Supporters of Justificatory Liberalism (JL) maintain that the state may not coerce its citizens on matters of constitutional essentials unless it can provide public justification that the coerced citizens would be unreasonable in rejecting. According to John Rawls, constitutional essentials include “basic rights and liberties,” such as “[l]iberty of conscience and freedom of association, and the political rights of freedom of speech, voting, and running for office [,which] are characterized in more or less the same manner in all free regimes.” Moreover, because citizens, including religious citizens, have an evidential set – sources of authority, background beliefs and reasons – not shared by their neighbors, they should restrain from employing those sources as the basis for the reasons why they enact laws that limit a constitutionally essential liberty of their fellow citizens who do not share those sources of authority. For this reason, Rawls writes that constitutional essentials are “the special subject of public reason.” As Gerald Gaus puts it: “Imposition on others requires justification; unjustified impositions are unjust … The basic idea is that freedom to live one's own life as one chooses is the benchmark or presumption; departures from that condition – where you demand that another live her life according to your judgments – require additional justification.