International peacebuilding can improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. Although peacebuilding strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local roots of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist sustainable peace. One can conceive of these as the three dimensions of a triangle whose area is the “political space”—or effective capacity—for building peace. We test these propositions with an extensive data set of 124 post–World War II civil wars and find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference. UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war, and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending the violence. Our study provides broad guidelines for designing the appropriate peacebuilding strategy, given the mix of hostility, local capacities, and international capacities.

It is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as “path dependent.” The concept, however, is often employed without careful elaboration. This article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of “increasing returns.” Reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics, the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent, and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their causes and consequences. The investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.

Political science is two realms, the intellectual and the organizational, and the task is to consider how the organizational realm might be adapted to the highest improvement of the intellectual realm. Political science has a certain competence (domain) in the study of politics as the organization of power. It also seeks to expand competence as capability. Charles Merriam provides a point of departure Merriam's most successful idea has been that of enhancing competence through improvements in “the field of method.” Competence, however, now demands methodological flexibility, so as to probe more into the exercise of power. Four fields are strategic: public administration, political interests, urbanization, and the interpenetration of politics and economics. Competence also leads into unorthodox subjects, such as force and foolish, irrational, and pathological decision making (or “the Oxenstierna-Mullins Effect”). Finally, competence demands (and is enhanced by) the reach of political science into serious practical problems of human affairs.

We challenge the widely held view that classic American voluntary groups were tiny, local, and disconnected from government. Using newly collected data to develop a theoretically framed account, we show that membership associations emerged early in U.S. history and converged toward the institutional form of the representatively governed federation. This form enabled leaders and members to spread interconnected groups across an expanding nation. At the height of local proliferation, most voluntary groups were part of regional or national federations that mirrored the structure of U.S. government. Institutionalist theories suggest reasons for this parallelism, which belies the rigid dichotomy between state and civil society that informs much current discussion of civic engagement in the United States and elsewhere.

We address a well-known but infrequently discussed problem in the quantitative study of international conflict: Despite immense data collections, prestigious journals, and sophisticated analyses, empirical findings in the literature on international conflict are often unsatisfying. Many statistical results change from article to article and specification to specification. Accurate forecasts are nonexistent. In this article we offer a conjecture about one source of this problem: The causes of conflict, theorized to be important but often found to be small or ephemeral, are indeed tiny for the vast majority of dyads, but they are large, stable, and replicable wherever the ex ante probability of conflict is large. This simple idea has an unexpectedly rich array of observable implications, all consistent with the literature. We directly test our conjecture by formulating a statistical model that includes its critical features. Our approach, a version of a “neural network” model, uncovers some interesting structural features of international conflict and, as one evaluative measure, forecasts substantially better than any previous effort. Moreover, this improvement comes at little cost, and it is easy to evaluate whether the model is a statistical improvement over the simpler models commonly used.

Modern liberal states are founded on individual rights and popular sovereignty. These doctrines are conceptually and historically intertwined but are in theoretical and practical tension. Locke's political theory is a source for proponents of both doctrines, and the same tension that runs through modern liberal thought and practice can be found in his theory. Rather than define the state in terms of a single sovereign authority, Locke constructs a sovereignless commonwealth with several coexisting claimants to supreme authority. He rejects sovereignty as what unifies the state, and he wants to replace the discourse of sovereignty theory with a language of obligation that will help bind together the sovereignless state. This language permits its adherents to articulate the reasonable basis and limits of political power. An understanding of Locke's sovereignless state helps us better comprehend the tensions embodied in discourses about individual natural rights, popular sovereignty, and governmental authority heard in the liberal state.

I examine competing explanations for House rules changes with significant partisan overtones. I sought to identify all rules changes adopted from 1867 to 1998 that were intended either to advantage or to undermine the majority party and its leaders in their efforts to shape the House agenda. I test a majority party cartel model of institutional change against a model that focuses on the ideological balance of power on the floor, that is, on the closeness of the median voter to the median member of the majority and minority parties. I also evaluate the conditional party government approach. The data analysis suggests the preeminent importance of shifts in the ideological balance. Two variables identified by the conditional party government theory, party polarization and party capacity, obtain limited support, but their effect is neither as robust nor as large in magnitude as that of change in the median voter's position.

We use cluster analysis to develop a model of political change in the Levant as reflected in the World Event Interaction Survey coded event data generated from Reuters between 1979 and 1998. A new statistical algorithm that uses the correlation between dyadic behaviors at two times identifies clusters of political activity. The transition to a new cluster occurs when a point is closer in distance to subsequent points than to preceding ones. These clusters begin to “stretch” before breaking apart, which serves as an early warning indicator. The clusters correspond well with phases of political behavior identified a priori. A Monte Carlo analysis shows that the clustering and early warning measures are not random; they perform very differently in simulated data sets with similar statistical characteristics. Our study demonstrates that the statistical analysis of newswire reports can yield systematic early warning indicators, and it provides empirical support for the theoretical concept of distinct behavioral phases in political activity.

Many have suggested that the findings of social choice theory demonstrate that there can be no “will of the people.” This has subversive implications for our intuitive concept of self-government. I explore the relation between the notion of a “social will,” that of self-government, and the impossibility theorems of social choice theory. I conclude that although the concept of the social will is essential to that of self-government, the findings of social choice theory do not cast doubt upon the possibility of either. Unlike many attempts to respond to the threat posed by social choice theory, my argument does not require any appeal to the problematic notion of the common good.

Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance. One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely “enforcement” mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.

Voters have been coordinating their choices for president and House of Representatives in recent presidential election years, with each voter using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among voters, in which each voter has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level NES data from 1976–96 support coordination versus a model in which voters act nonstrategically to moderate policy. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixed-point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation voters have about the outcome in the theoretical equilibrium. The proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the House with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes. Moderation has usually been based on voters' expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the House in determining postelection policy.

The Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES) was created by President Alberto Fujimori in 1991 with the stated objectives of generating employment, alleviating poverty, and improving access to social services. This article uses province-level data on monthly expenditures, socioeconomic indicators, and electoral outcomes to analyze political influences on the timing and geographic distribution of FONCODES expenditures between 1991 and 1995. I reach three main conclusions. First, these expenditures increased significantly before national elections. Second, FONCODES projects were directed at provinces in which the marginal political effect of expenditures was likely to be largest. Third, these projects favored the poorest provinces, which suggests that the program also had a redistributive function. The results are robust to a large number of specifications and controls. The Peruvian data support predictions made in the literature on political business cycles as well as the literature on political influences on the allocation of discretionary funds.

Recent challenges to the modern secular state invite us to reexamine the arguments made by its theoretical founders, especially Hobbes. Hobbes argues that the desire for security is the most reliable and rational desire of our nature, and the state based on satisfying that desire is fully in harmony with human nature and therefore fully capable of solving the problem of anarchy. I will examine his argument that anarchy, although in some sense the natural human condition, can be overcome once and for all through political institutions that ensure the rational fear of death will control humans' destabilizing hopes and longings for immortality. I then turn to Thucydides, the classical thinker whom Hobbes admired most and who seems closest to Hobbes in outlook, and consider his more somber thesis: Because human hopes for immortality are more powerful than the fear of violent death, anarchy will return over and over again.

The Senate's equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics. The great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weight. As a result, even though all senators' votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal “price.” Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states. Building on formal models of coalition building, two hypotheses are developed and tested. First, coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently. Second, the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators. The hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997–98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs. The findings support both hypotheses.

Do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation? Statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation. Political decentralization, however, does appear to reduce change in countries' relative inflation rates over time. By creating additional veto players, federal structure may “lock in” existing patterns of monetary policy—whether inflationary or strict. Among the (mostly developed) countries that started with low inflation, inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states. Among the (mostly developing) countries that started with high inflation, inflation tended to increase faster in the federations. There is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country's degree of practical central bank independence—whether high or low—and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments.

Relatively little research has focused on whether countries' political institutions affect their international trade relations. We address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy. In a formal model of commercial policy, we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country-pairs (composed of an autocracy and a democracy). We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990. The results of this analysis accord with our argument: Democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs.