The first postwar year found rural local government facing problems of readjustment. As the rural units had felt the impact of war less forcefully than the states and cities, so their reconstruction problems were less acute; but they were none the less genuine and significant. To mention but a few, these included the construction of deferred public-works projects, the provision of housing and various forms of assistance for returned veterans, the modernization and expansion of public-welfare services, the securing of additional revenues adequate to finance an expanded program of local activities, and the reorganization of local areas and machinery with a view to fostering economy and efficiency in a period of mounting governmental costs. Though less than a dozen state legislatures held regular sessions, the year's enactments served both to initiate reconstruction programs begun a year earlier in many states and to indicate the nature of other measures likely to be more generally adopted in the future. Statutes of previous years formed the basis of various improvements in local government which were effected in 1946.

The school-consolidation programs begun in the preceding year in Illinois and Kansas continued to make progress. At the beginning of October, 174 consolidations involving 897 districts had been effected in Illinois. In Kansas, some 2,000 districts have already been eliminated, and it has been estimated that the program in that state, as revised early in 1947, may ultimately reduce the number of districts, originally well over 8,000, to only 3,000.

The oft-heard argument in behalf of federalism that the states furnish important laboratories for social and political experimentation is illustrated by a good many new constitutional provisions interpreted for the first time this year. Two states, Missouri and Georgia, adopted entirely new constitutions in 1945, important sections of which have come before the highest courts for interpretation. One of these, the Georgia constitution of 1945, provides specifically: “Legislative acts in violation of this constitution or the constitution of the United States, are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” Such a provision may very well raise more questions than it settles—for example, what effects can be accorded unconstitutional acts?; can the other agencies of government refuse to perform under statutes they consider unconstitutional?; can the judiciary declare acts of the governor and other officers unconstitutional?; etc. Such questions have not as yet been raised. But there is some evidence that we may be embarking on an era of constitutional revision similar to that which followed the Civil War. If so, the problems of constitutional law now being discussed may furnish a clue to the kind of new documents to be written. This year the emphasis has been on civil rights and methods of adjusting state finances to the rapidly fluctuating value of the dollar—problems which naturally arise out of the intense social and economic conflicts of the past decade.

The President's signature of the new Administrative Procedure Act completed the second or legislative phase of the reform of administrative procedure which began with the introduction and passage of the ill-fated Walter-Logan bill in 1939–40. The investigatory phase which preceded it had its beginning in the reluctant recognition accorded administrative law as a separate discipline at about the turn of the century. The refusal to recognize the existence of administrative law gave way before a volume of literature on the subject, and became transformed into a criticism of the administrative process itself. The movement for reform of which the act of 1946 was the culmination has come largely in answer to these criticisms. Ignoring differences in phraseology and attacks on specific agencies, most critics appear to agree on the following arguments:

(1) The administrative process is essentially dangerous in that it ignores the traditional American theory of the separation of powers, a principal protection against tyranny and dictatorship in the United States. This argument may appear in several forms. Sometimes it is said that administrative law is to be deplored because it is typical of alien countries which are not as advanced politically as we. In the hands of the American Bar Association, this argument is used to point up dangers inherent in any system that has a tendency to limit judicial review. And sometimes the allegation is merely that the administrative process is a violation of the separation theory, leaving the evils of such a violation to implication.

Early in 1931, General Jorge Ubico Castaneda established in Guatemala one of the tightest dictatorships in all Latin America. For many years, his régime was not only popular, but benevolent. General Ubico loved his country, and under his leadership there was a remarkable increase alike in administrative efficiency and public honesty. Under the Ley de Probidad, one of his first statutes, every important government official from the president down was required to file a sworn statement upon assuming office of all property owned by him and by his immediate family, to serve as the possible basis of an accounting on termination of his services. Government employees receiving funds were required to give a receipt, made out in duplicate upon official blanks that must be accounted for, upon pain of a fine amounting to twice the amount involved, one-half of which was to be paid to the informer. No one could tell when General Ubico would “drop in” on him to audit his books and examine his papers, as he could reach even the most out-of-the-way government offices on his motorcycle. Indeed, “government by motorcycle” became a popular phrase of the day in reference to this rugged and domineering personality.

Although the constitution provided in Article 66 that the presidential term of office should be six years, and that no president should be reelected until he had been out of office for at least twelve years, a subservient Congress that had virtually abandoned its legislative powers to the executive called for a national plebiscite on extending General Ubico's term, and following a favorable vote the constitution was amended to provide that he should continue as president until March 15, 1943, Article 66 remaining in suspense until that date. Late in 1941; the constitution was again amended to extend his term another six years.

Modern science and modern scientific methods, with all their splendor of achievement, have led to an ethical vacuum, a religious vacuum, and a philosophical vacuum—so it has been said. For they have offered little or nothing to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice. All social sciences are involved in this calamity, but none has been so deeply affected as political science, which had to face the new creeds of Communism, Fascism, and Nazism as political phenomena of tremendous power. They settled down in the area abandoned by science, taking full advantage of the fact that, scientifically speaking, there was a vacuum.

No political theorist can honestly avoid the issue, and certainly every scholar worthy of the name gives it serious thought. While each may publish his own ideas freely, there is one thing which we cannot do individually, but which we may do collectively—take stock of the various opinions that prevail among us, and clarify their meaning by question and answer. This the members of a round-table tried to do at the last meeting of the American Political Science Association, in two sessions held jointly with the Research Panel on Political Theory, represented by its chairman, Francis G. Wilson of the University of Illinois.

Ours is a government of “checks and balances.” It is the traditional concept which Montesquieu propounded in saying: “There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates.” One of the knottiest problems in the science of democratic government is that of reducing this basic theory of separated powers to a workable and efficient system. It requires the establishment of a proper balance, and devices of coördination that facilitate action but do not disturb the balance of powers. It also requires formal methods of procedure.

Declining prestige of legislative bodies has recently prompted inquiries looking to self-appraisal and reform in Congress and in legislatures of a number of the states. Dissatisfaction with the traditional organization and procedure of state legislatures has grown among legislators, who undertake the perplexities of present-day law-making with inadequate assistance and ineffective machinery. Legislation was seldom a simple problem, but it is today more difficult than at any time in our national history. As the responsibilities thrust upon legislatures are increased, so must the tools and processes of legislation be improved if the quality of legislation is to meet the needs which call it forth.

To assist in the reappraisal and review of state legislative organization and procedure, twelve general suggestions for strengthening state legislatures have been reported to the Council of State Governments by a committee of state officials. Appointed in November, 1945, by the Board of Managers of the Council, the Committee on Legislative Processes and Procedures developed its report after broadly surveying legislative theory and practice and selecting for recommendation to the states those measures of most general application. Dealing with the problems of state legislatures generally, the committee decided at an early date to direct its attention to the strengthening of state legislatures as presently constituted. Questions of reapportionment, of representation in the legislature, proportional representation, unicameralism, and certain mechanics of procedure such as electrical voting were not treated in the final report.

The net result of ten years of extraordinary activity is that the Supreme Court has gone a long way toward squaring the legal concept of American federalism with the intent—and, it is tempting to add, the plain language—of the Constitution. The most important thing that has happened is that the Court has snuffed out the heresy of “dual federalism.” This subtle weapon of laissez-faire economics was utilized at a fairly early date, notably in the two child labor cases, to strike down federal reform legislation, but it achieved great weight, which comes with reiteration in important cases, during 1935 and 1936, when the Court was grimly determined to save the country from the horrors of the New Deal. Briefly, the doctrine holds that the mere existence of states constitutes an independent limitation on the exercise of national powers. Thus, Justice Day asserted in the first child labor case: “The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.” This theory is inconsistent with the principle of federal supremacy, a principle which the present Court has restored to its proper place in American constitutional law. But, in sustaining a sweeping exercise of national power, the Court has by no means been unmindful of the proper status of the states in the Union. Furthermore, it is a mistake to assume that every growth of national power is at the expense of state power. While it is true that we have more government at the federal level today than ever before, we also have much more state government. A fuller exploitation by Congress of the powers committed to it by the Constitution has been matched by a fuller exploitation of the authority reserved to the states. The laments of losing litigants should not be taken as a correct assessment of the present position of the American states.

Among the responsibilities which the Constitution imposes upon Congress is the regulation of the succession to the office of president in certain contingencies. The framers of the Constitution themselves disposed of the problem in part by creating the post of vice-president and making that officer a first recourse in filling a vacancy in the presidential office. Realizing the need for designating more than one prospective successor, since vacancies might occur in both offices simultaneously, the convention at a late stage in its proceedings added as a seeming afterthought a clause authorizing Congress to make further provision by law on the subject. Although seven presidents and seven vice-presidents have died in office and one vice-president has resigned during the time the Constitution has been in operation, the situation envisaged by the framers has never actually arisen. Nevertheless, the power entrusted to Congress is important potentially. During nearly one-fourth of the time since 1789, a federal statute rather than a constitutional provision has governed the succession to the presidential office in an immediate sense.

Two fundamentally opposed theories have been advanced concerning the officer upon whom Congress should cause the powers and duties of the presidency to devolve. One is that the presiding officer of the House or the Senate should be designated, in order to insure that any person becoming acting president shall achieve that status through an elective process.

The relationship between ideas and social and political changes remains one of the major controversial questions in the social sciences. Certain groups, particularly the Marxists and the behaviorists in both psychology and sociology, relegate ideas to a very subordinate rôle. They claim that for the most part changes in ideas are the result of changes in material conditions or other concrete external factors to which men in society must adjust. At the other extreme are certain philosophers, historians, and philosophically inclined political scientists who assign to ideas an outstanding rôle in the development of economic, political, and social institutions.

The controversy is one that has immediate and practical significance, as well as purely scientific importance. If the United States is to achieve a successful adjustment in a world of rapid economic and political change, the country's leaders will need an accurate understanding of the factors behind these changes, and the probable directions of such change. Such understanding cannot be obtained without knowledge of the major factors involved, such as material conditions and abstract ideas, and the relative importance to be attached to each one. Such knowedge is particularly important in assessing changes in the power relationships among America's potential allies and competitors in the modern world. At the present time, if one may judge from the published diaries of our ambassadors, as well as from what is known of the operations of various intelligence agencies that have received a good deal of publicity since the end of the war, there is no general agreement concerning the procedures to be followed in evaluating symbolic and ideological data, such as statements by important foreign leaders, programs of political parties, and the like, as opposed to more concrete data, such as information on natural resources, economic trends, and similar matters.

Introductory Comments. How and what to teach has been one of the most engaging topics of conversation in political science circles for many years. Yet it is a remarkable fact that not a single department of political science in the United States, so far as the writer is aware, offers its graduate students a seminar on teaching problems. Seemingly we have been content with the old formula for teaching success: “If you would be a good teacher, saturate yourself with your subject-matter and teach like hell.” Unfortunately, some of our teachers have done just that.

If we needed to reëvaluate our teaching before the war, it is imperative now that a little individual and collective soul-searching be done. The tremendous changes ushered in by the war and the uncertainties of the future emphasize more than ever the importance of our work. The world is entering a new era in which democracy will be put to real test as it continues to meet the challenge of more militant ideologies. It will be an era of bewildering social change accompanied by an increasing awareness of political power on the part of individuals and organized groups. The ideological conflict will be characterized by tension between management and labor at home and the old familiar pattern of power politics—with new forms of nationalism and militarism—in our relations abroad. Students will be bombarded with propaganda from every quarter.

Time was, perhaps before the New Deal, when the limitations upon executive reorganization were largely self-limitations, which arose from a conception of administrative reform as primarily a technical problem. That is to say, students of administration assumed that their work had nothing to do with politics. The basic political decisions were to be acknowledged, and if changes were necessary they would be made by legislative enactment. Administrative analysis consisted in determining, according to criteria of efficiency and economy, the proper distribution and relationships of governmental functions. The responsibilities of the technician ended with the submission of a factual report and plans for reorganization, except that if the politicians insisted upon a different set of organizational objectives, he might give advice on the best arrangements for meeting those objectives. He might accept the responsibility of a consultant or adviser on organizational policy; but in so doing he was acting in a professional capacity, contributing the results of his experience in investigating methods of policy execution.

The veto power is well known as one of the primary sources of the strength of a governor. Especially in the 38 states which give their chief executives the right to reject items in appropriation bills, the governors have been able to mold legislation to their liking. In a few states, including Pennsylvania, the power to veto items has been expanded to include the authority to reduce any item. Probably in no state in the union has the veto been a more effective club in the hands of the governor than in Pennsylvania. A study of the veto record in Pennsylvania over the past eight years reveals the extent to which the governor's will has prevailed.

The constitutional provisions concerning the veto in Pennsylvania are not unlike those in a number of other states. The governor may, within ten days after the passage of a bill by the General Assembly, disapprove it. If he fails to act within that period, the bill, unless approved by the legislature just before adjournment, becomes law without his signature. In addition, he is given the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills. The legislature may override any veto by a two-thirds vote of all the elected members of each house. A bill which is passed during the ten days before the close of the session becomes law unless vetoed by the governor within 30 days after the adjournment.

Montesquieu may have been inaccurate in his description of the English system of government of his time and a poor prophet of the developments that were to take place in it, but he certainly proved an excellent forecaster of one of the major trends in American political development. Montesquieu believed that in order to safeguard liberty it was necessary to separate the powers of government and to vest them in legislative, executive, and judicial departments. When the framers of the Constitution of the United States vested the legislative, the judicial, and the executive powers of government in the three departments, they were doubtless following the ideas of Montesquieu as well as generalizing from the hard experiences of early state and Confederation years.

The doctrine that a department to which certain powers of government have been assigned may not grant them to another department and thus frustrate the principle of the separation of powers is often called the doctrine of the delegation of powers. This doctrine is a corollary of the doctrine of the separation of powers. It might also be thought of as a sanction of that doctrine.

To think of the doctrines of separation and delegation of powers without reference to their qualifications may give one a misleading idea of both Montesquieu and the American system of government, and it is important to remember that Montesquieu himself introduced the idea of checks and balances in his formulation of the doctrine of the separation of powers. He also seems to have anticipated the charge that a rigid separation would be unworkable. Practical observer and reformer that he was, he saw the necessity for making it possible to have the legislative and executive branches of government work together, and he believed that in his proposed system of government he not only had protected liberty, but had made it easy for the government to function effectively. In his discussion of the constitution of England, he stated that: “These three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in concert.”

Although the Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress has existed for a good many years, it was not until 1946 that increased financial support and increased staff made it possible for “L.R.S.” to render the service that friends of the legislative reference idea had long felt that it should. Under Section 203 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, the Service was authorized and directed to appoint senior specialists in various fields “to be available for special work with the appropriate committees of Congress, and upon request to advise and assist any committee of either House or any joint committee in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of legislative proposals pending before it, or of recommendations submitted to Congress, by the President or any executive agency, and otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination of measures before the committee.‘ The services of such staff members are available also for members of Congress individually.

Before proceeding further with the discussion of the expansion of the Service made possible by recent legislation, it may be desirable to outline the nature of the existing organization, and to indicate briefly the character of the services which it renders. The Legislative Reference Service as a whole is one of the departments of the Library of Congress. It functions under Dr. Ernest S. Griffith, who has been Director since 1940. For administrative purposes, the work has been divided among six different sections, each of which has its own different and peculiar responsibilities.

The commerce clause has been a double-edged tool of constitutional interpretation from the earliest days of judicial review of state and federal legislative activity. It is at once a positive source of federal power and, in the absence of federal exercise of that power, a source of implied limitations on state legislation. Any consideration of trends of interpretation of the clause in the past decade must treat both aspects of the matter. In general, it may be said that expansive implications of the Wagner Act decisions in the spring of 1937 have been elaborated and broadened until the commerce clause is today an ample source of federal legislative authority to deal with a wide range of problems arising out of or having any substantial effect upon interstate commerce. No such clear generalization may be made with respect to the nature of the limitations which the unexercised commerce power imposes on state police power and tax legislation. But the tendency, not yet consistently dominant, seems to be in the direction of upholding much state legislation that would formerly have been ruled a burden on interstate commerce. It is, of course, unnecessary to labor the fact that state legislation incompatible with a valid federal exercise of the commerce power is unconstitutional.

Both the above generalizations require some further examination. The first can perhaps best be looked at in terms of (1) changing definitions of interstate commerce, (2) the reshaping of familiar formulæ for determining the reach of the power to regulate, (3) the abandonment of the “dual federalism” concept, and (4) the broad application of federal statutes to businesses alleged not to be in interstate commerce. Discussion of the second general problem may perhaps best be considered in terms of the gradual, and still wavering, emergence of what may be called the “leaveit-to-Congress trend” in the review of state legislation alleged to burden interstate commerce.

The interest and significance of the postwar municipal elections held in Britain can best be appreciated if they are seen against wartime conditions on the one hand and the reconstruction tasks which confront local authorities on the other.

In England, as elsewhere, local government was designed to promote the arts of peace. But for six years during World War II it was asked to shoulder burdens of the most formidable kind directly connected with the war effort. The decision to make local authorities responsible, under the guidance of the Ministry of Home Security and its regional commissioners, for the complex of functions comprised under civil defense was a momentous one. Never before in Britain or any other country had local authorities been asked to undertake a task of such magnitude and importance as that of providing air-raid shelters, wardens and fire-guard posts in almost every street, gas decontamination centers, light and heavy rescue squads, evacuation schemes, emergency feeding and reception centers for those rendered homeless by enemy air attack, furniture stores, rest homes, a first-aid repair service for houses, and various other items of this kind.

The Ministry of Food placed heavy duties on both local-government officers and councilors in connection with food control and rationing; and local authorities provided cheap restaurants and canteens on a large scale. The Ministry of Fuel and Power drew largely on the resources of municipal administration in appointing local fuel overseers and their staffs for regulating the distribution and consumption of solid and liquid fuel.