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Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2000

Walter R. Mebane Jr.
Walter R. Mebane Jr.*
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Abstract

Voters have been coordinating their choices for president and House of Representatives in recent presidential election years, with each voter using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among voters, in which each voter has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level NES data from 1976–96 support coordination versus a model in which voters act nonstrategically to moderate policy. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixed-point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation voters have about the outcome in the theoretical equilibrium. The proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the House with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes. Moderation has usually been based on voters' expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the House in determining postelection policy.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 94 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 37 - 57
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

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