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Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Daniel Diermeier
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
Randolph T. Stevenson
Affiliation:
Rice University

Abstract

We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strøm's noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches: (1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet's risks of being replaced without an intermediate election may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametric duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strøm model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternative, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability.

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Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

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References

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