Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  • Cited by 104
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2016
Print publication year:
2016
Online ISBN:
9781316415832

Book description

Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter.

Awards

Co-Winner, 2017 ILAW Book Award, International Law Section, International Studies Association

Runner-up, 2016 Chadwick Alger Prize, International Organization Section, International Studies Association

Reviews

‘International lawyers (and students of international governance) take note: this book is one of the most significant contributions yet from the growing interaction of international relations and international law. Barbara Koremenos shows how states carefully design and apply the technical provisions of treaties - from duration to monitoring to precision - to address incentives, constraints and actor characteristics. An analytical tour de force, the book sheds new light on legalized cooperation.'

Kenneth W. Abbott - Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Arizona State University

‘The Continent of International Law is an insightful and thought-provoking analysis of treaty design. Koremenos illuminates the rich diversity of international agreements, shining light on procedural clauses often buried in the back of treaties that many scholars, government officials and lawyers overlook. The book's theoretical contributions are as important as the extensive empirical data it presents. A tour de force of rational design scholarship.'

Laurence R. Helfer - Harry R. Chadwick, Sr, Professor of Law, Duke University, North Carolina

‘The Continent of International Law brilliantly generates empirical generalizations about the design of international agreements, demonstrating that a functional, or rational design, theory explains institutional design remarkably well.'

Robert O. Keohane - Princeton University, New Jersey

‘Barbara Koremenos demonstrates the surprising reach and variation of international law and shows the extent to which the provisions of agreements reflect rational institutional design. International law is indeed a continent that we can clearly map using the tools of modern social science.'

Stephen D. Krasner - Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University, California

‘This is one of the most systematic rationalist accounts ever of the cooperative dilemmas states face and the legal structures they create to resolve them. Koremenos's book is a triumph of argumentation and evidence that will spark debate across the disciplines of international law and international relations. Brava, Barbara!'

Beth Simmons - Harvard University, Massachusetts

'Koremenos … offers an important addition to the literature. The core of the text draws on a unique new data set (COIL) derived from a random sample of all international agreements submitted to the UN. This data allows Koremenos to test a series of hypotheses connected to the rational design of institutions by states … The text is one of the first to move beyond case studies in examining international agreements and organizations. In doing so, it is one of the first to allow making broad generalizations across all organizations and agreements … Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty.'

K. Buterbaugh Source: Choice

'The book contains many elements which in one way or the other can be used for the analysis of international law pertaining to both polar regions. … The Continent of International Law should indeed be an inherent part of the analysis of polar legal design, contributing to the understanding of polar legal dynamics and actor behavior.'

Nikolas Sellheim Source: Polar Record

‘Koremenos’ book does a great job in bringing a sense of purpose back into public international law and balancing some of the premises pertaining to anarchy and state-centredness - present in disciplines such as international relations - and the fact that treaties do matter and are drafted with the intention of being functional. Also, providing a detailed empirically grounded explanation of various treaty strategies and provisions, this book can easily serve as a manual for diplomats actually involved in the drafting process. As a result, the book has a very broad appeal, since it is likely to offer valuable insights for students of public international law, researchers and practitioners alike. Koremenos’ clear and accessible writing style clearly does the topic justice for that broad audience while simultaneously reinforcing her commitment to break the previously hermetic mould of the discipline.’

Ignas Kalpokas - LCC International University, Lithuania and Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
×

Contents

References
Abbott, Kenneth W. 1989. “Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers.” Yale Journal of International Law 14: 335–411.
Abbott, Kenneth W. 1993. “Trust but Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements.” Cornell International Law Journal 26 (1): 1–58.
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Snidal, Duncan. 1998. “Why States Act through Formal Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 3–32.
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Snidal, Duncan. 2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” International Organization 54 (3): 421–456.
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Snidal, Duncan. 2013. “Law, Legalization and Politics: An Agenda for the Next Generation of IR-IL Scholars.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abbott, Kenneth W., Keohane, Robert O., Moravcsik, Andrew, Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Snidal, Duncan. 2000. “The Concept of Legalization.” International Organization 54 (3): 401–419.
Allee, Todd, and Peinhardt, Clint. 2010. “Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (1): 1–26.
Alston, Philip, and Crawford, James. 2000. The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alter, Karen J. 2013. “The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L., and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alter, Karen J. 2014. The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Altonji, Joseph, Elder, Todd, and Taber, Christopher. 2005. “Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (1): 151–184.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven, New York/London: J. Wiley/Chapman & Hall.
Aust, Anthony. 1986. “The Theory and Practice of Informal International Agreements.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35 (4): 787–812.
Avant, Deborah D., Finnemore, Martha, and Sell, Susan K., eds. 2010. Who Governs The Globe?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Axelrod, Robert, and Keohane, Robert O.. 1985. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.” World Politics 38: 226–254.
Baccini, Leonardo. 2010. “Explaining Formation and Design of EU Trade Agreements: The Role of Transparency and Flexibility.” European Union Politics 11 (2): 195–217.
Bailey, Michael, Strezhnev, Anton, and Voeten, Erik. “Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Forthcoming. Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330913 [Last accessed June 13, 2015].
Baldwin, Edward, Kantor, Mark, and Nolan, Michael. 2006. “Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards.” Journal of International Arbitration 23 (1): 1–24.
Barceló, John J. III. 2009. “Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Cornell International Law Journal 42 (23): 23–43.
Barry, Brian. 1980. “Is it Better to be Powerful or Lucky? Part 2.” Political Studies 28 (3): 338–352.
Bates, Robert. 1997. Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bederman, David J. 2010. International Law Frameworks. Concepts and Insights Series., rd ed. New York: Foundation Press.
Bednar, Jenna. 2011. “The Political Science of Federalism.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 7: 269–288.
Bednar, Jenna. 2014. “Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Federal Systems.” In NOMOS LV: Federalism and Subsidiarity, eds. Fleming, J.E., and Levy, J.. New York: New York University Press.
Bennett, D. Scott, and Stam, Allan. 2000. “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” International Interactions 26: 179–204.
Berman, Paul Schiff. 2006. “Review Essay: ‘Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law’.” Review of The Limits of International Law by Goldsmith, Jack and Posner, Eric. Texas Law Review 84 (5): 1265–1306.
Bernheim, Douglas B., and Whinston, Michael D.. 1990. “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior.” The Rand Journal of Economics 21 (1): 1–26.
Betz, Timm, and Koremenos, Barbara. 2016. “Monitoring Provisions in International Agreements.” In Oxford Handbook on International Organizations, eds. Cogan, Jacob, Hurd, Ian, and Johnstone, Ian. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bilder, Richard. 1963. “The International Coffee Agreement: A Case History in Negotiation.” Law and Contemporary Problems 28 (2): 328–391.
Blake, Daniel J. 2013. “Thinking Ahead: Government Time Horizons and the Legalization of International Investment Agreements.” International Organizations 67 (4): 797–827.
Blake, Daniel J., and Payton, Autumn Lockwood. 2014. “Balancing Design Objectives: Analyzing New Data on Voting Rules in Intergovernmental Organizations.” Review of International Organizations September 2014: 1–26.
Bodansky, Daniel. 1999. “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law.” American Journal of International Law 93 (3): 596–624.
Bodansky, Daniel. 2013. “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L., and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge University Press.
Börzel, Tanja A., and Risse, Thomas. 2012. “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction.” West European Politics 35 (1):1–19.
Bradley, Curtis A., and Goldsmith, Jack L.. 2000. “Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent.” Pennsylvania Law Review 149 (2): 399–468.
Brewster, Rachel. 2006. “Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law.” Virginia Law Review 92 (2): 251–288.
Brunnée, Jutta, and Toope, Stephen J.. 2010. Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brunnée, Jutta, and Toope, Stephen J.. 2011. “Interactional International Law: An Introduction.” International Theory, 3 (2): 307–318.
Buchanan, Allen, and Keohane, Robert O.. 2006. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” Ethics and International Affairs 20 (4): 405–447.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph M., and Morrow, James D.. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Smith, Alastair. 2007. “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(2): 251–284.
Busch, Marc L. 2000. “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (4): 425–446.
Busch, Marc L., and Reinhardt, Eric. 2003. “Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement.” Journal of World Trade 37 (4): 719–735.
Calvert, Randall. 1995. “Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions.” In Explaining Social Institutions, eds. Knight, Jack and Sened, Itai. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Charnovitz, Steve. 2001. “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” American Journal of International Law 95 (4): 792–832.
Charnovitz, Steve. 2009. “The Enforcement of WTO Judgements.” Yale Journal of International Law 34 (2): 558–566.
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia Handler. 1993. “On Compliance.” International Organization 47 (2): 175–205.
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia Handler. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chayes, Antonia Handler, Chayes, Abram, and Mitchell, Ronald B.. 1995. “Active Compliance Management in Environmental Treaties.” In Sustainable Development and International Law, ed. Lang, Winfried. London: Graham and Trotman Ltd.
Choi, Susan. 1995. “Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID and New York Conventions.” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 28 (1): 175–216.
Christakis, Théodore. 2006. “Dénonciation ou retrait dans le cas d'un traité ne contenant pas de dispositions relatives à l'extinction, à la dénonciation ou au retrait – Commentaire de l'article 56 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités.” In Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traités: Commentaire article par article, eds. Corten, Olivier and Klein, Pierre. Bruxelles: Ed. Bruylant.
Cogan, Jacob Katz. 2009. “Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution and its Critics.” American Journal of International Law 103 (2): 209–263.
Cohen, Cynthia Price. 1989. “United Nations: Convention on the Rights of the Child.” International Legal Materials 28 (6): 1448–1476.
Cole, Wade M. 2005. “Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966–1999.” American Sociological Review 70 (3): 472–495.
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Robert W., and Jacobson, Harold Karan. 1973. The Anatomy of Influence; Decision Making In International Organization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. “Information Systems in Treaty Regimes.” World Politics 54 (4): 405–436.
Danilenko, Gennady M. 1989. “Outer Space and the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process.” Berkley Technology Law Journal 4 (2): 217–247.
De Bruyne, Charlotte, and Fischhendler, Itay. 2013. “Negotiating Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for Transboundary Water Treaties: A Transaction Cost Approach.” Global Environmental Change 23 (6): 1841–1851.
De Klemm, Cyrille, and Shine, Clare. 1993. “Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law: Legal Mechanisms for Conserving Species and Ecosystems.” IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 29. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge.
Dixon, William J. 1994. “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.” American Political Science Review 88 (March): 14–32.
Donnelly, Jack. 1986. “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis.” International Organization 40 (3): 599–642.
Donnelly, Jack. 2003. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, nd Edition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Donnelly, Jack. 2008. “The Ethics of Realism.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Law, eds. Reus-Smit, Christian and Snidal, Duncan. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dorn, Walter, and Fulton, Andrew. 1997. “Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, Sticks, and the Case of North Korea.” Global Governance 3 (1): 17–40.
Downs, George W., and Rocke, David M.. 1990. Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Downs, George W., and Rocke, David M.. 1995. Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., and Barsoom, Peter N.. 1996. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?International Organization 50 (3): 379–406.
Downs, George W., and Jones, Michael A.. 2002. “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31 (1): 95–114.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” International Organization 57 (3): 643–659.
Duffield, John S. 2003. “The Limits of ‘Rational Design.’International Organization 57 (2): 411–430.
Dunoff, Jeffrey L., and Pollack, Mark A.. 2013. “International Law and International Relations: Introducing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Edwards, Richard W. Jr. 1989. “Reservations to Treaties.” Michigan Journal of International Law 10 (2): 362–405.
Ehrlich, Isaac, and Posner, Richard A.. 1974. “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking.” The Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1): 257–286.
Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. “Respect for Human Rights has Improved over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability.” American Political Science Review 108 (2): 297–318.
Farrell, Joseph, and Gibbons, Robert. 1989. “Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1): 221–237.
Fearon, James D. 1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” International Organization 52 (2): 269–305.
Finnemore, Martha, and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917.
Franck, Thomas M. 1990. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David, and Maskin, Eric. 1994. “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.” Econometrica 62 (5): 997–1039.
Garvey, Jack I. 1995. “Trade Law and Quality of Life–Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment.” American Journal of International Law 89 (2):439–453.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2009. International Military Alliances, 1648–2008. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Gibler, Douglas, and Sarkees, Meredith Reid. 2004. “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816–2000.” Journal of Peace Research 41 (2): 211–222.
Giegerich, Thomas. 2012. “Article 56. Denunciation of or Withdrawal from a Treaty Containing No Provision Regarding Termination, Denunciation or Withdrawal.” In Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, eds. Dörr, Oliver, and Schmalenbach, Kirsten. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Glendon, Mary Ann. 2001. A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York, NY: Random House.
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Posner, Eric A.. 1999. “A Theory of Customary International Law.” The University of Chicago Law Review 66 (4): 1113–1177.
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Posner, Eric A.. 2005. The Limits of International Law. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Goldstein, Judith L., Kahler, Miles, Keohane, Robert O., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie, eds. 2000a. “Legalization and World Politics.” International Organization 54 (3).
Goldstein, Judith L., Kahler, Miles, Keohane, Robert O., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie, eds. 2000b. “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics.” International Organization 54 (3): 385–399.
Goldstein, Judith L., and Martin, Lisa. 2000. “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note.” International Organization 54 (3): 603–632.
Goodman, Ryan. 2002. “Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent.” American Journal of International Law 96 (3): 531–560.
Grando, Michelle T. 2006. “Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes. A Critical Analysis.” Journal of International Economic Law 9 (3): 615–656.
Green, Jessica F. 2013. Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Greenhill, Brian, Ward, Michael D., and Sacks, Audrey. 2011. “The Separation Plot: A New Visual Method for Evaluating the Fit of Binary Models.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (4): 990–1002.
Grinspun, Ricardo, and Kreklewich, Robert. 1999. “Institutions, Power Relations and Unequal Integration in the Americas: NAFTA as Deficient Institutionality.” In Economic Integration in NAFTA and the EU, eds. Appendini, Kirsten and Bislev, Sven. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Guzman, Andrew T. 2006. “The Promise of International Law. Review of ‘The Limits of International Law’ by Goldsmith, Jack and Posner, Eric.” Virginia Law Review 92 (3): 533–564.
Guzman, Andrew T. 2008. How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Guzman, Andrew T., and Meyer, Timothy L.. 2010. “International Soft Law.” Journal of Legal Analysis 2 (1): 171–225.
Guzman, Andrew T., and Simmons, Beth A.. 2002. “To Settle Or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31 (1): 205–235.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Helfer, Laurence R., and Fariss, Christopher J.. 2011. “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties.” International Organization 65 (4): 673–707.
Haftel, Yoram Z. 2012. Regional Economic Institutions and Conflict Mitigation. Design, Implementation, and the Promise of Peace. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Available at https://muse.jhu.edu/ [Last accessed June 13, 2015].
Haftel, Yoram Z., and Thompson, Alexander. 2013. “Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” International Organization 67 (2): 355–387.
Hanmer, Michael J., and Kalkan, Kerem Ozan. 2013. “Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models.” American Journal of Political Science 57 (1): 263–277.
Hansen, Holley E., Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Nemeth, Stephen C.. 2008. “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (2): 295–325.
Hanson, Arthur J. 2011. “Trilateral Environment and Sustainable Development.” International Journal 66 (2): 313–331.
Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by the Johns Hopkins University Press.
Harrison, John. 2005. “Uniformity, Diversity, and the Process of Making Human Rights Norms.” University of St. Thomas Law Journal 3 (2): 334–344.
Hathaway, Oona. 2003. “The Cost of Commitment.” Stanford Law Review 55 (5): 1821–1826.
Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L., and Tierney, Michael J., eds. 2006. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2002. “Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes.” Columbia Law Review 102 (7): 1832–1911.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2005. “Exiting Treaties.” Virginia Law Review 91 (7): 1579–1648.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2006. “Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design.” Yale Journal of International Law 31 (2): 367–382.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2008. “Redesigning the European Court Of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime.” European Journal of International Law 19 (1): 125–159.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2013. “Flexibility in International Agreements.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Helfer, Laurence R., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1997. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” The Yale Law Journal 107 (2): 273–391.
Henkin, Louis. 1979. How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Columbia University Press.
Henkin, Louis. 1995a. International Law: Politics and ValuesDordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Henkin, Louis. 1995b. “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker.” American Journal of International Law 89 (2): 341–350.
Hill, Daniel W. 2010. “Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior.” The Journal of Politics 72 (4): 1161–1174.
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Marks, Gary. 2014. “Delegation and Pooling In International Organizations.” The Review of International Organizations 10 (3): 305–328.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Vega-Cánovas, Gustavo. 2003. “Whither NAFTA: A Common Frontier?” In The Rebordering of North America, eds. Andreas, Peter and Biersteker, Thomas J.. New York: Routlege.
Hurd, Ian. 1999. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” International Organization 53 (2): 379–408.
Huth, Paul K., Croco, Sarah E., and Appel, Benjamin J.. 2011. “Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945.” American Political Science Review 105 (2): 415–436.
Jackson, John H. 1978. “The Jurisprudence of International Trade.” American Journal of International Law 72 (4): 747–781.
Jackson, John H. 1992. “Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis.” American Journal of International Law 86 (2): 310–340.
Jensen, Lloyd. 1974. Return From The Nuclear Brink: National Interest and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Johnson, Harry G. 1972The International Monetary System and The Rule Of Law.” The Journal of Law and Economics 15: 277–292.
Jonas, Susanne. 1988. “Contradictions of Guatemala's ‘Political Opening’.” Latin American Perspective 1 (3): 26–46.
Jonas, Susanne. 2000. “Democratization Through Peace: The Difficult Case of Guatemala.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42 (4): 9–38.
Jupille, Joseph, Mattli, Walter, and Snidal, Duncan. 2013. Institutional Choice and Global Commerce. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kaiser, Karl 1978The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements.” Foreign Policy 30 (1): 83–110.
Katzenstein, Peter, and Sil, Rudra. 2008. “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Reus-Smit, Christian, and Snidal, Duncan. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kaufman, Natalie Hevener. 1990. Human Rights Treaties and The Senate: A History Of Opposition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Kennan, George F. 1951. American Diplomacy, 1900–1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396.
Keohane, Robert O., Moravcsik, Andrew, and Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2000. “Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational.” International Organization 54 (3): 457–488.
Kleine, Mareike. 2013. “Knowing Your Limits: Informal Governance and Judgment in the EU.” The Review of International Organizations 8 (2): 245–264.
Koh, Harold Hongju. 1997. “Why do Nations Obey International Law?The Yale Law Journal 106: 2599–2659.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2001. “Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility.” International Organization 55 (2): 289–325.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2002. “Can Cooperation Survive Changes in Bargaining Power? The Case of Coffee.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31 (S1): 259–283.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. “Contracting Around International Uncertainty.” American Political Science Review 99 (4): 549–565.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2007. “If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?The Journal of Legal Studies 36 (1): 189–212.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2008. “When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?Law and Contemporary Problems 17 (1): 151–192.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2013a. “The Continent of International Law.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (4): 653–680.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2013b. “Institutionalism and International Law.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2013c. “What's Left Out and Why? Informal Provisions in Formal International Law.” The Review of International Organizations 8 (2): 137–162.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2015. “The Role of State Leadership in the Incidence of International Governance.” Global Policy 6 (3): 237–246.
Koremenos, Barbara, and Betz, Timm. 2013. “The Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Agreements.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan, eds. 2001a. International Organization, Special Issue: The Rational Design of International Institutions 55 (4).
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan, eds. 2001b. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” International Organization, Special Issue: The Rational Design of International Institutions 55 (4): 761–799.
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan, eds. 2001c. “Looking Back to Move Forward.” International Organization, Special Issue: The Rational Design of International Institutions 55 (4): 1051–1082.
Koremenos, Barbara, and Nau, Allison. 2010. “Exit, no Exit.” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 21 (1): 81–120.
Koremenos, Barbara, and Snidal, Duncan. 2003. “Moving Forward, One Step at a Time.” International Organization 57 (2): 431–444.
Kramish, Arnold. 1963. The Peaceful Atom on Foreign Policy. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Harper & Row.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1973. “Business-Government Relations: The Case of the International Coffee Agreement.” International Organization 27 (4): 495–516.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier.” World Politics 43 (April): 336–366.
Kreps, David M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Krisch, Nico. 2005. “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order.” European Journal of International Law 16 (3): 369–408.
Kucik, Jeffrey, and Reinhardt, Eric. 2008. “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime.” International Organization 62 (3): 477–505.
Kunz, Josef L. 1939. “The Problem of Revision in International Law.” American Journal of International Law 33 (1): 33–55.
Lai, Brian, and Reiter, Dan. 2000. “Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816–1992.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (2): 203–227.
Lake, David A. 2002. “Progress in International Relations: Beyond Paradigms in the Study of International Institutions.” In Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies, eds. Brecher, Michael and Harvey, Frank P.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lake, David A. 2010. “Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (3): 587–613.
Lamare, James W. 1987. “International Conflict ANZUS and New Zealand Public Opinion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (3): 420–437.
Leeds, Brett, Ritter, Jeffrey, Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Long, Andrew. 2002. “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions.” International Interactions 28 (3): 237–260.
Lipson, Charles. 1984. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” World Politics 37 (October): 1–23.
Lipson, Charles. 1991. “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?International Organization 45 (4): 495–538.
Llamzon, Aloysius. P. 2007. “Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice.” European Journal of International Law 18 (5): 815–852.
Mace, Gordon, and Bélanger, Louis. 2004. “What Institutional Design for North America?” In Free Trade in the Americas: Economic and Political Issues for Governments and Firms (New Horizons in International Business Series), eds. Weintraub, Sidney, Rugman, Alan M., and Boyd, Gavin. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Martin, Lisa. 1992. “Interests, Power and Multilateralism.” International Organization. 46: 765–792.
Martin, Lisa. 2013. “Against Compliance.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mattli, Walter, and Seddon, Jack. 2015. “New Organizational Leadership: Nonstate Actors in Global Economic Governance.” Global Policy 6 (3). Forthcoming.
McGinnis, Michael D. 1986. “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30 (1): 141–170.
McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–482.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19 (3): 5–49.
Miles, Thomas J., and Posner, Eric A.. 2008. “Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why?” University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 420; University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 225. Available at SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1211177 [Last accessed June 24, 2015].
Milgrom, Paul R., North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2: 1–23.
Mitchell, Ronald B. 1998. “Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes.” International Studies Quarterly 42 (1): 109–130.
Mitchell, Ronald B., and Keilbach, Patricia M.. 2001. “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange.” International Organization 55 (4): 891–917.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Powell, Emilia Justyna. 2011. Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions And International Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe.” International Organization 54 (2): 217–252.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2008. “The New Liberalism.” In Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Reus-Smit, Christian and Snidal, Duncan. New York: Oxford University Press.
Morrow, James D. 1994. “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information.” International Organization 48 (3): 387–423.
Morrow, James D. 2007. “When do States Follow the Laws of War?American Political Science Review 101 (3): 559–572.
Morse, Julia C., and Keohane, Robert O.. 2014. “Contested Multilateralism.” The Review of International Organizations 9 (4): 385–412.
Neumayer, Eric. 2007. “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties.” The Journal of Legal Studies 36 (2): 397–429.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. [1887] 1967. The Will to Power. Ed. Kaufmann, Walter. New York: Random House.
Norman, George, and Trachtman, Joel P.. 2005. “The Customary International Law Game.” American Journal of International Law 99 (3): 541–580.
Nye, Joseph S. 1981. “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime.” International Organization 35 (1): 15–38.
Oates, Wallace E. 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.” Journal of Economic Literature 37 (3): 1120–1149.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Oneal, John R., and Russett, Bruce M.. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985.” International Studies Quarterly 41 (June): 267–293.
Organski, A.F.K. 1958. World Politics. New York: Knopf.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oye, Kenneth A. 1986. “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies.” In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Kenneth A.. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pahre, Robert. 1994. “Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (2): 326–352.
Palmer, Glenn, D'Orazio, Vito, Kenwick, Michael, and Lane, Matthew. 2015. “The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. Forthcoming.
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2001. “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?American Journal of International Law 95 (3): 535–578.
Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2009. “Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (2): 349–368.
Pelc, Krzysztof J., and Urpelainen, Johannes. 2015. “When Do International Economic Agreements Allow Countries To Pay To Breach?The Review of International Organizations 10 (2): 231–264.
Pellet, Alain, and Müller, Daniel. 2011. “Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Not an Absolute Evil …” In From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma, eds. Fastenrath, Ulrich et al. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pevehouse, Jon, Nordstrom, Timothy, and Warnke, Kevin. 2004. “The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2): 101–119.
Poast, Paul. 2012. “Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945.” International Organization 66 (2): 277–310.
Poast, Paul. 2013; 2012. “Can Issue Linkage Improve Treaty Credibility?: Buffer State Alliances as a “Hard Case.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (5): 739–764.
Posner, Eric A., and Yoo, John C.. 2005. “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals.” California Law Review 93 (1): 1–74.
Powell, Emilia Justyna. 2013. “Islamic Law States and the International Court Of Justice.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (2): 203–217.
Pregelj, Vladimir N. 2005. “The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey” CRS Report for Congress. Available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-545.pdf [Last accessed December 5, 2015]
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42 (3): 427–460.
Raiffa, Howard. 1982. The Art and Science of Negotiating. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. 2005. “Review of the Limits of International Law by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner.” Ethics and International Affairs 19 (3): 106–109.
Raustiala, Kal. 2005. “Form and Substance in International Agreements.” American Journal of International Law 99 (3): 581–614.
Raustiala, Kal. 2006. “Refining the Limits of International Law.” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 34 (2): 423–444.
Redick, John R. 1981. “The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America.” International Organization 35 (1): 103–134.
Reynolds, Glenn Harlan. 1995. “The Moon Treaty: Prospects for the Future.” Space Policy 11 (2): 115–120.
Riker, William H. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74 (2): 432–446.
Risse, Thomas, and Ropp, Stephen C.. 1999. “International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change.” In The Power of Human Rights, eds. Risse, Thomas, Ropp, Stephen C., and Sikkink, Kathryn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosand, Eric. 2003. “Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism.” American Journal of International Law 97 (2): 333–341.
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Milner, Helen V.. 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions.” International Organization 55 (4): 829–857.
Sartori, Anne E. 2003. “An Estimator for some Binary-Outcome Selection Models without Exclusion Restrictions.” Political Analysis 11 (2): 111–138.
Schabas, William A. 1997. “Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.” William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 3 (1): 79–112.
Schachter, Oscar. 1977. “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements.” American Journal of International Law 71 (2): 296–304.
Schloemann, Hannes L., and Ohlhoff, Stefan. 1999. “‘Constitutionalization’ and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence.” American Journal of International Law 93 (2): 424–451.
Schwartz, Warren F., and Sykes, Alan O.. 2002. “The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31 (1): S179–S204.
Scott, Robert. E., and Stephan, Paul B.. [2006] 2011. The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sebenius, James K. 1983. “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties.” International Organization 37 (2): 281–316.
Selznick, Philip. 1949. TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Shaffer, Gregory C., and Pollack, Mark A.. 2010. “Hard v. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance.” Minnesota Law Review 94 (3): 706–799.
Sheffer, Megan Wells. 2011. “Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights?Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 39 (3): 483–521.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1986. “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions.” In Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Weisberg, Herbert. New York: Agathon Press.
Simma, Bruno. 1994. “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law.” In Recueil des Cours (Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law). Vol. 250. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law and Domestic Politics. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Simmons, Beth A. 2010. “Treaty Compliance and Violation.” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (1): 273–296.
Simmons, Beth A., and Hopkins, Daniel J.. 2005. “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods.” American Political Science Review 99 (4): 623–631.
Slaughter Burley, Anne-Marie. 1993. “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda.” American Journal of International Law 87 (2): 205–239.
Smith, James McCall. 2000. “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.” International Organization 54 (1): 137–180.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes.” American Political Science Review 79 (4): 923–942.
Snyder, Scott. 2000. “The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization: Implications for Northeast Asian Regional Security Co-operation?North Pacific Policy Paper 3: 1–34.
Stein, Arthur A. 1982. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.” International Organization 36 (2): 299–324.
Stein, Arthur A. 2008. “Neoliberal Institutionalism.” In Oxford Handbook on International Relations, eds. Reus-Smit, Christian and Snidal, Duncan. New York: Oxford University Press.
Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. “In the Shadow of Law or Power?International Organization 56 (2): 339–374.
Steinberg, Richard H. 2013. “Wanted: Dead or Alive – Realist Approaches to International Law.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stone, Randall W. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stone Sweet, Alec, and Brunell, Thomas L.. 1998. “Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community.” American Political Science Review 92 (1): 63–81.
Swaine, Edward T. 2006. “Reserving.” Yale Journal of International Law 31 (2): 307–366.
Swenson-Wright, John. 2005. Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945–1960. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Sykes, Alan O. 1991. “Protectionism as a ‘Safeguard’: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ‘Escape Clause’ with Normative Speculations.” The University of Chicago Law Review 58 (1): 255–305.
Szasz, Paul, ed., 1999. Administrative and Expert Monitoring of International Treaties. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.
Szasz, Paul, ed., 2002. “The Security Council Starts Legislating.” American Journal of International Law 96 (4): 901–905.
Tallberg, Jonas, Sommerer, Thomas, Squatrito, Theresa, and Jönsson, Christer. 2013. The Opening Up Of International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tan, Morse. 2005. “Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.” International Journal of Legal Information 33 (3): 319–344.
Thompson, Alexander. 2009. “The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma.” International Theory 1 (2):307–321.
Thompson, Alexander, and Verdier, Daniel. 2014. “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design.” International Studies Quarterly 58 (1): 15–28.
Tierney, Michael J. 2008. “Delegation Success and Policy Failure: Collective Delegation and the Search for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Law and Contemporary Problems 71 (2): 283–331.
Tollison, Robert E., and Willett, Thomas D.. 1979. “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations.” International Organization 33 (4): 425–449.
Tow, William, and Albinski, Henry. 2002. “ANZUS – Alive and Well After Fifty Years.” Australian Journal of Politics & History 48 (2): 153–173.
Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games: Rational Choice In Comparative Politics. Berkley: University of California Press.
Vabulas, Felicity. 2013. “Enhancing Monitoring and Enforcement in IGOs: When and Why States Grant Consultative Status to NGOs.” Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Chicago.
Vabulas, Felicity, and Snidal, Duncan. 2013. “Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements.” The Review of International Organizations 8 (2):193–220.
van Aaken, Anne. 2014. “Smart Flexibility Clauses in International Investment Treaties and Sustainable Development: A Functional View.” Journal of World Investment and Trade 15: 827–861.
Verdier, Daniel. 2008. “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime.” International Organization 62 (3): 439–476.
Verdier, Pierre-Hugues, and Voeten, Erik. 2015. “How Does Customary International Law Change? The Case of State Immunity.” International Studies Quarterly 59 (2): 209–222.
Victor, David G., Raustiala, Kal, and Skolnikoff, Eugene B.. 1998. The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice. Laxenburg, Austria: Cambridge, MA: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; MIT Press.
Voeten, Erik. 2012. “Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly.” Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111149 [Last accessed June 14, 2015]
von Stein, Jana. 2013. “The Engines of Compliance.” In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace, Michael, and David Singer, J.. 1970. “Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964.” International Organization 24 (2): 239–287.
Walt, Stephen M. 1999. “Rigor Or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies.” International Security 23 (4): 5–48.
Welsh, Susan B. 1995. “Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.” The Nonproliferation Review 2 (3): 1–24.
Wendt, Alexander. 2001. “Looking in the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Rational Design.” International Organization, Special Issue: The Rational Design of International Institutions 55 (4): 1019–1049.
Wilson, Robert R. 1934. “Revision Clauses in Treaties since the World War.” American Political Science Review 28 (5): 901–909.
Winter, Eyal. 1996. “Voting and Vetoing.” American Political Science Review 90 (4): 813–823.
Wit, Joel. 1999. “Viewpoint: the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization: Achievements and Challenges.” The Nonproliferation Review 6 (2): 59–69.
Wotipka, Christine Min, and Ramirez, Francisco O.. 2008. “World Society and Human Rights: an Event History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” In The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy, eds. Simmons, Beth A., Dobbin, Frank and Garrett, Geoffrey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, Oran R. 1991. “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society.” International Organization 45 (3): 281–308.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.