Several authors have recently challenged the adequacy of social cognition and attribution theory for the analysis of explanations. Critics propose the modification or the entire replacement of the attribution-oriented approach in social cognition. A central issue in these evaluations is the conceptual distinction between reasons and causes; authors have queried how, or indeed whether, attribution theories and related models can deal with both of these types of explanation (Buss, 1978; Locke and Pennington, 1982; Shotter, 1981a, 1984). A second issue is the question of whether the analytic mode of reasoning described by several attribution theories captures the imputations and rationalizations characterizing explanations in everyday life. Critics concerned with this issue argue for a more functional model that emphasizes self-presentation and related functions of explanations and discourse in general (Harré, 1981a, b; Michael, 1989; Neisser, 1980; Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

Frequently these issues are not discussed in isolation, but are linked to proposals for replacing the attribution approach with an ethogenic, hermeneutic or discourse analysis framework (Gergen, 1980, 1982; Harré, 1981a, b; Michael, 1989; Shotter, 1981a, b; 1984). Critics also suggest that conventional approaches to explanations have been selected and retained more as a consequence of ethnocentric and ideological influences than scientific or theoretical merit.