Common sense indicates to many that bankers probably rank quite high among would-be superiors of the Federal Reserve. They control money, organization, information, and expertise. This view is reinforced by several analysts who have suggested that bankers are indeed a very important reference group for the Federal Reserve. This perspective is held by analysts from different ends of the ideological spectrum, who see two kinds of problems that result. The first problem, one that interests principally liberal analysts, is that the System's relationship with bankers may restrict and bias the policy process further in the direction of elite values. Thus, with respect to goals for general policy targets such as inflation and employment, this relationship might reduce further the likelihood that the Federal Reserve would regard employment as the most important objective.

The second set of problems, which have been of more concern for relatively conservative analysts, has to do with the ability of bankers to shape policy at a technical level. In this case, analysts fear that bankers' short-term policy preferences make it less likely that policy makers will achieve control over the money supply – which is viewed as essential to effective anti-inflation policy. Not surprisingly, the conservatives have exactly the opposite fear of the liberals. The conservatives fear that bankers' influence will produce more inflation, not more unemployment.