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Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Randolph M. Siverson  and
Michael R. Tennefoss
Randolph M. Siverson
Affiliation:
University of California, Davis
Michael R. Tennefoss
Affiliation:
University of California, Davis
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Extract

A considerable amount of the international politics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations. There are, however, divergent views of this linkage. One view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power, while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal. Research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects of alliances on power relationships and has tended to focus its attention upon the occurrence of wars. This research examines the individual and joint effects of power and alliance upon the probability of 256 conflicts to escalate to reciprocated military action. The main finding is that equality of power, supplemented by alliance with a major power for those nations that are weak, tends to restrain the likelihood that a conflict will escalate.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 78 , Issue 4 , December 1984 , pp. 1057 - 1069
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 0000

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