In this work, I examine the political relationships between the Federal Reserve System and the president, Congress, bankers, and economists, and inquire about the consequences of those relationships for the behavior of the Federal Reserve. Of the many previous works on the Federal Reserve with which I am familiar, none examines the Federal Reserve System's external political relationships so extensively. As it is, this work is limited in coverage both in time (approximately 1965–82) and in scope (only domestic monetary policy), and there is no attempt here to spell out a full policy model. In short, although the topic of this book could scarcely be called narrow, much remains to be studied. I am convinced that this kind of study is a necessary first step toward a more complete view of the Federal Reserve because the institution is so much influenced by its political environment. Indeed, on reflection, it is surprising that this field has not already been more thoroughly plowed. In any case, it is my hope that this analysis will contribute to a fuller understanding of this institution, which has such a large role in determining our economic well-being.