Low voter turnout is a serious democratic problem for five reasons: (1) It means unequal turnout that is systematically biased against less well-to-do citizens. (2) Unequal turnout spells unequal political influence. (3) U.S. voter turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries. (4) Turnout in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections—less salient but by no means unimportant elections—tends to be especially poor. (5) Turnout appears to be declining everywhere. The problem of inequality can be solved by institutional mechanisms that maximize turnout. One option is the combination of voter-friendly registration rules, proportional representation, infrequent elections, weekend voting, and holding less salient elections concurrently with the most important national elections. The other option, which can maximize turnout by itself, is compulsory voting. Its advantages far outweigh the normative and practical objections to it.

The theoretical bifurcation of international relations theory into (neo)realist and (neo)liberal camps has resulted in a “gains debate” that says little about an empirical world in which states exhibit both relative and absolute gains pursuit. This article deploys prospect theory in an attempt to move beyond the gains debate. The intent here is synthetic. By bringing the predictions of both perspectives under a single theoretical umbrella, we can model a broader set of state behavior. The thesis developed demonstrates that states in a gains frame pursue absolute gains and are risk averse, while states in a losses frame pursue relative gains and are risk acceptant. This hypothesis is assessed against the behavior of the European Community in the formation of the Montreal Protocol, a regime intended to protect the earth's protective ozone shield. The new model accurately predicts the timing and content of shifts in EC preferences, suggesting that a synthesis of realist and liberal approaches is possible.

This paper develops a game-theoretic approach to the problem of political officials' respect for political and economic rights of citizens. It models the policing of rights as a coordination problem among citizens, but one with asymmetries difficult to resolve in a decentralized manner. The paper shows that democratic stability depends on a self-enforcing equilibrium: It must be in the interests of political officials to respect democracy's limits on their behavior. The concept of self-enforcing limits on the state illuminates a diverse set of problems and thus serves as a potential basis for integrating the literature. The framework is applied to a range of topics, such as democratic stability, plural societies, and elite pacts. The paper also applies its lessons to the case of the Glorious Revolution in seventeenth-century England.

Although the role of reciprocity in international cooperation is central to neoliberal institutionalism, empirical understanding of the concept remains weak. We analyze strategic response patterns—the use of reciprocity or inverse response (bullying)—in the Bosnia conflict from 1992 to 1995. We construct weekly time series of conflict and cooperation among the parties to the Bosnia war, using machine-coded events data. Time-series statistical analysis identifies several important patterns of strategic response, both reciprocal and inverse. These include bilateral responses, which are central to the concepts of reciprocity and evolution of cooperation, and triangular responses, which are central to the debates on containment versus accommodation in regional conflicts. Specifically, Serb forces displayed inverse triangular response, cooperating toward Bosnia after being punished by NATO. Outside powers displayed triangular reciprocity, increasing hostility toward Serb forces after Serbian attacks on the Bosnian government.

With which political and economic variables is change in international financial regulation robustly associated? I undertook multivariate regression analysis of this question using a quantitative measure of the regulation of international financial transactions. The measure was created by coding the laws of 64 nations. The associations between change in international financial regulation and measures of long-run economic growth, corporate taxation, government expenditures, and income inequality are estimated, using the models, methods, and data of Batro (1991), Deininger and Squire (1996a), Leamer (1983, 1985), and Levine and Renelt (1992). The findings point to a new agenda for research on international financial regulation.

The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis?

Contemporary communitarians argue that a proper consideration of ontological questions of identity and community forecloses deontological liberalism as a viable option, since deontological liberalism cannot ground a sufficiently strong form of immediate identification with the ethical life of the community. Hegel's ethical theory constitutes perhaps the most fully realized account of such identification. Yet, I argue, Hegel's ethics does not require the strong form of immediate identification required by communitarians. My analysis emphasizes the strands in Hegel's account which suggest that a weaker form of identification, reconcilable with deontological liberalism, can plausibly ground a stable form of civil society. In particular, Hegel's notion of patriotic trust is designed to ground both a direct and a reflective relation between individuals and their ethical and political tradition. Hegel's analysis anticipates and offers insights to supplement recent accounts of trust as a form of social capital.

Recently, the idea of phronesis has assumed great importance among political theorists. This prominence is due to the perception that, contrary to the application of the methods of natural science to politics, phronesis preserves the distinctive character of politics in its refusal to apply inappropriate standards of precision and to find certainty where it does not exist. But precisely because of this, the following question arises: Can we ascertain a nonarbitrary standard of phronesis without denying those characteristics that make it appropriate for the understanding of politics? I address this question by considering the treatment of phronesis (wisdom) found in Plato's Statesman and, in particular, the passage that weighs the relative merits of rule by wisdom and rule by law. In this seminal consideration of phronesis Plato (unlike Aristotle) does not confine his treatment to the practical sphere; even this intensely political passage contains far-reaching reflections on the nature of humanity and the world we inhabit. These explain what we are and what our world is, such that there is a need for this cognitive capacity. As I argue, they express the conditions of phronesis that can provide a guide for its use without negating its essential character.

Joseph Schumpeter is known to American political scientists as the originator of an elite conception of democracy as a political “method,” a conception found in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). But I show in this paper that in Schumpeter's study of the development of liberal capitalist societies, he also treated democracy as a socially transformative historical tendency, one of several that he thought were propelling such societies toward a form of “democratic” socialism. Schumpeter regarded the politics of labor and the reorientation of state policy in the New Deal era as evidence of these tendencies—especially of a tendency toward the democratic reconstruction of workplace hierarchy, which he deplored. In his later work, Schumpeter sketched the outlines of a “democratic” socialist society in which the most harmful of these tendencies, in his estimation, would be curbed.

This essay assesses communitarian and democratic critiques of capitalist economies. Distinguishing them are sharply contrasting evaluations of markets and private property. Communitarian critics of capitalism trace its moral failure to the marketplace. Drawing on Aristotle's normative economics, this school maintains that production for gain corrodes society's moral fabric. I defend the democratic approach. Democratic critics accept the modern claim that markets are both efficient and liberating. Capitalist ownership relations are another matter, indicted because they constitute a form of private power over people's lives. I reconstruct the ethical core of the democratic school and contend that it offers a better understanding of the most objectionable aspects of capitalist economies while avoiding the dangers inherent in the communitarian approach.

Previous studies of political decision making have used only “static” choice sets, where alternatives are “fixed” and are a priori known to the decision maker. We assess the effect of a dynamic choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a two-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based “process tracer” in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).

The hallmark of the new positive theories of the judiciary is that Supreme Court justices will frequently defer to the preferences of Congress when making decisions, particularly in statutory cases in which it is purportedly easy for Congress to reverse the Court. Alternatively, judicial attitudinalists argue that the institutional structures facing the Court allow the justices to vote their sincere policy preferences. This paper compares these sincere and sophisticated models of voting behavior by Supreme Court justices. Using a variety of tests on the votes of Supreme Court justices in statutory cases decided between 1947 and 1992, I find some evidence of sophisticated behavior, but most tests suggest otherwise. Moreover, direct comparisons between the two models unambiguously favor the attitudinal model. I conclude that the justices overwhelmingly engage in rationally sincere behavior.

Modern versions of public reason occasionally must address disputes so profound and divisive that the adjudicative powers of reason cannot resolve them on the expectations of liberal governance. The beliefs underlying these disputes represent the legitimate pluralism of the liberal state, but they also reproduce within the languages of public reason the same divisive views that the liberal state must manage in the larger society. The effects of divisive beliefs can be mitigated, however, with a noncomputational version of public reason that allows collective terms to dominate simple merit adjudication. This type of reasoning requires a survey of considerations beyond the merits of the case at hand and opens public reason to the more general needs of the political society.

We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; (2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystallization. Adolescents (aged 10 to 17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages.

Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy. Two experiments examined the effect of news frames on tolerance for the Ku Klux Klan. The first presented research participants with one of two local news stories about a Klan rally that varied by frame: One framed the rally as a free speech issue, and the other framed it as a disruption of public order. Participants who viewed the free speech story expressed more tolerance for the Klan than participants who watched the public order story. Additional data indicate that frames affect tolerance by altering the perceived importance of public order values. The relative accessibility of free speech and public order concepts did not respond to framing. A second experiment used a simulated electronic news service to present different frames and replicated these findings.

Is cooperation without central authority stable? If so, how robust is it? Despite what might be the conventional wisdom, The Evolution of Cooperation did not solve this problem deductively. In fact, results obtained later by others seem to have contradicted the book's main message. Reexamining this exceptionally influential work yields a new picture. Part of Axelrod's evolutionary story turns out to be false. But the main intuition, that retaliatory strategies of conditional cooperation are somehow advantaged, proves correct in one specific and significant sense: Under a standard evolutionary dynamic these strategies require the minimal frequency to stabilize. Hence, they support the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to reach and retain. Moreover, the less efficient a strategy, the larger is its minimal stabilizing frequency; Hobbesian strategies of pure defection are the least robust. Our main theorems hold for a large class of games that pose diverse cooperation problems: prisoner's dilemma, chicken, stag hunt, and many others.