Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-dnltx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-18T06:07:26.126Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Appendix A - Detailed Examples of Decision Strategies in Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2012

Richard R. Lau
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
David P. Redlawsk
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
Get access

Summary

This appendix follows the efforts of a hypothetical voter Ralph as he negotiates a choice between three candidates in an election for governor of New Jersey. For convenience, we will set up a static information board that lists the three candidates across the top and eight attributes down the side. The structure of the board is shown in Figure A.1. Ralph's job is to determine which candidate he supports based on the information he has at hand about the candidates.

COMPENSATORY STRATEGIES

Model 1: Rational Choice

Weighted Additive and Expected Utility Strategies. The Weighted Additive Rule (WAdd) and the Expected Utility Rule (EU) are both formal variants of rational choice, and are thus often considered normative standards in the behavioral decision theory literature. They suggest that decision makers evaluate each alternative according to the utilities of all relevant attributes or outcomes associated with it, form an overall evaluation of each alternative, and then choose the most highly evaluated one. The two approaches differ in that the Weighted Additive Rule assumes that decision makers further consider the relative importance of each attribute to the decision at hand, whereas the Expected Utility Rule assumes that decision makers consider the probability that each outcome will occur. Hence, they both involve great cognitive complexity. Of course, there is no reason a hybrid strategy could not consider both differential importance weights and differential probabilities, although this would involve yet another magnitude of complexity.

Type
Chapter
Information
How Voters Decide
Information Processing in Election Campaigns
, pp. 265 - 278
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×