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Preface

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Naomi Reshotko
Affiliation:
University of Denver
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Summary

I was born with an appetite for metaphysics and action theory, but my taste for ethics has been slow to develop. I am uncomfortable (and often frustrated) with the initial steps taken in ethical theory. The foundations of ethical theory can be understood as forcing a choice between two horns of a dilemma: either we embrace relativism, or we acknowledge the existence of universal ethical principles. Both of these horns are problematic. The difficulties of ethical relativism have been understood at least since Plato's Euthyphro: ethical relativism does not allow us to ask why any particular culture or person exhibits a particular ethical practice. The only explanation that can be offered for why a practice has been adopted is that its practitioners believe it is correct. But relativism does not invite us to give a philosophical answer to the interesting and important questions about why any particular person or culture believes a particular practice is correct. On the other hand, if there are universal ethical principles, we are equally at a loss to explain why these principles exist and not others. We can no more say why these principles govern ethics than we can say why these laws of physics govern the physical world. In neither case can we uncover a reason to invest in a given set of moral principles or a particular ethical practice. Why are we supposed to adhere to a particular ethical system and entreat others to do so?

Type
Chapter
Information
Socratic Virtue
Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad
, pp. ix - xii
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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  • Preface
  • Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver
  • Book: Socratic Virtue
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482601.001
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  • Preface
  • Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver
  • Book: Socratic Virtue
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482601.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Preface
  • Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver
  • Book: Socratic Virtue
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482601.001
Available formats
×