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3476 results in UN and International Organisations

Page 93 of 174

  • 6 - Grinding Away

  • Christopher S. Chivvis
  • Book:
    Toppling Qaddafi
    Published online:
    05 June 2014
    Print publication:
    16 December 2013, pp 123-146

  • Summary

    As NATO operations entered their second month, the standoff between the regime and rebels west of Benghazi had not budged, and the suffering of the population of Misrata had become the focal point of the war. Qaddafi’s forces were still shelling the city with heavy weapons, including self-propelled artillery, Grad rockets, and cluster bombs fired from 120-millimeter mortars. These cluster bombs killed indiscriminately, and often left behind unexploded yet still lethal “bomblets” that threatened the civilian population even after the shelling had stopped. The civilian death toll mounted.

    Continued pressure from NATO bombing and the heroic efforts of the cities’ urban revolutionaries finally yielded some progress by mid-May, pushing regime forces to retreat away from the port back to the town center. On May 14, rebel kata’ib pushed even further, taking the airport and some of the suburbs from which the regime had been shelling the city. From then on, rebels would hold their positions despite continued bombardment. Humanitarian aid flows would increase, and life would slowly start returning to the city.

Toppling Qaddafi
  • Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention
  • Christopher S. Chivvis
  • Published online:
    05 June 2014
    Print publication:
    16 December 2013
  • Toppling Qaddafi is a carefully researched, highly readable look at the role of the United States and NATO in Libya's war of liberation and its lessons for future military interventions. Based on extensive interviews within the US government, this book recounts the story of how the United States and its European allies went to war against Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, why they won the war, and what the implications for NATO, Europe, and Libya will be. This was a war that few saw coming, and many worried would go badly awry, but in the end the Qaddafi regime fell and a new era in Libya's history dawned. Whether this is the kind of intervention that can be repeated, however, remains an open question - as does Libya's future and that of its neighbors.

  • 4 - Crippling Qaddafi and Infighting over NATO

  • Christopher S. Chivvis
  • Book:
    Toppling Qaddafi
    Published online:
    05 June 2014
    Print publication:
    16 December 2013, pp 69-95

  • Summary

    Leaders from countries supporting the intervention gathered in Paris on March 19, two days after the UN resolution. Over the course of a few short days, the United States and its key allies had committed themselves to war with Qaddafi. Even when the president had told Ambassador Rice to push for a stronger Security Council mandate earlier in the week, it had still been uncertain what the outcome would be. But with the resolution behind them and Qaddafi’s forces at the outskirts of Benghazi, leaders faced immediate pressure for swift military action. The Paris meeting emphasized the leading role France was playing. President Obama had sent Secretary Clinton in stead of himself, to underscore the lesser role of the United States. Meanwhile, in Washington, Secretary Gates delayed a previously scheduled trip to Russia to oversee the initial strikes.

    At the request of the State Department, initial military operations were held back until the Paris meeting concluded, to avoid the appearance that military operations had trumped political aims. The delay was not long, however. Sarkozy walked out of the meeting and announced that French Rafale fighter jets (Figure 4.1) had just struck Qaddafi’s forces in Benghazi. Few other leaders were abreast of the French operation, and it looked like a thinly veiled attempt by Sarkozy to boost his domestic approval ratings at the expense of transparency and allied coordination. In response, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi warned that Italy might deny the use of critical Italian bases. According to at least one European diplomat, the move “nearly broke up the coalition.” This was only the beginning of the problem, however. Over the course of the next two weeks, allied tensions peaked as leaders struggled to define the mission and figure out how it was going to work.

  • 8 - The Impact of the War and Its Implications

  • Christopher S. Chivvis
  • Book:
    Toppling Qaddafi
    Published online:
    05 June 2014
    Print publication:
    16 December 2013, pp 169-206

  • Summary

    Libya after Qaddafi

    Free of Qaddafi and with the war now over, the people of Libya rejoiced. Public services were gradually restored in most areas, and oil production recovered fairly quickly to near prewar levels. Uncertainty about the future nevertheless hung in the air. More than a million Libyans remained abroad in neighboring Tunisia or Egypt, unable – or fearful – to return. Libya was about to begin a long and difficult process of reconciliation with its past. It would do so under trying circumstances. The end of the Qaddafi regime was ultimately just an opening toward a richer and more meaningful kind of freedom that might allow Libya’s new citizens to go about their lives with less fear and greater dignity. Realizing this future would be a major task. The NTC struggled to get its footing and suffered from continued apprehension about its basic legitimacy to govern, in no small part because so many of its members were either exiles with little connection to Libya or early defectors who only a year earlier had been regime loyalists. The NTC had been the face of the revolution to the outside world, but it was Libya’s new government only by default. A new, more representative government of the people, however, would have to await elections and these would take several months to prepare.

    Weak and fearful of alienating the population, the NTC proceeded with great caution on all fronts. This was not helpful, given the vast number of reconstruction and state-building tasks that loomed ahead. Initial hopes for rapid change began to fade in the face of Libya’s daunting, though hardly uncommon, postconflict challenges. The spontaneous emergence of a myriad of small civil-society organizations across the country to deal with a range of problems offered some reason for optimism, but Libya had no formal institutions to work with. Qaddafi left behind a hollow state whose administrative and governing institutions barely functioned before the war, and were now half emptied of functionaries fearing retribution for ever having been part of that state.

  • 23 - Drafting and final clauses

  • Anthony Aust, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book:
    Modern Treaty Law and Practice
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    24 October 2013, pp 363-390

  • Summary

    The party of the first part shall be known in this contract as ‘the party of the first part’…the party of the second part shall be known in this contract as ‘the party of the second part’.

    Although from an uproarious film, the quote is a useful reminder that lawyers are not always that good at drafting. The Greece–Republic of Macedonia Agreement 1995 refers to the parties only as ‘the Party of the First Part’ and ‘the Party of the Second Part’. This was because Greece (which has a province called Macedonia) objects to the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’. The full title is the Marx Brothers' formulation, and was therefore an imaginative way of breaking the impasse. When in a ticklish spot, such is the resourcefulness of the drafter.

    This chapter will therefore describe the way in which treaties, and to some extent MOUs, should be drafted, and what is good practice and what is not. It ends with some drafting tips. The views are inevitably subjective, though all are based on practical experience, including having to grapple with some thoroughly badly drafted treaties.

  • 17 - Invalidity

  • Anthony Aust, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book:
    Modern Treaty Law and Practice
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    24 October 2013, pp 273-282

  • Summary

    Groucho: That's what they call a sanity clause. Chico: You can't fool me; there ain't no Sanity Claus.

    McNair devoted thirty-one pages to invalidity, even though he found little diplomatic or judicial (though abundant academic) authority on, for example, duress. The Convention devotes nine main articles on invalidity (Articles 46–53 and 64), even though the subject is of no importance for the day-to-day work of a foreign ministry. Over more than fifty-five years of practice, the author can recall only one suggestion that an existing treaty might be invalid. The International Law Commission was well aware that invalidity was a rarity, there being a natural presumption that a treaty is valid; its continuance in force being the normal state of things. Nevertheless, because of its assumed intellectual attraction, books continue to devote much space to the topic. What follows is therefore a short account, in which we can also step back in time.

    Violation of internal law on competence to conclude treaties

    Article 46 is probably the only provision on invalidity that may have some practical importance. The need for certainty in treaty relations is clearly reflected in its wording:

  • A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.

  • A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

    • The provision is expressed in negative form (‘may not invoke … unless’) to emphasise the exceptional character of the cases in which this ground might be invoked. The other emphasised words stress the difficulty of successfully invoking the rule. There are a number of procedures in treaty making, such as ratification, that have been specifically designed to enable a state to reflect fully before deciding whether or not to become a party, and to comply with any constitutional requirements. States are entitled to regard other states as having acted in good faith when their representatives express their consent to be bound.

  • Appendix J - General full powers for permanent representative to the United Nations

  • Anthony Aust, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book:
    Modern Treaty Law and Practice
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    24 October 2013, pp 432-432

  • Summary

    Her Excellency, Ms [full names], is hereby granted full powers to sign on behalf of the Government of, subject if necessary to ratification, any treaty or other instrument deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and any notification related thereto.

    In witness whereof, I [full names], [President, Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs] have signed these presents.

    Signed [and sealed] at[ ], this day of 200[ ]

  • 18 - The depositary

  • Anthony Aust, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book:
    Modern Treaty Law and Practice
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    24 October 2013, pp 283-296

  • Summary

    Neither a borrower nor a lender be.

    Had Shakespeare only taken a closer interest in treaty procedures, he would surely have had Polonius add: ‘nor a depositary be’. This chapter will attempt to demystify the role of the depositary. Although not of much concern to others, and little appreciated, the exacting and onerous duties of a depositary are vital to the effective functioning of any multilateral treaty. Yet not all states, or even some international organisations, that act as depositaries are fully aware of their responsibilities or how they should be carried out. Their work can be made more difficult by simple lack of knowledge of the proper procedures.

    The term ‘depositary’ means a person to whom something is entrusted. Even when used in the context of a treaty it is sometimes wrongly spelt with an ‘o’ (depository), which means a storehouse, often for household furniture and the like.

    Bilateral treaties

    A bilateral treaty is usually signed in duplicate, so that each of the contracting states keeps one signed original. In the most exceptional case of a bilateral treaty having only one original text, the contracting states would have to decide which of them should keep it. Alternatively, they could deposit it with a third state or an international organisation. The depositary would then provide both states with a copy certified to be true and accurate. Apart from that, there should be little more for the depositary of a bilateral treaty to do. But the depositary of a multilateral treaty often hasmuch to do, in addition, of course, to registering it with the United Nations once it has entered into force.

  • 16 - Duration and termination

  • Anthony Aust, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book:
    Modern Treaty Law and Practice
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    24 October 2013, pp 245-272

  • Summary

    En toute chose il faut considérer la fin.

    The length of this chapter demonstrates that this is an important topic, though it is often neglected. Consideration of the duration and termination of a new treaty should not be left until the end of negotiations. Not only may the necessary provisions raise difficult technical questions, but they can also raise sensitive policy issues which should be discussed earlier rather than later in the negotiations. But, first, a note on terminology:

    Denunciation denotes a unilateral act by which a party terminates its participation in a treaty; lawful denunciation of a bilateral treaty terminates it. Although denunciation is also used in relation to a multilateral treaty, the better term is withdrawal, since withdrawal from a multilateral treaty will not, normally, result in its termination. While ‘denunciation’ is used in relation to treaties as a technical term, non-lawyers may see it as carrying undertones of its ordinary, condemnatory meaning. For this reason it should be avoided, if at all possible, ‘termination’ being a much better word.

    Part V of the Convention, Articles 42–45 and 54–64, set out the various circumstances in which a treaty can be denounced, terminated or its operation suspended, other than on grounds of invalidity (for which see, the much shorter, Chapter 17). Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a party claiming that it is not bound by the treaty has the onus of establishing this. To be effective, denunciation, termination or suspension may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty itself or Article 42(2). These days, most treaties contain provisions on duration and termination, often in the same article. But when there are none, one must consider not only the relevant article in Part V, but other articles in that Part which govern the conditions for applying the article, such as Articles 65–68 concerning the procedure to be followed. Certain other articles of the Convention may also be relevant, for example, Article 5, if the treaty is the constituent instrument of an international organisation.

Page 93 of 174