The article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions. There exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise: workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains. When these conditions hold and a compromise is in force, the role of the state consists in institutionalizing, coordinating, and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists.

The purpose of this article is to explore the connection between ideology and issues in the minds of voters and the relationship between this connection and the electoral prospects of candidates engaged in two-candidate competition. Toward this end we examine the effects on electoral competition of either magnifying or collapsing the expected policy difference that voters associate with a fixed ideological difference. We find that magnifying this difference aids the incumbent, whereas collapsing it aids the challenger. We go on to point out how this second result provides an explanation for the electoral appeal of extremist candidates and an important insight into the question of state stability.

Science involves the accumulation of knowledge, which means not only the formulation of new sentences about discoveries but also the reformulation of empirically falsified or theoretically discredited old sentences. Science has therefore a history that is mainly a chronicle and interpretation of a series of reformulations. It is often asserted that political science has no history. Although this assertion is perhaps motivated by a desire to identify politics with belles lettres, it may also have a reasonable foundation, in that political institutions may change faster than knowledge can be accumulated. To investigate whether propositions about evanescent institutions can be scientifically falsified and reformulated, I examine in this essay the history of the recent and not wholly accepted revisions of the propositions collectively called Duverger's law: that the plurality rule for selecting the winner of elections favors the two-party system. The body of the essay presents the discovery, revision, testing, and reformulation of sentences in this series in order to demonstrate that in at least one instance in political science, knowledge has been accumulated and a history exists.

Since 1960 turnout has declined in presidential elections, and since 1966 it has declined in off-year congressional elections. These declines occurred despite several major trends that could have increased electoral participation. An analysis of the eight SRC-CPS presidential election surveys conducted between 1952 and 1980 and of the six SRC-CPS congressional election surveys conducted between 1958 and 1978 suggests that these declines may result largely from the combined impact of two attitudinal trends: the weakening of party identification and declining beliefs about government responsiveness, that is, lowered feelings of “external” political efficacy. Between two-thirds and seven-tenths of the decline in presidential turnout between 1960 and 1980 appears to result from the combined impact of these trends. Data limitations hinder our efforts to study the decline of congressional turnout, but approximately two-fifths to one-half of the decline between 1966 and 1978 appears to result from the combined impact of these attitudinal trends.

The existence of a trade-off between military expenditures and social spending is widely hypothesized but often difficult to establish empirically. This article constructs a model to test the effects of changes in military spending on federal expenditures for health and education from 1941 through 1979. Important economic, demographic, and political changes are controlled. No systematic tradeoff between military spending and federal health and education expenditures is found, nor in this period was there any significant depressing effect on health and education expenditures by Republican presidential administrations. Thus, the current administration, under which there are major increases in military spending and major cuts in health and education spending, emerges as exceptional.

The essay is concerned with justice in the Oresteia and the way the Oresteia contributes to the justice it celebrates. It begins by examining the place of tragedy in Athenian politics as a preface to an analysis of the trilogy's understanding of justice. That understanding is explored using two examples of fundamentally conflicting forces which are reconciled in the play to create a whole larger and more just than either force alone. The essay goes on to argue that the form of tragedy recapitulates and reinforces the substantive teachings on justice previously analyzed. Here four elements are considered: the balances between intelligence and passion, action and boundaries, political discourse and poetry, and the Euminides and Agamemnon.

Politicians do not endorse rules of the game as reliably as is implied by traditional constitutional commentaries or by modern democratic theory. Interviews with Members of Parliament and candidates demonstrate that their views are deeply and systematically divided between alternative constitutional interpretations constructed upon foundations of party-political bias. Thus, attitudes towards nearly all rules of the game are powerfully shaped by political values such as authority and equality, values that differentiate views within as well as between the Conservative and labour parties. Similarly, patterns of support seem much affected by a disposition to boost norms that aid one's own party, depending on whether it is in Government or Opposition, and to downgrade norms that might aid political opponents. The article considers implications of these results for the viability of Britain's unwritten Constitution and for theories about the foundations of representative government.

Fundamental to the logic of American constitutionalism is the bonding of language and politics, the equivocal linkage of two quite different orders of composition. Unabashedly, the constitutional enterprise purports to infuse writing with power and to shape power with the written word. Such a theory of what it means to organize a political order according to a written design should systematically regulate the ongoing processes of constitutional interpretation. The result is a two-text framework of interpretive methods which is justified by the nature of the American constitutional enterprise, a system of signification that coordinates constitutive language, the authoritative modeling of the polity in words, and political legibility, the readability of the resulting scheme of government in operation. The Interpretable Constitution, as such a construct, reflects in its divisions the interconnection between document and polity and demonstrates the bond and tension between the Constitution as a linguistic artifact and the constitution as a political product.

The first section of the article establishes the political salience of macroeconomic issues to the British electorate, reviews the distributional consequences of macroeconomic outcomes, and suggests that unemployment outcomes in particular have strong class-related distributional effects.

The second part presents a dynamic model of how rational voters evaluate the governing party, based on the idea that voters evaluate the cumulative performance of the governing party relative to the prior performance of the current opposition. Since the present relevance of prior outcomes decays over time, voters weight current performance more heavily than past performance informing contemporaneous political judgments.

The empirical analyses in the third section include measures of nominal economic performance (inflation and exchange rate movements) and real economic performance (unemployment and real income fluctuations). The regression results indicate that the responses of political support among the occupational classes to macroeconomic changes are sizeable, and that the cross-class variations are consistent with the distributional consequences reviewed at the beginning of the article.

The concluding section develops the electoral implications of the empirical results and presents a novel interpretation of trends in class-related political support for the parties. The evidence shows that the argument that there has been a persistent decline of class-based political alignments in Britain is erroneous.

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.

According to the SRC-CPS surveys, the proportion of Americans identifying with a political party declined sharply between 1964 and 1976, from approximately 75 percent to 63 percent. In order to cast some light on the reasons for this dealignment, we examine the contributions made by the changing age composition of the electorate, the entry of new voters into the electorate, the party desertion among voters already in the electorate, and the suppression of age gains in partisanship. These four sources are shown to explain close to 100 percent of the aggregate decline from 1964 to 1976, with the single largest contribution made by entry of new voters. Nevertheless our findings indicate that the decline occurred throughout all age cohorts and suggest the potency of dealigning period forces. These forces simply had their strongest effect on those voters with predictably the least resistance, the youngest cohorts.

From the onset of industrial capitalism in Latin America, urban workers have been dependent on the state. This is particularly true in Brazil, where urban workers are still in a situation of extreme dependence on the state. Thus, the Brazilian setting provides an ideal opportunity for the study of the consciousness of dependent workers as well as an important point of reference for comparative study of working-class consciousness. This paper outlines the general characteristics of the situation of state-dependent workers in Latin America, with special attention to the Brazilian worker, in order to show how their dependence is reflected in their consciousness. The evidence for our interpretation is based on the attitudes of 617 urban workers who are part of a larger probability sample of the population in central and southeast Brazil.

Professor Hibbs's article presents an ingenious model wherein political support of the government depends on “cumulative discounted relative performance.” Specifically, “the worse (better) the performance of the prior government, the higher (lower) will be the initial support of the new government… (G)overnments following bad acts by the opposition are likely to enjoy greater initial support than governments following good acts.”

This is a reasonable hypothesis, and it may well be correct. However, Hibbs offers no evidence of its correctness other than the overall performance of his model, and he reports no consideration, let alone rejection, of alternative hypotheses. Instead he assumes that the discounted past performance affects the new government's support with the opposite sign but with the same slope. Pursuit of Hibbs's illustrative example shows that the assumption is far from trivial, and that it produces some startling results.

This article is based on data from the 1980 National Election Study surveys. It reports findings concerning the rates at which voters become familiar with presidential candidates and their policy positions, trends in public opinion during the 1980 presidential campaign, and the dynamics of individual attitudes that underlie those trends. The impact of political attitudes on the individual vote decision is assessed within the context of a simultaneous equation model. In addition, the net effects of attitudinal distributions on the election outcome are estimated. The analysis yields support for the retrospective voting model and provides no evidence for the contention that Reagan's victory was the result of his policy or ideological positions.

The article is a methodological examination of public choice analysis, with particular reference to the currently topical policy field of natural resources. It is also a methodological critique of public choice analysis on logical, epistemological, and normative grounds. Its purpose is to make scholars of natural resources management aware of the substantive and methodological features of the public choice approach to the field, and to make public choice scholars and philosophers of science aware of the methodological grounds of the approach.

The so-called hard core of concepts of public choice are first described in relation to the natural resource policy field, and the selection of these hard core concepts, as well as their distinguishing features from political science, economics, and public administration, are justified. The argument is advanced that the hard core is interrelated by the methodological criterion of logical consistency—one interpretation of the notion of rationality—and the criterion accounts for the impetus behind the growth of the paradigm. It is also argued that the paradigm is buttressed and protected from rival approaches at an epistemological level, and it is shown that a variety of epistemologies have been linked to the approach. Finally, I argue that the congruence of public choice with this variety of epistemologies makes many of the criticisms about the normative implications of the approach inaccurate and misleading.

I am flattered that a political scientist of William Keech's caliber uses words such as ingenious and outstanding to describe my work. I am also grateful that he took the time and was given the opportunity by the Review to show the implications of my theory of political support for a stylized case where unmeasured sources of support for British governments among the occupational classes are nil (aqj = 0), the only performance variable valued by voters is the unemployment rate, which has a reasonable contemporaneous impact of –0.02, and where the decay rate parameter g for past performance outcomes is set equal to the sensible value of 0.8 (implying a backward-looking discount rate of 0.25 per quarter).

A check of selected entries in Keech's Table 1 indicates they are correct, and I have no important disagreements with his interpretations of their behavioral implications. One caveat, however, about Keech's statement that my model “presumes that the performance of the old government affects the support of the new one with exactly the same slope (bn = b0 in equation A), but with opposite sign”: the absolute value of the partial derivative of Y* with respect to Zt–k in my model is b gk, which of course depends on lag k. b(bn, b0) is a scale parameter; the slope, as defined in the usual way, is given by the (time varying) derivative above.

Professor Sartori's 1962 article on constitutionalism in the American Political Science Review was influential in the acceptance of a narrow view of the constitution. Sartori argued that constitution meant specifically limitation on government and underplayed the role of the state in establishing a political order. This article argues that there are good historical reasons for keeping a balanced view of a constitutionalism that maintains a tension between strong government, to create a secure and stable order, and limitation on government power. It therefore attempts to reaffirm McIlwain's more traditional view of the constitution as a combination of gubernaculum and jurisdictio, power and its control.

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

Despite or because of a decade of research that yielded conflicting results, the question of whether or not military coups or regimes brought into power through coups have an impact on subsequent military spending remains open. A review of the relevant literature suggests that part of the analytical problem may result from assumptions about military political behavior as well as various limitations associated with cross-national analyses of change, and the use of exclusively cross-sectional or longitudinal research designs. In addition, some of the disparity in research findings may result from the reliance on different indicators—both dependent and independent—by a number of different analysts. In response to these potential technical problems, this analysis of military spending patterns in 66 less-developed states applies a GLS routine, pooling cross-sectional and time-series data, to the 1967–1976 relationships between two measures of military spending and several predictor variables, including regime type, coup occurrences, level of conflict, economic development, arms imports, and previous military spending. Although the empirical outcome varies according to which dependent variable is examined, we find, in general, that information on the distribution and timing of regime types—military, civilian, and mixed—and successful military coups is not very helpful in predicting post-coup military spending policies. This finding suggests, in turn, that the crucial presumption that military personnel participate in politics primarily to defend or advance their corporate interests is not a very useful predictive foundation for the examination of post-coup military spending.