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5 - Imagining

Anthony Hatzimoysis
Affiliation:
University of Athens
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Summary

As I look at a horse coming slowly towards me I am presented, in experience, with that elegant animal. Yet seeing something face to face is not the only way for it to appear to us. I may look at a black and white pho-tograph of a horse by the sea, observe Whistler's vivid painting, dream that I am edging ahead at the Grand National, or simply visualize a stallion with its thick hair caressed by the light wind. Looking at pictures, having a dream or just imagining something are all phenomena too ordinary for any theory of human experience to attempt to analyse. A proper analysis of such phenomena, though, encounters a serious puzzle: how is it possible that we are presented with something that is not physically present?

Several philosophers have outlined a story of how to deal with that perplexing aspect of human experience. They usually approach the phenomena as deliverances of a supposedly peculiar faculty whose role is to populate one's consciousness with immaterial entities we call images. Imagination is thus conceived as a failed perception, a weak or defective attempt to launch into reality, that effectively locks oneself inside one's mind. This approach treats perception and imagination on a par, rendering the former a particularly vivid version of the latter, turning the sharp distinction between looking at something, and visualizing it, into a dubious difference of degree.

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Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2011

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  • Imagining
  • Anthony Hatzimoysis, University of Athens
  • Book: The Philosophy of Sartre
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653713.006
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  • Imagining
  • Anthony Hatzimoysis, University of Athens
  • Book: The Philosophy of Sartre
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653713.006
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Imagining
  • Anthony Hatzimoysis, University of Athens
  • Book: The Philosophy of Sartre
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653713.006
Available formats
×