate attire” are an example of a conventional norm, while concerns about how to treat others such as rights, justice, and autonomy involve morality. Failing to differentiate conventional norms with morality leads to confusion about coercion and cooperation. I will offer an analogy to emphasize the coercion/cooperation distinction.
In many democratic countries, criminal law includes several defences, including the defence of duress. Duress can be raised where an accused person has committed a criminal offence under threat of death or serious bodily harm by another individual or group of individuals. The accused person is excused from criminal responsibility because the person had no choice but to break the law.
Similarly, when we speak about cooperation, we must consider the choice or lack of choice of the individuals involved. MDT takes a “subjective selection” approach that claims, “people use their intuitions and folk-theories to craft cultural traits” (target article, sect. 3.4, para. 3). When making claims about what is considered a value in a particular culture, we must ensure that we identify what group of people are crafting the value. Certainly, cultures have assumptions about how people ought to behave, and purity language is often used to reference behaviours; however, one must be cognizant of what group of people are controlling the assumptions. We must not confuse cooperation with cooperation under duress.
In present-day Iran, are the puritanical “values” subjectively viewed as, “improving people's inner self-control” that is aimed at “lowering the demand for self-control by preventing temptations to arise in the first place” (target article, sect. 4.4, para. 1)? I doubt it. I argue that the current situation in Iran is the result of an increasing number of people, from diverse segments of society, challenging a theocratic regime who use “puritanical values” to impose a warped ideology.
Failing to consider how people live their lives in both WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies and ignoring how puritanical values have been challenged and eventually changed, leads to misconceptions about “cooperative” cultural practices. Not very long ago, a man kissing a man or a Black man holding the hand of a white woman offended the puritanical values of all WEIRD societies. Historically, “puritanical values” change, not because they are no longer needed, but because brave people have challenged discriminatory conventional norms. Often “puritanical values” have nothing to do with morality.
Although the MDT is unconvincing, encouragingly the authors conclude on a positive note. They say that perhaps the focus on the WEIRD/non-WEIRD dichotomy has limited our understanding of cross-cultural variation that psychological theories must account for. I agree. I suspect that a lack of respect for human autonomy by those enforcing “puritanical values” plays a significant role in both WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies, and a subjective uneasiness about the inadequate self-control of others has little to do with the “puritanical values” of any culture.
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