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Chapter 2 - Socratic desire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Naomi Reshotko
Affiliation:
University of Denver
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Summary

Informal discussions of human motivation typically start with several common assumptions that are generally considered uncontroversial: while we often want what is best for us and for others, there are also times when we want things that are bad for others and (or) for ourselves. In fact, our desires for bad things often compete with our desires for good things, and the former often overcome the latter. There are bad people – evil ones even. They are bad because their desire to do what's bad almost always wins out over their desire to do what's good. They seek to harm others as a way of benefiting themselves. The most dangerous are those who are very knowledgeable. Smart but evil people are far more effective in harming others than are the ignorant and foolish ones. Even if we focus on good people (people who want to be good and benefit themselves and others), we find that many of them allow their desires for the bad to overwhelm their desires for the good. Weakness of will is a major reason why even good people often do bad things. One of the major problems with the world is that most people usually think about themselves and what is good for them, personally, when they act. The world would be a better place if, rather than focusing on our own self-interest, we were to focus on what is good for others.

Type
Chapter
Information
Socratic Virtue
Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad
, pp. 21 - 56
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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  • Socratic desire
  • Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver
  • Book: Socratic Virtue
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482601.003
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  • Socratic desire
  • Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver
  • Book: Socratic Virtue
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482601.003
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Socratic desire
  • Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver
  • Book: Socratic Virtue
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482601.003
Available formats
×