The political and legal disputes over embryonic stem cell research, cloning, and abortion are some of the most contentious in public life. But, as I noted in both the introduction and Chapter 2, the question that any resolution to these disputes must address – when does a human being become a subject of moral concern? – is sometimes assessed in a way that suggests that the prolife answer to this question – that a human being is a moral subject from conception or soon thereafter – is a religious one and thus not a deliverance of rational argument. In this chapter I show that this is a mistake, and that its advocates seem to confuse a position that is tightly tethered to a theological tradition with a position incapable of being supported by rational argument. Why they make this mistake is unclear, although I suspect that it has more to do with commonly held, although rarely questioned, beliefs about the positions held by religious citizens rather than a charitable and careful assessment of the actual grounds on which the religious citizens hold the positions they do.