The overwhelming concensus of Fourth Amendment scholars is that the Supreme Court's sea and seizure cases are a mess. This article proposes that the confusion arises from the manner in which the cases were studied, not from the decisions themselves. A legal model with variables that me the prior justification of the search, the nature of the intrusion, and a few mitigating circumstance used to explain the Court's decisions on the reasonableness of a given search or seizure. The parameters are estimated through probit.

The results show that the search and seizure cases are much more ordered than had commonly been believed. Virtually all of the estimates are as expected. Additionally, the Court is shown to act favorably toward the federal government than toward the states. Preliminary analysis suggests the model has predictive as well as explanatory value.

This article presents a model of arms expenditures and arms accumulation for the Soviet Union and United States from 1952 through 1978. It argues that contemporary superpowers do not react solely to the military budgets of one another in assessing the potential threat against which they must allocate military resources, i.e., in deciding upon the military budget. Rather, they respond primary to the relative balance of strategic and conventional military forces. A continuous time model of this process is developed and estimated. If one examines only the budgets of these two nations, it would appear that no race is occurring; rather, the Soviets are simply increasing their arms expenditures irrespective of what the United States does. However, when one examines the relative stocks of military capabilities, it appears that the USSR is racing to catch up to the United States. Finally, the dynamics governing arms competition between the United States and the USSR appear to be undergoing marked change.

One contemporary method of reconciling the conflict in methodology between determinism and indeterminism is the notion of rational choice, which allows for both regularities in behavior and artistic creation. A detailed explanation of artistry within the rational choice context has not yet been developed, so this essay offers such an explanation in terms of the notion of heresthetics or the dynamic manipulation of the conditions of choice. The running example used throughout is the decision on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the method of selecting the president.

Our study of political participation in the Soviet Union, based on interviews with recent emigres, leads us to conclude that Soviet political culture is neither a “subject” nor a “subject-participant” one. There are meaningful forms of participation in the system, but they take place either outside the nominally participatory institutions, or within those institutions but in nonprescribed ways. The citizen may participate covertly, utilizing unsanctioned or blatantly illegal methods in attempts to influence policy implementation, not policymaking. The findings support the concept that traditional, prerevolutionary modes of citizen-state interactions are reinforced by the pattern of Soviet socioeconomic development and by a highly centralized and hierarchical administrative structure, itself a continuation of tsarist patterns. This study describes how different types of Soviet citizens try to influence policy implementation, and how they differentiate among the bureaucracies. Analysis of this activity leads us to reformulate our conception of Soviet political culture.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the theoretical understanding of African military coups d'etat. We begin by replicating a well-known model (Jackman, 1978) that purports to identify the structural determinants of coups d'etat within the states of Sub-Saharan Black Africa. When the research problem is changed slightly to focus exclusively on military coups, we find major weaknesses in the original Jackman model. We then extend and refine this model and thereby account in a theoretically meaningful fashion for 91% of the variation in military coups within 35 Black African states from 1960 through 1982. Our major substantive findings indicate that Black African states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics.

Italian cabinets (governi) fall from power in a seemingly haphazard pattern, thus defying most deterministic analyses of their durability. This analysis views Italian government longevity as essentially indeterminate, or stochastic, and it applies the theory of “political reliability” to explain the probability that an Italian government will be in power at time t after it was formed. An exponential survival model R = e−kt, with constant government breakdown rate k = .021 per week, is developed, estimated, tested, and discussed. It is shown that Italian governments have a half-life (τ) of approximately 32.8 weeks, after which their political reliability drops below .50, and their mean duration is 47.7 weeks, so the probability that an Italian government will survive as long as the average is only 36.8%. Theoretical aspects of the model are also discussed, together with characteristic features of exponential political reliability, such as lifetime density, political mortality, and government downfall rate, as well as the systems reliability and crisis process characteristic of Italian governments.

Recent research on House elections has focused on the decline in congressional competition since the mid-1960s. However, this body of research suffers from three major problems: 1) an imprecise specification of the nature of change in the degree of congressional competition, 2) its exclusive reliance on a limited time frame, which calls into question the generalizability and adequacy of its explanations, and 3) its overemphasis on incumbency-oriented explanations. Using a Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS) analysis of trends in aggregate electoral data from 1824 to 1980, we find that current low levels of congressional competition are not historically unique, but instead constitute a continuation of a long-term trend established in the mid-1890s. In addition, and in contrast to the general thrust described in the literature, there appears to be a post-1965 trend toward greater competition, although the absolute level of competition is lower after the mid-1960s. Finally, a disaggregation of electoral results by incumbency status suggests a growth in the incumbency advantage since the mid-1890s, but that lower post-1965 levels of congressional competition are the result of a winners' and not an incumbency, advantage. Such findings cast doubt on the adequacy of explanations that focus on post-1965, incumbency-oriented factors.

In the period from 1947 to 1976, the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in more than half the cases involving conflict with Supreme Court precedent or intercircuit conflict. In both instances, the denial rate has been higher in the Burger Court than in the Vinson and Warren Courts and denial has been greater for intercircuit conflict cases than for cases in which the ruling in the lower court was in conflict with one or more Supreme Court precedents. When conflict was conceptualized as a predictor of decision and examined along with federal government as petitioning party, economic issues, and civil liberty issues, it was found to have 4 to 7 times the predictive power of the other variables combined for the Vinson and Warren Courts. For the Burger Court, the petitioning party variable was found to be a better predictor than conflict, but conflict was a much better predictor than the subject variables. Discriminant function models using the four predictor variables were able to account for up to 36.9% of the variance in the Supreme Court's certiorari decisions, almost all of which was the result of the contributions made by the conflict and party factors.

Several of the earliest advocates of proportional representation upheld the “principle of free association”: that electors should be free to choose the constituencies to which they belong. This article analyzes this principle in game-theoretic terms and investigates how far the free association “game” can be simulated through proportional representation. It is assumed that each voter's prime concern is that his most-preferred candidate should be elected. If preferences are single peaked, the outcome of an election based on free association can be predicted; the same outcome would result from a modified form of the single transferable vote.

This article uses a variety of multilevel data collected from a nine-county study of felony courts to examine the joint effects of contextual and individual level (sociopolitical characteristics of decision workers) upon decisions made in face-to-face groups. The research finds that although the sociopolitical characteristics of decision makers (attitudes toward punishment, Machiavellianism, and operating styles) made a difference in the outcome of interactions, their role could not be accessed independent of the contextual factors surrounding the interactions. Some of the most important contextual factors were the kind of criminal case being handled, prosecutor office policies restricting discretion, and the configuration of attributes in the group handling the case. Although the data are wholly derived from the criminal court setting, the implications of the findings for studying decision making in other face-to-face groups are developed.

Research within the agenda-setting framework has generally ignored the potential influence of purposive efforts by external actors (those outside the political system) to manipulate media coverage related to their interests. The present study uses interrupted time-series analysis to examine one such set of manipulative efforts, those undertaken by professional public relations consultants to influence the images of foreign nations as portrayed in the United States press. Data represent New York Times coverage of six nations that signed public relations contracts with American firms during the period from 1974 to 1978, and one nation that expressly rejected such a contract. The analysis identifies consistent patterns of improvement along two primary dimensions of national image, visibility and valence, which are associated in time with the public relations contracts.

Reagan's view of how to deal with the Soviet Union is compared to the U. S. performance record in three Soviet-American crises: Berlin, 1948-1949, Berlin, 1961, andCuba, 1962. Reagan's public statements indicate that he views the Soviets as incorrigibly hostile, so that conflict bargaining with the Soviets is a zero-sum game requiring a coercive U.S. bargaining strategy. This is characterized as a “bullying” strategy and contrasted with a “reciprocating” approach. The two approaches provide competing hypotheses for an examination of Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts. The study tests the association between types of U.S. influence attempts and initial Soviet reactions and then proceeds to an interrupted time series analysis of the longer effects of U. S. threats of force on the mix of coercion-accommodation in Soviet crisis bargaining. The author finds a positive association between specific U.S. threats of force and initial Soviet responses in kind, and between carrot-and-stick inducements that use less specific threats and more accommodative Soviet responses. With the exception of the Cuban crisis, U.S. threats of force have not been associated with significant extended shifts in the level of Soviet hostility. The article concludes that, on balance, the performance record of the United States is more supportive of the efficacy of a reciprocating strategy than the coercive bargaining strategy implied by Reagan's beliefs.

This article examines the relationship between two variables: interpretations by members of Congress of the consequences of legislative proposals and the influence of those who advocate particular actions on the proposals. The article investigates how the legislative decisions of members depend on interpretations, how the arguments of advocates shape interpretations, and how the influence on interpretations translates into influence over patterns of congressional support expressed for a legislative proposal. The major thesis is that member interpretations and hence legislative influence are unstable, a result of basic features of human decision making in the congressional context. As a result, advocates are hypothesized to have considerable influence in maintaining and expanding the size of their congressional coalitions in some legislative situations, but not others. In particular, when faced with weakening amendments or motions, advocates are unable to prevent defections among their supporters. Evidence of the legislative influence of the National Education Association during the Ninety-fourth Congress is found to be consistent with these hypotheses.

The stability of the American two-party system is examined from 1866 until 1980. Following the approach of Stokes and Iversen (1962), restoring forces are posited for presidential elections, but restraining forces also are suggested for congressional elections, leading to an equilibrium between the two in elections to the House. Points of maximum restoration in presidential elections are derived using autocorrelations, and these points suggest a pattern of second-term Republican victories every 28 years beginning in 1872.

Equilibrium properties of the American two-party system lead to the twin criteria of representation and restraint in multiparty cabinet coalitions in order to achieve cabinet durabilities on the order of those found in two-party systems. Minimum entropy-minimum winning coalitions satisfy these criteria. Cabinet durabilities on the order of two-party systems can be achieved by means of a 44-55 percentage of the legislative seats won by the first party in a multiparty system.

This article develops a new statistical model of trade-offs among defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process. The Competing Aspiration Levels Model (CALM) builds on Crecine's (1971) “Great Identity” argument. Unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting, CALM explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense, nondefense, and total federal expenditures. CALM models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint. Statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the CALM formulation. Substantively, the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened, that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level, and that when a potential “fiscal surplus” has existed, the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector. In keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments, the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure “budgetary base” for both the defense and nondefense sectors. Both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists. The analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as Congress.

As the first comparative study of religious terror groups, the article provides detailed analyses of the different doctrines and methods of the three best-known groups: the Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots-Sicarii. Despite a primitive technology, each developed much more durable and destructive organizations than has any modern secular group.

The differences among the groups reflect the distinguishing characteristics of their respective originating religious communities: Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. The distinctive characteristics of religious terror are discussed, and relationships between religious and secular forms of terror are suggested.

In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs hypothesized that rational, utility-maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits from voting (as opposed to abstaining altogether) and then vote if this expected benefit exceeded voting cost. This hypothesis is logically derived from economic principles of rational behavior, but is counterintuitive: even if the utility increment is plausibly large, the probability of casting a pivotal, tie-breaking vote in any sizable polity is minute. Hence the expected benefit will be less than the time cost of voting, and no rational person will vote. Nevertheless, a number of statistical studies have found that voter turnout does respond to differences in the probability of casting a decisive vote, even though that probability may be small.

This article uses data gathered at the state level from the 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980 general elections to reestimate the relationship between voter turnout and the probable closeness of the election. Pooled data Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) regressions are used whenever preliminary tests indicate that such pooling is permissible. The empirical results suggest that the relationship between closeness and turnout is weak, unstable, or nonexistent in all of the models tested.

Approval voting is being promoted as “the election reform of the 20th century” (Brams, 1980, p. 105), and indeed if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities: it is uniquely strategy-proof, a candidate wins if and only if he is a Condorcet winner, and voters have simple strategies that are at once sincere and sophisticated. However, all of these results depend on the existence of dichotomous preferences, a contrived and empirically unlikely assumption. Here I show that these virtues of approval voting are replaced by some rather undesirable features under more plausible assumptions. More fundamentally, rather than promoting “honest” behavior, as is sometimes implied, the existence of multiple sincere strategies almost begs voters to behave strategically. I also examine sophisticated approval voting and show that in the general case it need not pick a Condorcet alternative. Ironically, there is a condition under which Condorcet winners may always be picked, but for this to occur, voters sometimes have to vote for candidates of whom they disapprove.

This article examines individual responsiveness to the media's changing political agenda during the years from 1964 to 1980. In the context of a dynamic model, the data indicate that responsiveness is positively associated with education, political interest, and a social motivation to attend to public affairs. A two-component model, in which heightened involvement increases individuals' exposure to information but also decreases their receptivity to the impact of the messages, is considered in a multivariate analysis. Although the results are only suggestive, the exposure function appears to operate for all three variables, whereas the inhibitions owing to the integration of previous information are evident only for political interest. Some speculations are offered about how these results may elaborate models of democratic public choice.

Interest group theory traditionally assumed that policies advocated by group representatives in some sense grow out of the interests or values of the group's members. Mancur Olson and others compelled important revisions in this assumption, but still left the process of interest advocacy to membership groups. It is contended here that institutions, such as corporations or local governments, occupy a dominant position with respect to interest representation in Washington, and this finding requires substantial revisions in both theoretical and descriptive formulations of the governmental process.