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An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Serena Guarnaschelli ,
Richard D. McKelvey  and
Thomas R. Palfrey
Serena Guarnaschelli
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Richard D. McKelvey
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Thomas R. Palfrey
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
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Abstract

We present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatment variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vote deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule: A large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contrary to Feddersen and Pesendorfer, in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium.

Type
Forum
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 94 , Issue 2 , June 2000 , pp. 407 - 423
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

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