The coup d'état, so-called, which, on January 6, 1929, brought into being a new form of government and established a new type of constitutional régime in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, marked the end of exactly a decade of experimentation with the traditional principles of parliamentary government. That this “critical period” had not been an unqualified success is admitted by statesmen, diplomats, and politicians alike; that it was abruptly ended by the personal intervention of King Alexander and the supercession of the Vidov-dan constitution is equally a matter of fact. From Zagreb to Belgrade the passing of the political order which had obtained in the triune kingdom since 1918 has brought general rejoicing; outside the country, however, the queries have been raised: Is the change indicative of the future fate of all democracies, and have not the doctrines of fascism, of military dictatorship, of camarilla government, simply been transplanted to the Yugoslav capital from Rome and Madrid respectively?

The situation is not to be understood merely by drawing hasty conclusions as to the prospective demise of democratic or parliamentary government everywhere, nor is it possible to speak, with any scientific accuracy, of the new régime in the Serb-Croat-Slovene state as a Balkan adaptation of the Italian and Iberian dictatorships. The occurrence of this constitutional change in the life of the Yugoslav people has its own distinctive raison d'être and does not flow from mere facile imitation of dictatorial practices in other countries.

Following the adoption by Greece of proportional representation in the general election of November 7, 1926, that system was abandoned in the last election, held on August 19, 1928, on the ground that it failed to give the country a strong and homogenous government. The earlier operation of “P. R.” in Greece was set forth in a former number of this Review. In a total of 286 seats, in the election of 1926, the Venizelist Republican group secured 144, as against the Antivenizelist Royalist group which secured 130, there being also a unit of nine Communists and three Agrarians elected to that Chamber. In view of the impossibility of either of the major groups forming a cabinet with the strong support of the Chamber, a coalition ministry was resorted to, and it worked with marked success so long as a compromise program was followed. This cabinet, under the leadership of the veteran statesman, Dr. Alexander Zaimis, himself not a deputy, was supported in the Chamber by the 106 votes of the Liberal Union, the 18 of the Republican Union, the 63 of the Popular Royalists, and the 54 of the Free Opinion Moderate Royalist party, thus having a total support of 241 votes, against 45 disunited and leaderless opponents. This coalition was able to heal the serious breach that had split the Hellenic nation since 1915 over the question of Greek participation in the World War or absolute neutrality. The ministry was, furthermore, instrumental in bringing some order into the chaotic finances of the country.

“Italian unification” is an old phrase, today acquiring new meaning. Whatever Garibaldi would have thought of D'Annunzian and Fascist squadrism, however Cavour would have viewed the modern cult of Machiavelli, avowed by Mussolini, one may be sure that Mazzini would have been shocked at the chauvinist absolutism now proudly boasted by the Fascist régime: absolutism in the sense of an executive guided by its own intuitions and conscience, free from political criticism or parliamentary control; absolutism also in a sense for which English words are wanting, except as we boldly transliterate, and hope that “intransigence,” “totalitarianism,” will be understood to mean an all-inclusive hundredpercentedness. Italy is called by Mussolini “monolithic,” all of one piece, tolerating anti-Fascist criticism no more than other states tolerate treason; all in and for Fascism, nothing against Fascism. Indeed, Fascism, without ceasing to be a party, has become the state. For parties in Edmund Burke's sense there is supposed to be no more need than for the factions Washington abhorred. Opposition such as is normal in the Cavourian scheme of parliamentary government—responsible critics, loyal and ready to take their turn in governing—is superfluous, a mere obstacle or obstruction to efficiency. None is permitted—in parliament, in press, in platform, or even in theory.

What has just been said is presented, not by way of judging, but only of summarizing, the attitude firmly (courageously or arrogantly, according to the observer's prejudices) maintained by the powers that be in Italy today. The recent months have seen several important steps taken in the direction of institutional realization of this view.