Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (hereafter, the Sketch) has acquired classic status as an original analysis of emotional phenomena, yet its exact position in the philosophical debate over the nature of emotions is hard to determine. It is often argued that Sartre conceives of emotions as actions, but, given the implausibility of such a conception, his sketch can be rescued only by showing that what it outlines is not a general theory of emotion, but an analysis of emotional behaviour (see Barnes 1997; Neu 2000; Solomon 2003).

We shall see in this chapter that the standard line of interpretation is incorrect. Sartre draws a theoretical outline, whose subject matter is emotion in general, rather than only a particular aspect of it. His theory is immune to the main criticisms directed against it, since – selective readings to the contrary – it denies that emotions are actions. Most importantly, the value of his approach lies not so much in the defence of a particular camp in the current debates, as in the attempt to redefine what it is we do when we offer a philosophical account of emotions.

The analysis of these issues requires a clear grasp of the Sartrean conception of psychological states. I shall, accordingly, begin with a brief account of the Sartrean view of those states, followed by a presentation of the Sartrean critique of some classic theories of emotion, which will then take us to the analysis of the reasoning behind the claim that emotions are ways of apprehending the world (STE 35–6).