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4024 results in Texts in political thought

Page 32 of 202

  • Chapter 2 - Making Sense of a Special Relationship

  • from PART I - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
  • Ho Ying Chan
  • Book:
    Special Relationship in the Malay World
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    13 August 2018, pp 11-56

  • Summary

    This chapter reveals that a special relationship between two states is founded on their two sources of closeness — that of the two states’ common identities and shared strategic interests. It subsequently discusses about the expressions of a special relationship. This chapter then brings to light the understanding that two states bound by common identities each needs to own a necessary amount of power before they could share a special relationship. After defining a security community, this chapter demonstrates that a special relationship and a pluralistic security community are basically different from each other, yet they are essentially interlinked — the two concepts each represents a relationship of common identities as well as power between two sovereign states. Finally, the chapter reveals that certain conditions need to be in place before a special relationship can transform into a pluralistic security community.

    THE CONCEPT OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

    The Coming About of the Conception of a Special Relationship

    The concept of a special relationship is generally being understood as a closer friendship between two states when compared to their other bilateral relations, where such a relationship is founded on the two states’ closely shared interests and their sentimental assertion of shared identities. The idea of a “special relationship” entered into the discussion of international relations when the term was coined by Winston Churchill in his “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. Churchill in his speech warned that permanent peace would not be achieved without “the fraternal association of the English Speaking People. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.”

    The notion of a special relationship between Britain and the United States was a century in the making, amid the ripening of their friendship since the late eighteenth century. The sense of closeness between the two states was naturally and consistently generated by their common identities, rooted in the two states’ shared culture, common language, historical ties and shared political values and institutions. In 1782, after it was reminded by Britain of the possibility of French pursuing deceptive tactics, the United States had decided to ignore its treaty with France, which obliged them not to make separate peace with other states.

  • Chapter 1 - Introduction

  • Ho Ying Chan
  • Book:
    Special Relationship in the Malay World
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    13 August 2018, pp 1-8

  • Summary

    The term “special relationship” has been used by many states to characterize a specific set of their bilateral ties with other states: for example, the ties between the United States and the United Kingdom; the United States and Canada; the United States and Israel; France and the Sub-Saharan African states; and Spain and the Latin American states. The meaning of a special relationship is centred on the term “special”. It usually means a quality that is exceptional in a positive sense. Consequently, a special relationship between two states is generally being understood as a close friendship.

    The concept of a special relationship remains under-defined and underconceptualized. A large part of the meaning of this concept has been introduced by politicians, which often entails sentimental expressions. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reiterated her understanding of the Anglo-American special relationship during her speech in Washington in 1985: “[i]t is Special. It just is. And that's that!” she asserted. Margaret Thatcher's assertion reflects politicians’ instinctive understanding of the concept of a special relationship. Such instinctive tendency contributes to the opacity of the concept. Feldman has pointed out that an obvious reason for the absence of a definition of a special relationship is “the brevity with which journalists are forced to write or with which politicians and government are obliged to speak”. Systematic disentangling of what has been said about a special relationship, therefore, is necessary in order to establish an understanding of the concept which best reflects its real meaning.

    The essence of a special relationship is reflected by its association with close friendship. As Aristotle had noted, “no one can have complete friendship with many people”. A friendship fundamentally means a relationship that is different from other relations. Friendships are commonly understood as “a relationship satisfying cognitive and emotional needs and characterized by reciprocity, trust, openness, honesty, acceptance, and loyalty”. In other words, a friendship is an intimate relationship that is “necessarily exclusive”.

    The intimate nature of a friendship means that friends depend on each other for creating “a stable sense of Self”, in which they constantly confirm and adapt their ideas of order. Berenskoetter has pointed out that throughout history, “friendships have been identified as being capable of both strengthening and undermining order”.

  • Chapter 3 - The Conceptual Foundations for a Special Relationship

  • from PART I - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
  • Ho Ying Chan
  • Book:
    Special Relationship in the Malay World
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    13 August 2018, pp 57-96

  • Summary

    A theory needs concepts to formulate its explanations. To develop a theoretical framework of a special relationship, this chapter seeks to outline the definitional concepts that constitute such relationships. Based on the review of literature in Chapter 2, this study defines a special relationship as follows:

    A special relationship exists between two states when two sources of closeness, that of the two states’ common identities and shared strategic interests, coexist in their relations.

    Common identities of two states are derived from their shared culture, common language, historical ties or shared political values and institutions. Common strategic interests of two states, on the other hand, mean the two states rely on each other's material presence for survival.

    Common identities of two states sharing a special relationship spawn their mutual sentimental expressions of closeness. The sentimental associations, combine with the two states’ mutual sense of closeness engendered by their common strategic interests, result in the two states sharing an understanding that their relationship is closer than their other bilateral ties. The shared understanding, in turn, stirs up the two states’ respective expectation that their relationship should be closer than their bilateral ties with others. Such an expectation leads to a higher intensity of interactions between the two states as compared with that of their other bilateral relations.

    The above definition brings to light the key conceptual components that constitute a special relationship: the concepts of power, identity and expectation. This chapter hence begins with the explanations of the three concepts.

    As this study looks at how a special relationship could evolve into a pluralistic security community, the defining feature of such a community, namely, dependable expectations of peaceful change, therefore also stands as one of the key conceptual components of a special relationship.

    The most obvious characteristic of a pluralistic security community is the absence of war among the states involved. As such, such a community is founded on the war avoidance norms shared by the states involved. States have to learn to avoid war between them before being able to renounce their defense gesture against each other. Viewed in this light, the concept of norms has to be among the key conceptual components of a special relationship.

Special Relationship in the Malay World
  • Indonesia and Malaysia
  • Ho Ying Chan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    13 August 2018
  • This book offers an illuminating account of how material and ideational dynamics shape the evolution of Malaysia–Indonesia relations. It addresses the circumstances, conditions and constraints that determine the double-edged effects of the culturally bound “special relationship”. The author argues that while their shared serumpun identities and strategic interests do give rise to a considerable closeness between Malaysia and Indonesia, the politics of power (im)balance have prevented the transformation of the special relationship into a “pluralistic security community”, as their egoistic understanding averts the formation of collective self.

  • 2 - Southeast Asia: From Trust Deficit to Strategic Trust

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 14-69

  • Summary

    Southeast Asia has been a region transformed.

    In 1967 the region was afflicted with wars and conflicts; tensions and instability; poverty and underdevelopment. Five decades since, while tensions and instability still permeate, and the battle against the scourge of poverty is yet to be completely won, the region is largely free from war and has made economic strides that are the envy of much of the world.

    Anchoring these developments has been a fundamental transformation in the nature and dynamics of relations among the countries of the region — the transformation of “trust deficit” to “strategic trust”.

    What have been some of the conditions conducive for such transformation? What has made this transformation possible? Are such conditions likely to persist over the next fifty years? Indeed, even if they do continue to exist, are such conditions still of relevance in the face of possible new types of challenges in the next fifty years? Will ASEAN's current strengths still be of relevance in the world of tomorrow? Of equal interest, has ASEAN simply been the manifestation, the embodiment and beneficiary of the positive transformation of Southeast Asia, or has ASEAN actually facilitated and made such transformation possible? Has ASEAN been a passive bystander or a determinant of the region's dynamics? Or, indeed, has it been both — ASEAN as peace dividend and facilitator for peace? In other words, while the birth of ASEAN itself was made possible due to initial and fragile dynamics towards positive change, ASEAN in turn helped to consolidate, nurture and accelerate these emerging positive dynamics. ASEAN helped turn what was probable to possible, and what was possible into reality.

    There is little doubt, however, that the fifty years of ASEAN's existence coincided with some of the most fundamental transformations in Southeast Asia's milieu — the conversion of trust deficit to strategic trust, and the conversion of a culture of war to a culture of peace.

    Prior to 1967, Southeast Asia had been a region marked by deep tensions, distrust and, indeed, open conflict. Prior to Western colonial rule, relations among the kingdoms and entities then existent in Southeast Asia were not entirely devoid of conflict. Such conditions, the divisions inherent in Southeast Asia and the complex diversities prevalent, provided optimum settings for their exploitation that enabled Western colonial rule to take hold.

  • Appendix 3 - Statement of Asean Foreign Ministers on Asean's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 239-240

  • Summary

    ASEAN Foreign Ministers reiterate and reaffirm the commitment of ASEAN Member States to:

  • the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002);

  • the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011);

  • the early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea;

  • the full respect of the universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);

  • the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and

  • the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    • The ASEAN Foreign Ministers resolve to intensify ASEAN consultations in the advancement of the above principles, consistent with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2008).

  • 5 - ASEAN: Wither or Prosper?

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 228-235

  • Summary

    Has ASEAN mattered? Without hesitation, I can say, absolutely. Without ASEAN the past five decades could have been witness to an entirely different experience for the countries of Southeast Asia.

    It would not have been too far-fetched to imagine the countries of Southeast Asia continuing to be enveloped by a deep sense of distrust and animosity, providing fuel for and sustaining the latent sources of conflict between them. It would not have been improbable for the countries of Southeast Asia to continue to be sharply divided along the interests of the extra-regional major powers — remaining as pawns in the proxy rivalries of non–Southeast Asian states. Indeed, Southeast Asia could have suffered the same fate as other regions afflicted by incessant conflict; namely, of economic regression and malaise, as well as the extensive neglect of human rights, good governance and democracy.

    While ASEAN's record over the past fifty years has not been without blemish, and there have been critical moments in the region's evolution when ASEAN has been felt to be “absent” — divided even — there is little doubt that ASEAN has made a difference; it has mattered. However, to remain of consequence over the next five decades, clearly a business-as-usual approach by ASEAN will not suffice.

    In the preceding chapters I have sought to make the case for ASEAN to recognize some of its likely future challenges and opportunities and, more importantly, to ensure that it is suitably equipped to manage and address these challenges, and to seize such opportunities. In my view — given, on the one hand, ASEAN's significant past achievements and, on the other, the constantly changing national, regional and global milieu — it is critical that ASEAN consolidates and secures aspects of its cooperation that have worked, adapt and adjust where necessary, and create and innovate where new forms of challenge and opportunities beckon.

    In other words, ASEAN must find equilibrium between the need for change and continuity. In a world marked by a dizzying pace of change, an ASEAN that relies simply on its past achievements would run the risk of irrelevance. Conversely, an ASEAN overly driven to change for the sake of change — to reinvent the wheel, so to speak — may find itself not necessarily strengthened as a result.

  • 4 - From State-centric to People-centred ASEAN

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 164-227

  • Summary

    ASEAN's transformative impact can be recognized in how it changed the dynamics of the region (chapter 2) by securing strategic trust among Southeast Asian countries that was previously absent, and by altering the dynamics of its relations with the rest of the world (chapter 3), asserting the centrality previously denied it. But the previous fifty years have also been significant in witnessing the promotion of the so-called “people-centred” ASEAN. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration and the 2007 ASEAN Charter, for instance, are a study in contrasts — reflecting ASEAN's evolution hitherto unforeseen. While the Bangkok Declaration made scant reference to “peoples”, it is a constantly recurring theme in the latter. Indeed, in marked contrast to the Bangkok Declaration, the 2007 ASEAN Charter begins: “WE THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)…”.

    Today, promoting a “people-centred” and “people-oriented” ASEAN has become as much a part of ASEAN lexicon as the so-called “ASEAN way” in describing intra-ASEAN relations and “ASEAN centrality” in depicting ASEAN's role in the wider region. A people-centred ASEAN may be viewed as a “process” and outcome. The former refers to the engagement of non-state stakeholders in determining policy priorities, policymaking and policy implementation; in other words, the development of peoples’ sense of participation in and ownership of ASEAN affairs. The latter, as an “outcome”, refers to the extent to which ASEAN has had an impact on its peoples at large. In short, is ASEAN making a difference in areas that matter to its peoples?

    People-centred ASEAN: It's Always the Economy

    Without doubt one of the clearest illustrations of ASEAN's transformative impact — its positive impact on the peoples of Southeast Asia at large — has been in the economic domain. The Southeast Asia of 1967 bears little resemblance to the one that prevails today — fifty years after ASEAN's inception.

    Some key indicators illustrate the magnitude of the transformation. ASEAN's combined estimated GDP (US$ at current prices) in 2016 stood at US$2.55 trillion (sixth largest in the world, or third in Asia, if it were a single economy), four times the level in 1999 when ASEAN 10 was achieved (US$ 576,519 billion) and in sharp contrast to the level in 1967 at US$22,542 billion. Meanwhile, its combined GDP per capita in 2016 stood at US$4,021, in contrast to figures in 1999 and 1967 of US$1,135 and US$122, respectively.

  • 3 - ASEAN and the Region: From Cold War Pawn to ASEAN Centrality

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 70-163

  • Summary

    The transformative impact of ASEAN to intra–Southeast Asia relations over the past fifty years has been matched by ASEAN's contribution to altering the dynamics of Southeast Asian countries’ relations with countries beyond the region. Concurrent with, a sine qua non perhaps, the changing dynamics in intra–Southeast Asia relations, relations between Southeast Asian countries and countries outside the region have also been fundamentally transformed.

    If the period prior to ASEAN was marked by a Southeast Asia sharply divided along Cold War lines — of individual Southeast Asian countries essentially succumbing to East–West rivalries — then fifty years of ASEAN saw those very same countries playing a central role in framing the region's affairs. Indeed, five decades of ASEAN have seen the setting of norms and principles on the nature of major powers’ engagement in the region; of an ASEAN being in the “driving seat” in shaping the region's political, diplomatic and economic architecture. The terms ASEAN centrality and ASEAN in the driving seat have become deeply ingrained in the region's lexicon. As a matter of fact, over different periods during the past fifty years, ASEAN-led forums and processes have often provided the only venues for certain competing non-ASEAN powers to gather. This has certainly been the case as far as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are concerned (in the ASEAN context, the so-called “Plus Three” countries).

    Such a transformation did not occur overnight. And, as far as Indonesia is concerned, did not occur fortuitously. Instead, it has been the culmination of a continued and deliberate process — it has been policy outcomes.

    As argued above, prior to ASEAN 10, the countries of Southeast Asia were divided as much due to their varied political systems and histories as their diverse foreign policy orientations. These ranged from countries actively aligned with the “West” or the “East” to those pursuing a stance of active “nonalignment” — indeed, essentially, of isolation. In fact it was precisely such a diverse array of foreign policy orientations that made Southeast Asia such fertile ground for East–West proxy conflict for much of the Cold War.

  • Introduction

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 1-5

  • Summary

    Does ASEAN Matter?

    The world that greeted the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) upon its formation in 19671 differs sharply from the one that prevails today — fifty years after ASEAN's inception. And, more likely than not, the world in the next fifty years will bear little resemblance to the one which is current.

    Indeed, for the future, as it is sometimes said, the only certainty is uncertainty itself. Change is permanent.

    This book is about the present and future relevance of ASEAN. It is about ASEAN's quest for security and prosperity in a region marked by complex dynamics of power. Namely, the interplay of relations and interests among countries — large and small — which provide the settings within which ASEAN must deliver on its much-cited leadership and centrality in the region.

    How can ASEAN build upon its past contributions to the peace, security and prosperity of Southeast Asia, to the wider East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific regions? More fundamentally, and a sine qua non, how can ASEAN continue to ensure that peace, security and prosperity prevail in its own region: Southeast Asia? And, equally central, how can ASEAN become more relevant to the peoples of ASEAN, such that its contributions can be genuinely felt in making better the lives of its citizens?

    Will ASEAN Continue to be Relevant in Facing Future Challenges and Opportunities?

    The milieu within which ASEAN finds itself as it commemorates fifty years of its existence is certainly a radically complex one, marked by at least two overriding qualities: connectivity and change.

    More than ever, ASEAN confronts an interconnected world in which the delineation between local, national, regional and global issues is increasingly blurred. It is facing a milieu in which economic, political and social issues increasingly converge. It is navigating a world in which the indivisibility of peace, security and prosperity holds a greater truth than ever.

    Yet, recent developments suggest that the apparent reality of an interconnected world does not necessarily translate into a world with a greater sense of unity of purpose and cohesion. While the past fifty years have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of formal interstate institutions and organizations, regional and global alike, all committed to manage, facilitate and, even, promote global and regional cooperation, signs of unrest and dissatisfaction currently abound.

Does ASEAN Matter?
  • A View from Within
  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018
  • Written by the highly regarded diplomat Marty Natalegawa, former ambassador and foreign minister of Indonesia, this book offers a unique insider-perspective on the present and future relevance of ASEAN. It is about ASEAN's quest for security and prosperity in a region marked by complex dynamics of power. Namely, the interplay of relations and interests among countries — large and small — which provide the settings within which ASEAN must deliver on its much-cited leadership and centrality in the region. The book seeks to answer the following questions: How can ASEAN build upon its past contributions to the peace, security and prosperity of Southeast Asia, to the wider East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific regions? More fundamentally and a sine qua non, how can ASEAN continue to ensure that peace, security and prosperity prevail in Southeast Asia? And, equally central, how can ASEAN become more relevant to the peoples of ASEAN, such that its contributions can be genuinely felt in making better the lives of its citizens?

Page 32 of 202