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Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Mark Fey
Mark Fey*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Abstract

This paper investigates the dynamics of the “wasted vote” phenomenon and Duverger's Law. I construct a theoretical model in order to consider how preelection polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and how that information acts over time to decrease the support of the trailing candidate. The results shed light on how public opinion polls can aggregate information in the electorate and coordinate voters on the viable candidates in the election. Specifically, I show that in a Bayesian game model of strategic voting there exist non-Duvergerian equilibria in which all three candidates receive votes (in the limit). These equilibria require extreme coordination, however, and any variation in beliefs leads voters away from them to one of the Duvergerian equilibria. Thus, non-Duvergerian equilibria are unstable, while two-party equilibria are not. In addition, I describe how preelection polls provide information to voters about the viability of candidates and can thus be used by voters to coordinate on a Duvergerian outcome.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 91 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 135 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1997

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